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Abstract: 
The optimal farm size and organizational form of agriculture is a widely discussed topic with 
little consensus as to which organizational form would be optimal under certain 
circumstances. There is often confusion as to what constitutes a corporate farm as well as a 
family farm, with the size of the farm often used as a distinguishing factor. This should 
however not be the case as there are many extremely large farms that are owner-operated 
within South Africa. The distinguishing factor should rather revolve around the management 
structures of these farms. It is these management structures that would seem to limit the 
metamorphosis of owner-operated farms into large corporate structures. 
 
This thesis uses an analysis of both technical and allocative efficiency in determining the 
organizational form chosen within agriculture. It is shown in the thesis that farm size 
determines or improves the technical efficiency and this is brought about by the farms ability 
to stay abreast with the technological times by having “economies of size” to their advantage. 
The evolution of farm size would therefore seem to be driven by this need to obtain 
“economies of size” so as to be able to earn comparable wages to off-farm activities. The 
attainment of this technical efficiency however does not seem to be linked to the 
organizational structure of the farm; it is rather dependant of the size of the farm. 
 
While the size of the farm is an important factor in achieving technical efficiency it is not as 
important in determining allocative efficiency, with various studies arguing that larger farms 
are less allocatively efficient than smaller farms. This reduced allocative efficiency seems to 
stem from various transaction costs and principle agent issues within the corporate setting 
that are not prevalent in the owner-operated farms. This is because in the owner-operated 
settings the family are the residual claimants to profit, which suggests that they do not have 
the incentive to shirk. The opposite is true for the corporate setting where the model is 
fraught with moral hazard and other issues of the principle-agent nature, which would seem 
to raise the transaction costs of this organizational form, and this has negative implications 
for the allocative efficiency with which these farms operate at. 
 
This thesis therefore uses data obtained from such a corporate farm, where the owners of the 
farms are kept on as farm managers and the company makes all the production decisions. 
This thesis argues that it is these agency issues and transaction costs that hamper this 
organizational form while it is shown that the technical efficiency for these farms are high 
suggesting that economies of size are important in determining the technical efficiency of 
these farms.   
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Opsomming: 
Die optimale plaasgrootte en organisasievorm in die landbou is ’n onderwerp wat al baie 
aandag in die literatuur ontvang het, maar waar daar min ooreenstemming is oor watter 
organisasievorm optimaal sal wees onder spesifieke omstandighede. Met die grootte van die 
plaas wat dikwels as 'n onderskeidende faktor gebruik word, is daar dikwels verwarring oor 
wat ‘n korporatiewe plaas sowel as ŉ familie plaas uitmaak. Dit hoort egter nie die geval te 
wees nie, want daar is baie groot plase wat as alleen-eienaar bedryf word in Suid-Afrika 
(m.a.w. familie-plase met gehuurde arbeid). Die onderskeidende faktor moet eerder die 
bestuur strukture van hierdie plase wees. Dit is hierdie bestuur strukture wat die metamorfose 
vanaf eienaar-bedryfde plase na (groot) korporatiewe strukture beperk. 
In hierdie tesis word 'n ontleding van beide tegniese en allokatiewe doeltreffendheid gebruik 
in die ontleding van die optimale organisasievorm in die landbou. Die tesis bewys dat die 
plaas se grootte die tegniese doeltreffendheid bepaal of verhoog, vanweë die groter plase se 
beter vermoë om op hoogte te bly met tegnologiese ontwikkeling deur die "ekonomieë van 
grootte" tot hul voordeel te gebruik. Plaasgroottes pas aan by die geleentheidskoste van die 
eienaar-bestuurder en tegniese doeltreffendheid is nie afhanklik van die organisasiestruktuur 
van die plaas nie, maar is eerder afhanklik van die grootte van die plaas. 
Terwyl die grootte van die plaas 'n belangrike faktor in die bereiking van tegniese 
doeltreffendheid is, is dit nie so belangrik in die bepaling van allokatiewe doeltreffendheid 
nie. Verskeie studies wys daarop dat groter plase minder allokatief doeltreffend is as kleiner 
plase, hoofsaaklik as gevolg van verskeie transaksiekoste voordele van klein plase. Maar daar 
is ook prinsipaal-agent kwessies in die korporatiewe omgewing wat nie algemeen by eienaar-
bedryfde plase voorkom nie. Dit is omdat in die geval van die eienaar-bedryfde instellings die 
familie aanspraak het op die residuele wins, en dus ŉ aansporing het om opdragte uit te voer. 
By korporatiewe plase is daar egter prinsipaal-agent probleme wat gepaard gaan met morele 
risiko (‘moral hazard’). Dus het familieplase ŉ koste voordeel oor korporatiewe plase. 
 
Hierdie tesis gebruik dan data wat verkry is uit 'n korporatiewe boerdery onderneming, waar 
die eienaars van die plase die plaasbestuurders is en die maatskappy al die produksie besluite 
maak. Die tesis wys dat dit hierdie agentskap kwessies en transaksie koste is wat die 
organisasievorme belemmer terwyl dit blyk dat die tegniese doeltreffendheid vir dié plase 
hoog is wat daarop dui dat die ekonomie van grootte belangrik is in die bepaling van die 
tegniese doeltreffendheid van hierdie plase. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Within the micro-economic theory of the firm there are two price considerations that firms 
face which govern their decisions about what to produce and how to produce it. These are the 
prices of the inputs and the prices of the outputs - determined by the market. These decisions 
are said to be made by the producer under profit maximizing and cost minimizing 
assumptions (Leibenstein, 1977). If the firm does not produce the level of output aimed for, 
or could have produced the level of output using less of the given inputs then there is a 
situation in which there is waste (Stigler, 1976). Waste would seem to be unavoidable in 
agriculture because of the difficulty in the optimal choice of inputs, ex ante, given the 
uncertainty about the season to come, ex post. Waste in agriculture can therefore either arise 
because the decisions of the producer could be flawed (allocative inefficiency), or the 
technique of producing these outputs could be flawed (technical inefficiency) (Stigler, 1976).  
In the case of technical inefficiency this waste could present itself in the form of how well the 
inputs are used to produce outputs given the level of output produced and inputs used in 
producing this output such that excess levels of inputs applied would result in a low level of 
technical efficiency and subsequently wastage of inputs. Allocative inefficiency, on the other 
hand, would have an impact on the level of wastage via the incorrect proportions of inputs 
being chosen to produce outputs given the input prices and quantities used in producing the 
output. Although these types of waste are unavoidable in agriculture, the magnitude of these 
wastes however can be controlled for. 
This level of waste would seem to be at the centre of the argument favouring the smaller 
family owned farm, especially with reference to allocative inefficiency. Numerous studies 
have found that family owned farms are more allocatively efficient than corporate farms 
while the converse is true for technical efficiency (Bojnec & Latruffe, 2013) (Liefert, 2005). 
Liefert (2005) argues that this is as a result of the higher flexibility of family owned farms in 
altering output levels as well as the input mixes in response to changes of both input and 
output prices (Liefert, 2005). This ability allows the farmers to react quicker to signals from 
the market and thus maintain profitability in an ever changing environment. It is because of 
this superior allocative efficiency that agriculture globally is based on a family farm model 
(Lipton, 2009). However, the advantage that flows from superior allocative efficiency alone 
does not explain the increase in the size of farms that is observed globally as soon as 
agricultural production starts to increase. This increase in farm size is better explained by a 
host of factors such as, amongst others, the opportunity costs of the farmers generated by off 
farm incomes, an aspect that will be further discussed later on in the thesis.    
 South African agriculture and farming organization 
This trend of increasing farm size has also been prevalent in South African agriculture and 
according to Liebenberg (2012) the “total farmed area grew from 77.6 million hectares in 
1918 to a peak of 91.8 million hectares in 1960, declining steadily to 82.2 million hectares in 
1996, where it has more or less stabilized since” (Liebenberg, 2012, p. 29) . While the land 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
2 
 
area used for farming purposes since 1996 has stayed at a relatively constant level the same 
cannot be said for the total number of farmers in South Africa. The total number of farmers 
according to Liebenberg (2012) has been “declining at an average rate of 1.23 percent per 
year, so that by 2007 the number of farmers had dropped to about a third of the number that 
prevailed in 1953 (Liebenberg, 2012, p. 29).”  This suggests then that the average farm has 
increased in size (ha) and a significant number of farmers have exited the industry.   
This increase in farm size in South Africa could be explained by the well-functioning labour 
market that gold encouraged. This is largely because of the opportunity cost that talented 
management faced. There were thus two ways of enticing this talented management to either 
remain on the farm or to start farming. The first was to corporatize farming, as was done on a 
large scale by the mining houses before mineral rights were separated from the ownership of 
land and they therefore did not need to own large tracts of land. The second was to either hire 
and exploit the abundant supply of labour or alternatively employ better labour management 
techniques suggesting that these farmers were good Human Resource’s managers, which is a 
largely neglected in the literature, or there was a combination between the two.  
This increase in farm size and subsequent exploitation or improved Human management 
however was driven by the opportunity costs of the farm managers such that on-farm incomes 
could be comparable to incomes generated from off farm activities. It could thus be argued 
that it is this opportunity cost together with the ability to exploit labour that has encouraged 
the increase in farm size within South Africa. Resulting in farms that are thus for the most 
part owner-operated and grew into commercial farmers. These commercial farms in South 
Africa are regarded as “family farms”, this is not to be confused with the “family farm” in the 
international literature which are likened to subsistence farms in South Africa. 
Commercial owner-operated farms produce goods for the market using own and hired labour, 
while small scale or subsistence owner-operated farms only intermittently produce a small 
portion of goods for the market, using mostly family labour and some hired labour, especially 
at harvest time when the demand for labour is high. Furthermore, while most of the labour 
input on commercial owner-operated farms does not come directly from the family, most of 
the supervision and management input does. It is therefore assumed that all commercial 
family farms produce goods for the market, and they use both hired and own labour in 
production. 
 Introducing the factors limiting corporatization 
Various reasons are given in the literature to explain the endurance of the family owner-
operated farm model1. The first of these is that as residual claimants to profits, family 
workers will be more likely to work harder than wage workers, and these wage workers often 
require costly supervision (Deininger & Byerlee, 2012). Secondly owner-operators 
supposedly have intimate knowledge of the local soil and climate conditions that could give 
them an advantage in making management decisions (Deininger & Byerlee, 2012). Thirdly 
there are random shocks (including weather shocks) that limit the ability for specialization of 
                                                 
1 In this thesis the nomenclature of family owned farms is used throughout to refer only to commercial farms, 
while small-holder or subsistence farms are ignored further. 
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these farmers (Allen & Lueck, 1998). Lastly family owner-operated farms are said to have 
considerable flexibility in adjusting labour supply with the seasonality and variability found 
in agriculture by easily reallocating effort to other tasks both on and off the farm (Deininger 
& Byerlee, 2012).  
Allen & Lueck (1998) argue that it is the nature of the farm which prevents the smaller 
egalitarian “family farm” from tending toward the larger corporate farm. They suggest it is as 
a result of their inability to specialize2 in certain aspects of production because the production 
process is characterized by short annual cycles. The result for the farmer is that his or her 
management time3 has to be split up to such an extent that they do not have the luxury of any 
form of true specialization4. This would imply that it is because of these factors that when 
crop cycles are short the farms would tend to stay smaller “family owned farms” in terms of 
both area as well as turnover, and not grow into large corporate farms, Allen & Lueck (1998). 
It is for this reason that fruit farms have tended to become bigger in both area as well as 
turnover, and even take on the form of large corporate farms (Allen & Lueck, 1998). 
This would seem rather counterintuitive because in co-operatives the resources are pooled, 
while companies are thought to possess the ability to access better sources of finance. Why 
then would the family farm be superior to these organizational forms? Allen & Lueck (1998) 
argue that there are often considerable moral hazards that arise because of the inability of the 
company to accurately monitor or punish any negative outcomes, for example in the 
production phase the farm manager could decide to apply inputs to generate maximum output 
to the detriment of profitability. Because of the difficulty in monitoring and or punishing such 
unfavourable outcomes, the manager could blame any negative outcomes on poor weather 
conditions.  
The result for the corporation that hires these farmers/managers to perform the farming duties 
is thus increased transaction costs. Buduru & Brem (2007) argue that it is these transaction 
costs5 that are bound to have an influence on the choice of the organizational form (Buduru & 
Brem, 2007). Crops with short cycles and many stages between the cycles6 are thought to 
generate even bigger transaction costs because of the affinity for moral hazards to arise 
between the principle and agent, perpetuated by the negative effects that environmental 
shocks can have on the output. These incentives and possible moral hazards are explained by 
technical and allocative efficiency as explained below.  
If the farm manager is given the correct incentives to produce based on the correct use of 
intermediate inputs and fixed factors of production, given specialist advice, one could assume 
                                                 
2 Allen and Lueck (1998) argue that “seasonal parameters (cycles, stages, and so on) limit gains from 
specialization and cause timing problems between stages of production” (Allen & Lueck, 1998, p. 346) 
3 Management time in this instance is limited, in a quantifiable value (x hours/ day and x days per year) such 
that the manager’s time then has to be shared between all tasks on the farm. 
4 Specialization in this case would be defined as at least 80% of one’s time being devoted to one aspect of 
production. 
5 Buduru and Brem (2007) define transaction costs in this setting as “the amount of resources used to establish 
and maintain property rights over assets” (Buduru & Brem, 2007). 
6 Allen and Lueck (1998) argue that since “most farmers control several stages of production, such as soil 
preparation, planting, cultivation, and harvest” crops with short cycles therefore limit the possibility for 
specialization (Allen & Lueck, 1998, p. 347). 
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that some level of specialization in crop production7 has been achieved. This would indicate 
that the incentives for production are correct and the technical efficiency would thus be 
relatively high. But if the allocative efficiency is low then one could assume that there are 
either incentive issues or moral hazards present.  
These are because of adverse selection in choosing farmers to join the corporate farming 
model of Farmsecure that result in post-contractual opportunism. This generates a moral 
hazard and results in the principle agent problem (Allen & Lueck, 1998). These moral 
hazards therefore generate transaction costs (Allen & Lueck, 2000) which are perpetuated by 
short crop cycles and stages (Allen & Lueck, 1998) and the off-farm wage rate (Deininger, 
2011). It is these factors that seem to be working in favour of the smaller family owned and 
operated farm and against corporatization.  
 Introducing productive efficiency 
Following the work of Koopmans (1951), Debreu (1951) and Shepard (1953), Farrell set out 
to explain and predict productive efficiency. Farrell suggests that there was generally a failure 
to predict productive efficiency because it was considered adequate to measure the 
productivity of labour and use this as a measure of efficiency (Farrell, 1957). The obvious 
problem with this measure was the fact that it ignored all other fixed factors of production 
and other intermediate inputs save labour. The aim of Farrell’s paper was therefore to create a 
framework to analyse firms that did not succeed in the optimization problem and compare 
them to “best practice” efficient frontiers that he decomposed into technical and allocative 
components using distance functions. This would allow the evaluation of the efficiencies of 
the firms that failed to either minimize costs or maximize profits relative to an “industry” 
frontier production function. A more complete discussion of these ideas and means of 
measurement will take place in Chapter 4. 
1.3.1 Technical efficiency 
Technical efficiency measures are used to determine how efficiently the farm managed to use 
their available inputs in producing a given level of output (Grazhdaninova & Lerman, 2005). 
In other words, technical efficiency determines whether the farm achieves maximum output 
using a given bundle of factors of production. Koopmans defines technical efficiency as a 
situation in which it is impossible to produce more of any output without producing less of 
some other output or using more of some input (Koopmans, 1951).  Technical efficiency can 
therefore be either output maximising if using an input orientation or input minimizing if 
using an input orientation. These various orientations and applications will be discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
1.3.2 Allocative efficiency 
While technical efficiency is concerned with how well the farm managed to use their inputs 
to produce outputs, allocative efficiency is a measure of the farms ability to obtain maximum 
profit given the existing market prices for inputs as well as outputs, i.e. allocative efficiency 
measures whether or not the inputs are used in the optimal proportions to generate the 
                                                 
7 Specialization in crop production in this instance refers to the “specialist management” that is supplied and 
applied by the farmer. 
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maximum output given the market prices for both the inputs and outputs. Allocative 
efficiency would therefore give an indication of the farmer’s flexibility as well as ability to 
alter production with the signals from the market. It is expected that in a corporate setting 
where bureaucratic processes limit the ability and flexibility to quickly alter production 
following changes in the market place, and where moral hazards that result from imperfect 
information in seeking farmers for the model, allocative efficiency of these farms is reduced, 
thereby favouring owner-operated farms. 
1.3.3 Economic efficiency 
Economic or cost efficiency of a farm consists of the above two components. This would 
indicate that if one of these two forms or types of efficiency were low this would have a 
negative impact on economic efficiency as this is the same of allocative and technical 
efficiency. Therefore in order to obtain economic efficiency both the allocative and technical 
efficiencies need to be at unity and the lower these two scores are the lower the economic 
efficiency would be. In order to improve economic efficiency the factors decreasing or 
limiting either technical efficiency or allocative efficiency need to be identified and rectified.  
 Objectives and importance of the study 
In a study performed by Van Zyl (1996) on the total factor productivity of South African 
grain farmers, the frontier showed an interesting trend. As farms get larger they begin 
converging on the efficiency frontier even though he found that the total factor productivity 
(TFP) for these larger farms was lower than for the smaller farms. If this phenomenon is true, 
this would suggest that improved access to the market would allow the modern day farmer to 
specialize in the management of their farm by being able to elicit help from a wide range of 
industry specialists. This would imply that since most production decisions are made ex ante 
with the elicited help of specialists the farms could then be technically efficient in that if they 
follow the advice given to them they will achieve ceterus paribus, maximum output and by 
definition revenue. It is proposed then that any deviations from the frontier should be as a 
result of factors that are beyond the control of the manager. These would not be measurement 
errors, but instead factors such as weather and other acts of God.  
If the technical efficiency is high because of the ability to hire industry specialists from the 
market place, how does “economies of size” influence this ability and subsequently technical 
efficiency, as well as the possibility for specialization on these owner-operated farms? Can 
this be used as an explanation for the ever increasing size of farms within modern day 
agriculture? 
It is argued that short annual crop cycles result in moral hazards between the parties involved 
on corporately-owned and managed farms who rely largely on hired management8, and this is 
what decreases the allocative efficiency of the farms. In the family farm organization on the 
                                                 
8 It is important to remember that both the owner-operated commercial farms as well as the corporate farms rely 
largely on hired labour. The distinction between the two organizational forms would thus seem to lie in the 
amount of hired management the two different organizational forms rely on and not the size of the farm. That is 
commercial owner-operated farms rely largely on own or family management, while corporate farms rely 
largely on hired management, and this hired management generates the largest moral hazards for the corporate 
farms. 
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other hand they use family contracts (Allen & Lueck, 1998), and one could therefore assume 
that the family farm is not faced with these moral hazards or utility constraints. This is 
because in South Africa these owner-operated commercial farms do not largely rely on hired 
management and since the family are the residual claimants to farm profit they are not 
thought to behave in an amoral or opportunistic fashion. Thus how can agency theory and 
transaction cost theory affect allocative efficiency, and how could this be used to explain the 
organizational form chosen in farming?   
It will thus be argued that because smaller farms are technically inefficient but allocatively 
efficient, with economies of size these owner-operated farms do have the ability to improve 
their technical efficiency, while the corporate farm is hampered by allocative and economic 
inefficiency and it is hypothesized that it is because of this fact that farms are not 
corporatizing. The objective of this thesis is therefore to contribute to the literature by using 
efficiency or inefficiency as a determining factor for the predominance of the owner-operated 
organizational form within South African agriculture by studying both the allocative and 
technical efficiency of a corporate farm. It is suspected that the family owned farm in the 
corporate9 setting is technically efficient, but it is the allocative and subsequently economic 
efficiency or inefficiency that has an impact on the organizational form chosen in agriculture.  
 Data  
The study is performed on a privately owned corporation entitled Farmsecure Grains (FG) 
which is a subsidiary of Farmsecure Holdings, whose main purpose was to carry out primary 
production of certain field crops. In the 2011/2012 production season Farmsecure Grains 
decided to go into a form of partnership with various farmers in order to carry out the 
production of these field crops. The partnership was designed such that the farmers would 
contribute their farming experience and knowledge as well as the land and equipment for 
which they would receive a management fee in the case of their management time and rent 
for their land and equipment. FG would supply and pay for all other intermediate inputs and 
do the marketing for the produce, keeping the proceeds from such sales. If the venture 
showed operating profits over a five year period these would be shared equally between FG 
and the specific farmer concerned. The decisions as to what would be produced and where, 
however, was to be made by FG and various industry specialists and the farmers were to 
carry out FG orders and production decisions. This will be further discussed in Chapter 3. 
The data used in this thesis was thus gathered from FG in the form of management accounts 
for the 2011/2012 production season, which had detailed financial information on the 
production for the various farms. This was cross sectional data with 51 farms spread out in 
six different areas of the maize belt in South Africa, namely the North West Province, the 
Eastern, Southern and Western Free State, Mpumalanga and Northern KwaZulu-Natal. 
                                                 
9 It is important to note that since only limited data was available the comparison between the efficiency of the 
group of farms within the Farmsecure model and the wider industry was not possible: the farms could thus only 
be compared to one another.  
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 Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is thus organised as follows: The current chapter, Chapter 1, gives a general 
background to the South African owner-operated farms, and gives background information 
on the reason for the favourability of this functional form within South Africa. Chapter 1 also 
briefly discussed the data that will be used as well as established the concept of efficiency 
developed by Farrell (1957).  Lastly Chapter 1 established firstly the objectives of the study 
and secondly the importance of the study within the field of knowledge. 
  
Chapter 2 gives a review of theories and approaches that have been used to study firstly 
different organizational forms concentrating on the owner-operated, partnership and 
corporate organizational forms. Chapter 2 therefore attempts to isolate different studies that 
were relevant to this thesis, by seeing what effect these transaction costs and agency issues 
have on productive efficiency.  
 
Chapter 3 gives a background to the company’s model explaining the various obligations and 
expectations of the parties involved which was drawn from the contracts used. It also 
discusses the various aggregations of the variables to generate the production function which 
is then used to determine the functional form that best fit the data. Chapter 3 therefore also 
serves as a preliminary analysis of the data used for the empirical analysis in Chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the various theoretical underpinnings of each approach used to model the 
technical and allocative efficiency of the various farms. These efficiencies are determined 
using both the parametric and non-parametric approaches in order to better generate variables 
that correctly measure efficiency.  
 
Chapter 5 discusses the implications for the owner-operated and corporate organizational 
forms using the efficiency scores obtained in Chapter 4. This chapter draws on the various 
theoretical underpinnings and discusses the impacts of these transaction costs and principle 
agent relationships on the efficiency scores, and argues that it is these scores that would have 
an influence on the organizational form chosen. Lastly Chapter 6 concludes the findings of 
the thesis and highlights possible issues within the study. It also offers ideas for future 
research.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2 Farm Size and Efficiency 
 
There is a wealth of literature about the advantages of the family owner-operated farms 
(Johnson & Ruttan, 1994), (Schultz, 1964) and (Van Zyl, 1996). In Schultz’s (1964) 
landmark study, Transforming Traditional Agriculture, he argued that smaller10 family 
owned farms were more efficient than larger farms. Similarly Van Zyl (1996) in a study done 
on South African grain farming found that on average small farms had a higher level of total 
factor productivity and was thus more efficient than larger farms.  It is this apparent 
inefficiency of larger farms that is often suggested as a reason for the existence of the Inverse 
Relationship11 (Oya, 2012), (Griffin, Khan, & Ickowitz, 2002) and (Heltberg, 1998), between 
farm size and productivity within agriculture.  
Sender & Johnston (2004) argue that higher productivity12 and efficiency of the smaller 
family owned farms is in most cases solely based on the productivity of labour by comparing 
the opportunity cost of family labour versus hired labour as well as the transaction costs 
involved. However, this idea often ignores the other factors of production. In the most recent 
studies total factor productivity (TFP) differences are taken into account, suggesting that the 
real problem lies in the differences in the quality of all inputs, not only land. To thus assume 
from competitive market assumptions that all inputs are homogenous in quality is to 
perpetrate a tautology. 
The flaw in the argument would seem rather obvious and a key argument against the 
existence of the Inverse Relationship is that it often ignores differences in the quality of all 
intermediate inputs. This is said to then generate bias in the statistical analysis, and 
subsequently findings and recommendations (Sender & Johnston, 2004). For example, one 
cannot compare a sheep farm in the middle of the arid Karoo’s productivity to the 
productivity of a sugar cane farm on the sub-tropical KwaZulu-Natal Coastline. 
Similarly one should not be able to compare a one hectare farm to a one-thousand hectare 
farm. This could perhaps be because on the one hectare farm more intensive and 
unsustainable pressure could be put onto the environment to produce; this would lead to land 
degradation and subsequently economic degradation as a consequence. Or stated in another 
way with the inclusion of externalities, the function is not correctly specified to make 
provision for all the variables. Another important consideration is that family labour does 
have an opportunity cost, as members of the family are also faced with the decision of on or 
off farm employment, what-ever that employment maybe be. To therefore assume zero 
                                                 
10 There is seldom any reference to what constitutes a smaller family owned farm. The World Bank suggests that 
a smaller family owner-operated farm, relying mainly on family labour, is less than five hectares in the 
developing world. 
11 The inverse relationship suggests that productivity and efficiency with which farms operate decline with the 
size of the farms. That is that smaller farms are more efficient than larger farms. 
12 Griffin et al. state that “Given that labour is abundant (and hence has a low opportunity cost) and land and 
capital are scarce (and hence have relatively high opportunity costs), small farmers have a higher total 
productivity than large and hence utilize resources more efficiently” (Griffin, Khan, & Ickowitz, 2002, p. 286). 
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opportunity cost for family labour is not completely correct. Added to these important 
considerations is the fact that the majority of the factors of production are ignored in the 
analysis of the superiority of the smaller farm. It would seem then that a statement 
vindicating the superiority of a “small farm” over a large farm on the grounds of productivity 
and efficiency is somewhat unfounded.   
Contrary to the idea of an Inverse Relationship within agriculture, farm size has constantly 
been increasing in most countries across the world, and various authors cite different reasons 
for this phenomenon. Deininger & Byerlee (2012) suggest that the major factors contributing 
to increased farm size have been the development of new technology that makes it easier to 
supervise labour13; high capital requirements of land clearance and infrastructure; and greater 
emphasis on integrated supply chains and certification of produce. Fandel (2003) argues that 
increasing competitive pressure has led to a change in both size and structure of the family 
owner-operated farm, to such an extent that farm sizes have been increasing because of this 
pressure. 
Within agricultural economics, “economies of size” imply that there are certain advantages 
that larger farms have over smaller farms (Hallam, 1991). This constitutes another important 
argument for the increasing size of farms. One of the benefits of “economies of size” would 
be the farm’s ability to lower its costs of production (Duffy, 2009). This could be brought 
about by spreading fixed costs, by bulk purchases, and by marketing power (Duffy, 2009), 
therefore lowering the farm’s transaction costs which would provide a cost advantage for 
larger operations. This term however is often confused with “economies of scale” which has 
a very similar but at the same time a very different meaning in that “economies of scale” 
measures what the effect of inputs on outputs is i.e. what happens to output if all inputs are 
increased by the same proportion (Hall & LeVeen, 1978). 
Deininger (2011) suggests that an important factor for the increase in farm size is increasing 
wages in the non-agricultural sector. The idea then is that farmers would seek to earn an on-
farm income comparable to what they might obtain in the off-farm sector (Deininger, 2011). 
The result is that there will be a substitution of capital for labour which is made possible by 
recent developments and innovations in biotechnology, information technology and more 
productive means of working with the soil (collectively termed agronomic technology)14. 
Therefore, the better farmers who have the willingness and the ability to generate on farm 
wages equal to or better than off-farm wages, would grow in size while farmers who are not 
willing or able to achieve the same would perhaps exit the industry. This argument would 
therefore seem to rely on the effects of opportunity costs for the farmers, a key argument for 
the Inverse Relationship, which exists only when these opportunity costs are zero. 
Management has thus developed, with the use of certain technological tools, the ability to 
effectively manage larger areas because standardization and or monitoring of processes have 
                                                 
13 Deininger and Byerlee (2012, pg. 707) suggest that “The ability to have machinery operations guided by GPS 
technology rather than driver’s skills makes close supervision of labour less relevant while information 
technology can generate data to help better supervise labour”. 
14 Factors like variable-rate Global Positioning Systems (GPS) technology and access to soil laboratories for 
example. 
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improved (Deininger & Byerlee, 2012). The irony of the argument however, is that these 
farms often have to be a certain size before they are able to take advantage of these 
technologies. Larger farms will therefore have the ability to exploit modern technologies, 
giving these farms an added advantage over smaller farms who because of their size do not 
have the ability to take advantage of these technologies (Balmann, 1999), and therefore exit 
the industry where they are able to earn higher wages (Deininger & Byerlee, 2012). 
Balmann (1999) suggests that because of path dependence, farm size has a larger bearing on 
the evolution of farm size than off-farm wage rates and it might be that, perhaps the 
relationship between farm size and off-farm wage rates is coincidental rather than causal as 
suggested by (Deininger, 2011) and (Deininger & Byerlee, 2012). This is because as farms 
get larger they have the ability to take advantage of economies of size, and thus better employ 
lumpy inputs such as management and machinery which together with biotechnology 
constitutes a large portion of the “technology” aspect discussed throughout the literature. 
Although it is perhaps possible for smaller farmer’s to do the same, one would expect it less 
frequently and perhaps management and management ability in that sense would have a 
larger impact on farm growth than “economies of size” or technology. 
Another advantage of the “economies of size” for larger farms, is the ability of farmers to 
access credit and finance, which would have an impact on the farmer’s ability to carry the 
farm through difficult times (Heltberg, 1998) and (Mondelli & Klein, 2013). This advantage 
arises from the lower transaction costs of providing formal credit to the farmer. Deininger 
(2011) argues that since the size of the loan is bigger, the unit cost of providing the credit has 
decreased and this reduces the credit bias against the farmer.  
Morrison et al. (2004) suggest that as a result of increasing costs (both fixed and variable), 
there has been increasing pressure for smaller family farms to grow bigger, as their economic 
viability has been constantly decreasing. This concept of economies of size and the benefits it 
infers would then seem to be a rather crucial determinant of the evolution of farm size over 
time. The advantages that “economies of size” infer is firstly the ability for these farmers to 
reduce unit fixed costs by spreading them over a larger and more diversified business, and 
secondly, by obtaining discounts on bulk purchases with lower interest rates for credit, the 
variable costs could also be reduced. Both of these factors improve the profitability of these 
farms. Furthermore as access to finance is easier for larger farmers they often have the ability 
to invest in technology such that they are on the leading edge of the technological curve, 
furthering the production advantage the larger farmer has over the smaller farmer (Deininger 
& Byerlee, 2012). 
Balmann (1999) and Bebchuck & Roe’s (1999) theory of path dependence as an explanation 
for the ever growing farm size is rather appealing, because larger farms have the ability to 
take advantage of their size they will continue to grow larger while the smaller farms who 
perhaps cannot interact freely within the market because of transaction costs will stagnate or 
even continue to grow smaller, and eventually be forced to leave the industry. Deininger 
(2011) and Deininger & Byerlee (2012) argue that it is the level of income that the farmer is 
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able to obtain off the farm that would explain smaller farmers exiting15 the industry. The 
increase in farm size then seems to be a vicious cycle that is almost inevitable, unless there is 
state intervention that puts a stop to this process.  
Balmann (1999) on the other hand suggests that sunk costs in production would have an 
impact on increasing farm size and this would increase competition for land. He uses the 
German milk quota market as an example to illustrate his point and states that “the paradox 
situation arises that dairy farms rent quotas for up to a price of 40% of the yielded milk price 
although at the actual milk price (even without considering costs of quotas) most dairy farms 
are hardly able to cover their full costs” (Balmann, 1999, p. 18). There is little doubt that 
farm owners have been acquiring more land. However there is uncertainty as to the evolution 
of the organizational form of the farm. Therefore, given these reasons for farm size 
increasing, why are commercial farms staying family owned and operated rather than 
corporately owned? 
Perhaps the answer lies in the alignment of objectives and incentives in production of the 
individual who is actually managing the production process. Liefert (2005) suggested that, 
during the central planning of Russian agriculture, the objective of the farm managers was 
not profit maximization, but rather achieving mandated output targets. As this had a negative 
impact on efficiency, it was often found that the managers lobbied for low-output targets with 
high input allocations (Liefert, 2005). As such, there was an obvious moral hazard present in 
the model, in which case the agent (farmer) had the incentive to understate his abilities, and 
the level of effort he applied throughout the productive process, and the principle did not 
have the means of detecting such behaviour (Allen & Lueck, 2000) and (Liefert, 2005). The 
implication was a deterioration of the manager’s incentives to attain economic efficiency. 
 Organizational forms in agriculture  
Within agriculture, organizational forms can vary from the smaller family owned and 
operated farm to a public corporation with many anonymous owners. Allen & Lueck (1998: 
347) define the purest family farm as an organization where “a single farmer owns the output 
and controls all farm assets, including all labour assets”, i.e. most of the labour input is 
supplied by the family members. On the other hand, the corporation is defined as the case 
where “many people own the farm and labour is provided by large groups of specialized 
fixed wage labour” (Allen & Lueck, 1998, p. 347). While the increase in farm size over time 
is an often cited fact, the optimum size and organizational form is not16. 
The organizational form of the farm and which organizational form under which 
circumstances is best is a widely discussed topic in agricultural economics. Various reasons 
and theories are offered to try and answer these questions. However there is not much 
consensus as to which the best organizational form within agriculture would be, with equally 
compelling arguments both for and against the various organizational forms. We will 
therefore first discuss the main organizational forms within agriculture that are pertinent to 
                                                 
15 They are able to obtain higher incomes outside of farming in the labour market. 
16 “This is a traditional question about the “optimal farm size” and “optimal farm structure”, which has a long 
history in agricultural economics, in general, and in transitional economics in particular” (Fandel, 2003, p. 
376). 
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this study, namely family owner-operated farms and Corporate Farms, while at the same time 
taking note of some of the theoretical reasoning for certain organizational forms to prevail 
under certain situations. 
2.1.1 Family owner-operated farms 
In the previous discussion it was established that larger farms will continue to grow in size, 
and smaller farms will continue to shrink, the reasons being the off-farm wage rate for the 
smaller family farm and economies of size for larger farms (Antle, 1999) and (Deininger & 
Byerlee, 2012). It is thought that this trend poses a threat to the perseverance of the smaller 
family farm (Hurtig, 2003). Perhaps the difficulty lies in the definition of the smaller family 
owned farm, which is often defined by the use of family labour or by size (Lipton, 2009). It 
should strictly speaking be defined by organizational structure i.e. if the farm is owner-
operated irrespective of the size it should be termed a family farm, while if there are partners 
it should be called a partnership and so on. Various studies suggest that the superiority of the 
family owner-operated farm is as a result of the family being the residual claimants to profit: 
in that case they will be less likely to shirk and therefore require less supervision than hired 
workers, who do have the incentive and the opportunity, given the spatial dispersion of 
agricultural production, to shirk (Deininger, 2011), (Breimyer, 1962) and (Berry & Cline, 
1979). 
Since the average farm size in South Africa is high by international standards, one can safely 
assume that not all the work is done by the family members. Therefore if they use hired 
labour these workers too would have the ability to shirk. The only difference between the 
commercial and corporate farm then is the reliance on hired management thus the size of the 
transaction and by implication the cost that is relevant (James, Klein, & Sykuta, 2011). That 
is the hired manager’s wage and attributes compared to the general employee would be 
higher since the manager has a scarcer skill and would therefore command a higher wage. 
The family owner-operated farm should therefore rather be defined by who makes the 
management decisions which would be the farmer/family in this case, and not the labour as 
the majority of the labour is supplied by wage workers. The result is that in the owner-
operated scenario, the farmer would make all these decisions, and avoid moral hazard in the 
management of the business (James, Klein, & Sykuta, 2011). Deininger (2011) argues that 
because agricultural production has few technical (dis) economies of scale, a farm can consist 
of many different enterprises, something that is in any case common in South Africa with its 
poor natural resources. Any production forms could co-exist within the farm. This means that 
larger family owner-operated farms have the ability to diversify their enterprises, which 
enables them to spread costs over a larger asset base and in doing so reducing per unit costs 
of production.   
The reduction of these costs means that these family farms are able to take advantage of all 
the benefits of “economies of size” (Antle, 1999) (Hallam, 1991) and (Helfand & Levine, 
2004). “Economies of size” however are present regardless of the organizational form of the 
farm (i.e. family-owned, corporate or a partnership) and the presence or absence of these 
economies of size is a function of the size of the farm and not the organizational form of the 
farm.  
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Since large farms can be owner-operated, where the owner of the farm is also the manager of 
the farm, in the corporate setting this is not generally the case i.e. the manager of the farm is 
not the owner. The difference that separates the owner-operated organizational form from the 
others therefore is that the family owner-operated farm does not seem to be impeded by the 
potential moral hazard of hired management. This is a rather appealing explanation of the 
advantage of the family owner-operated farm over other organizational forms of farms. As a 
result of the inability of the owner (principle) to monitor or detect amoral behaviour from the 
farm manager (agent), the result is a moral hazard between the owner and manager which 
increases the transaction costs of running the farm (Boland & Marsh, 2006) and (Larsén, 
2007), i.e. farms will grow to the extent of the farmer’s management ability as well as the 
farmer’s desired utility (Stigler, 1976).  
Allen & Lueck (1998) attribute this to the lack of specialization17 and argue that when there 
are a low number of cycles in the farming process18 the gains from specialization are severely 
limited. Therefore the costs of extending the farmer’s duties to adjacent stages would be 
lowered as a result of the importance of the timing between stages. Various studies have 
shown that it is for this reason that the family owner-operated farm would be the superior 
organizational form in the production of annual field crops (Allen & Lueck, 2000), 
(Deininger & Byerlee, 2012) and (Latruffe L. , Balcombe, Davidova, & Zawalinska, 2005). 
Allen & Lueck (1998) suggest that this is as a result of the possible moral hazards that arise 
between the principle and the agent in the form of either random production shocks, or 
seasonal parameters (cycles, stages and tasks). It is these moral hazards that they argue would 
limit the gains from specialization as well as cause timing problems between the stages of 
production, and thus favours the owner-operated farm as one individual makes all the 
management decisions.  
They also suggest that when there are a large number of cycles, with long stages between the 
cycles, the farm has the ability to specialize and the monitoring of the various stages becomes 
easier (Allen & Lueck, 1998). Deininger & Byerlee (2012) seem to confirm Allen & Lueck’s 
(1998) argument and they conclude that when the focus is on a single enterprise such as a 
perennial crop or intensive livestock production, there exists the opportunity to perform 
repetitive tasks and therefore to specialize. This is made possible by the fact that contracts 
can be made more complete, because it is easier to monitor the various stages. This reduces 
the transaction costs from the moral hazard to such an extent that the corporate farm becomes 
the dominant organizational form within agriculture (Allen & Lueck, 2000). 
2.1.2 Corporate farming 
Allen & Lueck (1998) argue that farmers cannot specialize in any specific task in the 
production of crops with few cycles. Crop farming thus favours the owner-operated farm over 
the corporate farm as an organizational form. On the other hand, Deininger & Byerlee (2012) 
suggest that many land abundant countries are characterized by rising investment in large-
                                                 
17 Specialization is used here to mean specialization in a certain aspect of the farm process, i.e. either in 
production, marketing, or financial management, etc. 
18 Cycles in this instance refer to the establishment of crops and the production thereof  i.e. perennial or annual 
crops and not commodity cycles. See Allen &Lueck (1998) for a full discussion on the effects of cycles and the 
impact it has on specialization in agriculture. 
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scale farming based on a non-family corporate model, while Lipton (2009) finds that there 
hasn’t been much change in the agrarian structure of farming in land scarce developed 
countries. 
Deininger & Byerlee (2012) provide examples of large corporate farms in developing and 
transition countries to make their point19. Three out of five of the largest corporate farms in 
Latin America produce commodities with long cycles. This is as predicted by Allen & Lueck 
(1998) where they suggested that in agricultural production characterized by many cycles 
with long stages between the cycles, the farm organization would tend towards corporate 
ownership. 
Allen & Lueck (1998) thus suggest that the more important specialization20 becomes on the 
farm, the more likely that a corporate or partnership form of ownership will be chosen.  
However on an irrigation farm the principle would be able to reduce the moral hazard 
between itself and the agent by having the ability to specialize in a task; the irrigation 
scheduling for arguments sake. The ability of the principle to mitigate some of the 
uncertainty would then improve the ability to monitor stages, such that amoral behaviour of 
the agent could now be detected. It is for this reason that Allen & Lueck (1998) suggest that 
irrigation farms would tend to corporatize or form partnerships.  
However these massive grain farms that are heavily reliant on significant capital stocks are 
obviously the exception rather than the rule. These farms seem to have worked particularly 
well under certain instances; this however has not been the case to a large extent in Africa 
(Eicher & Baker, 1992). Deininger & Byerlee (2012) suggest that this is probably the result 
of poorly established property rights. However since this thesis is on South African 
commercial farming and the property rights are generally well established, it shall be 
assumed that South African commercial farming behaves in a similar fashion to developed 
countries in that regard. 
Deininger & Byerlee (2012) argue that if a country has well defined property rights it allows 
easy contracting, and this encourages the formation of corporate companies to farm on a large 
scale. The advantages these organizational forms have is their ability to freely transact with 
the market; i.e. they will have the ability to hire specialist labour at lower costs, as well as 
lower the costs of production due to the size of the organization, enjoying all the advantages 
of “economies of size” as discussed above (Deininger & Byerlee, 2012).  As a result of this 
ease of access to the market, it is suggested that there will be feedback between producers 
and consumers. It is because of this feedback that James et al. (2011) argue that a tipping 
point in agriculture has been reached which has encouraged contracts and organizational 
transformation within agriculture.  
These contracts are thought to encourage organizational transformation within agriculture and 
come in the form of either a marketing contract or a production contract (Allen & Lueck, 
2000) and (James, Klein, & Sykuta, 2011). Under a marketing contract the producer and 
                                                 
19 See Deininger and Byerlee (2012) page 702, table 1. 
20 There is a significant level of specialization required in irrigation, and it is a widely studied field within Soil 
Science. 
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buyer negotiate prices and quantities before production begins. The production process 
details, such as planting date etc. are managed by the manager/producer (James, Klein, & 
Sykuta, 2011). A production contract on the other hand is a more tightly co-ordinated 
agreement such that the producer has far less authority over the production process, and the 
production methods are specified in much more detail by the parent company (James, Klein, 
& Sykuta, 2011).  
Again the difficulty would seem to lie in the definition of a corporate farm, and it is assumed 
to relate to organizational structure and direct involvement in primary production rather than 
size and indirect involvement. Therefore marketing contracts should not be viewed as 
corporate farming, as in this case the farmer apply his or her labour and management and is 
contracted by a company which has investments in either upstream (intermediate input 
companies) or downstream markets (processing, value adding).  
An example would be a flour milling company giving out marketing contracts to farmers for 
wheat; the farmer has the choice of either taking the contract or trading in the open market, 
involving a certain amount of risk. If a farmer accepts the contract they are then obliged to 
meet the contract with consequences should the contract not be met. The company can only 
design the contract such that the quality and quantity of the product is delivered at the end of 
the season using price as a reward or punishment. The company however cannot control or 
contract too far into the future because of risk, so that the farmer can therefore change 
contracts year on year and, since the farmer has full control over production, one could 
assume that he is an autonomous unit. Therefore under a marketing contract, one could not 
call the flour mill a corporate farmer as the firm is not directly involved with primary 
agriculture, but relies heavily on primary agriculture’s output (Allen & Lueck, 1998). 
Under the production contract on the other hand there are generally two forms used by 
corporate entities: either the cash-rent contract or alternatively the crop-share contract (Allen 
& Lueck, 2000). Allen & Lueck (2000) suggest that in cash rent contracts the farmer has the 
incentive to over-use the land and produce unsustainably, while with crop-share contracts the 
farmer has the incentive and the opportunity to shirk, while having less of an incentive to 
over-use the land. Therefore in order to ensure that agents take actions that maximize 
ownership interests, owners would have to invest in measurement and monitoring costs, also 
called agency costs (Elliott & James, 2013). 
Numerous studies  in the former Eastern European countries have all found that in general 
corporate farms21 did not perform well compared to owner-operated farms e.g. (Balmann, 
1999) for Germany, (Mathijs & Vranken, 2000) for Bulgaria and Hungary, (Fandel, 2003) for 
Slovakia and (Hockmann & Svetlov, 2006) for Russia. Agency costs and moral hazards 
constitute one of the three main reasons offered, for the dominance of the owner-operated 
farm as the predominant organizational form within agriculture these will all be discussed 
later on in Chapter 2. 
                                                 
21 Corporate farming in this sense uses mainly production contracts where the corporate is physically involved 
with the production process. The farmer does not have much authority in the production process, and thus acts 
as a true “manager” or agent. 
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 Commercial farming: The dominant form in grain farming 
There are reoccurring arguments within the literature that attempt to explain the persistence 
of family farms, or commercial farms in the South African context, as the predominant 
organizational choice of agriculture. These are transaction cost considerations (James, Klein, 
& Sykuta, 2011), (Allen & Lueck, 2000) and (Boland & Marsh, 2006), principle agent issues 
that present themselves in the form of a moral hazard (Allen & Lueck, 1998), (Mondelli & 
Klein, 2013) and (Boland & Marsh, 2006), or asset specificity (Deininger & Byerlee, 2012), 
(Hockmann & Svetlov, 2006) and (Allen & Lueck, 2000). In the remainder of the chapter we 
will consider the various theoretical considerations that are suggested as reasons for the 
perseverance of the commercial family farm as the predominant organizational form in South 
Africa. 
2.2.1 Transaction costs 
The overriding theme in the transaction cost22 approach according to Allen & Lueck (2000) is 
that patterns of ownership and contracts are chosen to mitigate transaction costs, which result 
from attempts to establish and maintain property rights. These transaction costs are 
perpetuated in agriculture by factors such as Mother Nature and the uncertainty in production 
she brings (Allen & Lueck, 2000) and (James, Klein, & Sykuta, 2011). Transaction costs 
arise because of the difficulty in monitoring the outcome because of the complexity of the 
biological production process and the inputs it requires, and this makes it difficult to detect 
certain amoral behaviour (Allen & Lueck, 2000).  
Allen & Lueck (2000) argue that because all the goods involved in agriculture are complex 
and contain many attributes, they create an opportunity for transaction costs to arise for 
almost every single attribute. A good example would be that of land. Because of the various 
attributes of land, it is difficult to record all these attributes to document all these attributes, 
and lastly and most importantly to negotiate and implement prices to be paid for the land 
(Boland & Marsh, 2006). As a result, transaction costs are generated. 
This is especially true if any circumstances change between the trading partners, as each 
trading partner would have the incentive to try and claim certain rents that a specific asset 
might have accrued, but is perhaps not due to them (James, Klein, & Sykuta, 2011). The 
transaction costs would then arise as a result of the governance structure attempting to dictate 
how the various prices and shares of the asset accrual are discovered and shared between the 
partners (James, Klein, & Sykuta, 2011). These price discoveries therefore often involve 
contracts between the principle and agent, and the more complex these assets or goods are the 
more imperfect the contracts between the parties become, resulting in increased transaction 
costs between the two parties (Allen & Lueck, 2000). 
The organizational form chosen seeks to minimize these transaction costs, and it is for this 
reason that Allen & Lueck (1998) suggest that these transaction costs or lack thereof favours 
the owner-operated farms because grain farms have short cycles and infrequent tasks and are 
                                                 
22 Allen and Lueck (2000) define transaction costs as “the costs of enforcing and maintaining property rights-
regardless of whether a market exchange takes place or not, and include the deadweight losses that result from 
enforcing property rights” (Allen & Lueck, 2000, p. 647) 
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subject to random as well as weather shocks making the monitoring of these various stages 
and cycles difficult. The result is that the transaction costs of contracting this uncertainty in 
production increases (Allen & Lueck, 1998). The advantage of the owner-operated farm 
could then perhaps lie in the management i.e. since it is assumed that in the owner-operated 
farm all the management decisions are made by the family, and since they are the residual 
claimants of profit they would not be faced with the same incentives to shirk as hired 
management (Allen & Lueck, 1998). The owner-operated farm would therefore be superior in 
this instance because the transaction costs are lower.  
Therefore when considering the transaction cost approach it would seem to be important to 
remember that all individuals would only choose contracts or organizational forms that 
maximize their own expected value within the relationship (Allen & Lueck, 2000) and 
(Roberts & Milgrom, 1992). This does not necessarily have to be in the form of monetary 
gain however; instead it is dependent on the utility of that individual involved (Stigler, 1976).  
That is in every pattern of ownership there are various incentives that result in certain parties 
gaining at the expense of others (Allen & Lueck, 2000). Both the landowners and managers 
would therefore seek to mitigate amoral behaviour by altering the incentives given the 
various constraints, and the organizational form and contract chosen will be the one that 
lowers or has the lowest transaction costs (Allen & Lueck, 2000). 
2.2.2 Principle-Agent theory 
In the previous section it was shown that uncertainty results in increased transaction costs as 
a result of the difficulty in accounting for uncertainty in the contracts (James, Klein, & 
Sykuta, 2011), (Boland & Marsh, 2006) and (Allen & Lueck, 2000). In agriculture and 
specifically grain production this uncertainty can be caused by the weather and random 
shocks which, according to Roberts & Milgrom (1992), means that there is the potential for 
post-contractual opportunism between the parties involved. That is the agent has the potential 
to exploit23 the principle because their level of effort is hidden by the uncertainty from the 
principle and this therefore generates a moral hazard between the parties involved (Allen & 
Lueck, 2000).   
It is therefore said that under certain conditions of incomplete information and uncertainty 
there are two types of agency problems that can arise, those are adverse selection and moral 
hazard (Boland & Marsh, 2006). Adverse selection according to Boland & Marsh (2006) is 
the condition where the agent has asymmetrical information, and this makes it difficult for 
the principle to accurately determine if the agent is performing the tasks for which he is being 
paid. Allen & Lueck (2000) argue that this is because of the uncertainty generated by the 
weather that the agent can take advantage of the principle in several different ways. One of 
these many ways is that the managers could under-supply effort and blame any negative 
results on random weather patterns while the principle has no means of determining the 
actual cause of the negative outcome (Allen & Lueck, 2000).  
                                                 
23 Roberts and Milgrom (1992, pg. 42) take a negative view of people and suggest that “People will be very 
sharp in discovering even subtle ways in which they can advance their interests and that they will fundamentally 
be amoral, ignoring rules, breaking agreements, and employing guile, manipulation, and deception if they see 
personal gain in doing so”.  
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Therefore if individuals only choose contracts or organizational forms that maximize their 
own expected value, the moral hazard24 arises when their interests differ from the decision 
maker’s interests and they have the incentive not report complete and accurate information to 
the decision maker (Roberts & Milgrom, 1992). It is obvious that this would limit the ability 
of management to make good decisions. The moral hazard in this instance would therefore be 
an information problem that is created by the difficulty or costs associated with monitoring 
amoral behaviour or the enforcement of actions against amoral behaviour (Roberts & 
Milgrom, 1992).  
According to Allen & Lueck (1998) however, the owner-operated farm is able to avoid these 
agency problems, because as residual claimants to profits the family members would not have 
the incentive to withhold information or falsely report effort levels. Allen & Lueck (1998) 
argue that it is because of these moral hazards together with the lack in ability to specialize 
that the owner-operated farm is favoured above the other organizational forms in crops with 
short cycles such as field crops.  
In a study conducted by Larsen (2007) in which they used questionnaires to determine the 
levels of trust between collaborating farmers, they found that if there is a high level of trust 
between the collaborating farmers their incentives to shirk may be eliminated, and they offer 
this as a reason for the relatively simple nature of the contracts within agriculture. However 
Larsén (2007) study could have had a bias in the questionnaire such that the respondents 
could have falsely reported their answers as to whether or not they found moral hazards in 
their existing relationships.  
If this was so instead of the simple contracts in agriculture being explained by the lack of 
moral hazard (Larsén, 2007), it could be that there is a significant moral hazard, because the 
impacts of the actions that have efficiency consequences are not freely observable (Allen & 
Lueck, 2000), (Allen & Lueck, 1998), (Boland & Marsh, 2006) and (James, Klein, & Sykuta, 
2011). There is therefore no point in trying to specify the way in which the farmer should 
behave, as this would involve enormous transaction costs (Roberts & Milgrom, 1992).  
The principle therefore has to find methods and means of mitigating these moral hazards and 
Allen & Lueck (1998) suggest that it is for this reason that firms engage in agricultural 
production at either the beginning with the supply of intermediate inputs or at the end of the 
production process, while the owner-operated farms engage in and dominate the primary 
production process of agriculture (Allen & Lueck, 1998). An example of these firms could be 
the mill that gives out a marketing contract to the farmer. Although the company has very 
little say about the production decisions, the company to a certain extent controls these 
production decisions by paying different prices for quality as well as quantity. This would 
therefore create an incentive for the farmers to produce good quality commodities with high 
yields. The Global G.A.P standards in the fruit industry present a further example. Agency 
theory therefore suggests that the organizational form that best serves to squelch the moral 
                                                 
24 Roberts and Milgrom (1992) define a moral hazard as “the form of post contractual opportunism that arises 
because actions that have efficiency consequences are not freely observable and so the person taking them may 
choose to pursue his or her private interests at the expense of others” (Roberts & Milgrom, 1992). 
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hazard through incentives and contracts will be the predominant organizational form in the 
industry. 
2.2.3 Property rights 
According to Agency theory managers can behave in an opportunistic way because of 
contractual incompleteness and asymmetrical information (Roberts & Milgrom, 1992). This 
generates a moral hazard between the principle and the agent and is used to explain the 
dominance of the owner-operated farm. Boland & Marsh (2006) however argue that it is 
because of property rights that this moral hazard arises and this is thought to explain the 
persistence of the owner-operated farms.  
Mondelli & Klein (2013) argue this is important because when assets are highly specific to a 
project or enterprise they will have a lower value for other purposes and this subjects 
bondholders to opportunistic behaviour by the owner-manager of the farm (Mondelli & 
Klein, 2013). Therefore if property rights are absent Deininger & Byerlee (2012) suggest that 
there will be significant social and environmental risks for the strategies that employ these 
highly specific assets in production.  
For example if a company hires land and management from the farmer, should the contracts 
need to be renegotiated the farmer who owns the assets has more bargaining power than the 
company25, and the more complex and unique the asset or activities are the more disputes in 
need of renegotiation there will be (Boland & Marsh, 2006) and (Allen & Lueck, 1998). 
However since a considerable amount of resources are needed to establish and maintain these 
property rights in the renegotiation process, transaction costs become a determining factor in 
the success of the organizational form chosen (Buduru & Brem, 2007), (Hockmann & 
Svetlov, 2006) and (Deininger & Byerlee, 2012).  
One of the greatest advantages that the owner-operated farm has over a company hiring land 
and using production contracts is that since the owner-operated farm has fully functioning 
property rights and relies predominantly on family management they have the ability to 
minimize transaction costs and squelch moral hazard between themselves (Allen & Lueck, 
2000). However Allen & Lueck (2000) suggest that when the role of nature is diminished or 
the extension of seasons is possible, such as using greenhouses or orchards, the ability of the 
principle to monitor amoral behaviour and enforce their own property rights increases, and 
this favours the large factory style corporate farms. 
There are thus three predominant theories within the literature that try to provide some form 
of explanation for the dominance of owner-operated farms within the production of 
agricultural goods that are characterized by short cycles, with few distinct tasks (Allen & 
Lueck, 1998). These are transaction cost theory, principle-agent theory and lastly property 
rights theory. It could be, however that all three of these theories determine the functional 
form within agriculture. In other words, because of the difficulty in property rights there are 
various contracts that need to be written to monitor behaviour and these create the 
                                                 
25 This is because the owner of the land is the residual claimant to profits. 
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opportunity for post contractual opportunism. It is important to note however that what is 
cause and what effect is not known. 
 Efficiency of organizational forms 
Technical efficiency is described by Koopmans (1951) as a situation in which it is impossible 
to produce more of any output without producing less of some other outputs or using more of 
at least one input. If the inputs are used to produce the maximum output obtainable with those 
levels of inputs, the farm manager uses her/his inputs well to produce outputs. Allocative or 
price efficiency on the other hand is the measure of the firm’s success in choosing an optimal 
set of inputs to produce the output (Farrell, 1957).  Therefore efficiency, both allocative and 
technical, seems to hang on the management ability of the farmers.  
If the farmer does not have the management ability to know what the right amounts and in 
what combinations the inputs need to be used to generate the maximum amount of output 
given certain production constraints, one would not expect these farms to be producing 
outputs efficiently. These production constraints are generated by weather shocks as well as 
random shocks and while the owner-operated farms lack the ability to specialize, for the 
corporate farm there is a significant moral hazard that develops due to the fact that this 
management ability of the agent or manager in this case is unobservable (Allen & Lueck, 
1998). Sarris et al. (1999) seem to confirm Allen & Lueck’s (1998) argument and find that 
family run and owned farms are the most technically efficient followed by co-operatives and 
lastly by companies. In the next section, the effects of organizational form on both technical 
and allocative efficiency will be considered. 
2.3.1  Technical efficiency 
The impact of the organizational form on the efficiency of these farms is of considerable 
importance to this thesis, as inefficiency can have a drastic impact on both the profitability as 
well as the long term viability of any corporate farm. Contrary to the literature in support of 
the Inverse Relationship (Berry & Cline, 1979), there have been numerous authors who have 
found that there is a positive relationship between farm size and technical efficiency (Bojnec 
& Latruffe, 2013), (Deininger & Byerlee, 2012) and (Latruffe L. , Balcombe, Davidova, & 
Zawalinska, 2004). Helfand & Levine (2004) found that there is a U-shaped curve for 
economic efficiency with decreasing efficiency up to about 500 hectares, and then increasing 
efficiency up to 10-20 thousand hectares. It would seem then that these large farms do have 
the ability to be technically efficient. 
According to Deininger & Byerlee (2012) and Bojnec & Latruffe (2013), these high technical 
efficiency scores are attributed to preferential access to services such as credit and extension 
services. This improved access to credit and extension, according to Bojnec & Latruffe 
(2013) results in the farmer’s ability to employ capital intensive production techniques and 
suggest that this affinity for capital intensive production coupled with the ability to employ 
external factors such as rented land and labour add greatly to the technical efficiency of these 
large farms. 
This can be expected because larger farms have better access to machinery and other 
technology, helping them to more timeously attend to the various tasks on the farms. It could 
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also be coupled to the fact that larger farms have better access to the various markets and 
have the advantage of being able to afford transport, as well as solicit the skills of various 
industry specialists such as agronomists in this scenario. While larger farms are more 
technically efficient than smaller farms the organizational structure of these farms is not often 
discussed in the literature.  
With regards to the technical efficiency of the organizational form of the farm Fandel (2003) 
found that for farms in Slovakia, owner-operated farms were more technically efficient than 
agricultural co-operatives in crop and crop and dairy production. Similarly, Mathijs & 
Vranken (2000) in an empirical study performed in Hungary and Bulgaria, found that on 
average owner-operated farms were more efficient than co-operatives who were in turn less 
efficient than corporations or companies. These findings were similar to the predictions made 
by Allen & Lueck (1998): due to the potential for moral hazard the owner-operated farm 
would be the predominant form in the production of field crops with a low number of cycles 
and other production processes that limit the ability of the farmer to specialize in any certain 
aspect of his farm. Contrary to these findings however, Skold & Popov (1992) found that the 
technical efficiency scores for collective and state farms in the Stavropol region of Russia 
were high, and they concluded that eliminating inefficiencies in production would not 
increase the outputs of these farms. 
In line with the predictions of Allen & Lueck (1998) however, Fandel (2003), Latruffe et al 
(2004) and Deininger & Byerlee (2012) all found that on average co-operatives and 
corporations were more efficient in livestock production. Allen & Lueck (1998) argue that 
because livestock production has many production cycles the ability to specialize increases 
and the moral hazard can be avoided as a result of the ability to better monitor the various 
stages in production. It is as a result of this ability to specialize that the technical efficiency of 
these farms would be improved; however the allocative efficiency of these farms is also of 
utmost importance, and will be considered next.  
2.3.2 Allocative efficiency 
According to Bojnec & Latruffe (2013), the second component of economic efficiency is that 
of allocative efficiency which, contrary to technical efficiency and very much in line with the 
Inverse Relationship, has a negative relationship with size. That is small farms are less 
technically efficient but more allocatively efficient and profitable than larger farms. The 
overall effect on economic efficiency however is positive, which would suggest that large 
farms are more economically efficient than smaller farms (Bojnec & Latruffe, 2013).  
Within economic theory the production-allocation decisions are a set of constrained 
optimization problems, i.e. producers will optimize their objectives to certain constraints that 
are imposed by the production technology (Cherchye & Van Puyenbroeck, 2007). This is of 
course assuming that the farmers are profit maximizing and secondly that they have no 
incentive to not use resources inefficiently, i.e. they are guided by a set of prices within the 
market place and do not have any incentive to shirk. Liefert (2005) therefore argues that the 
raising of the allocative efficiency of input use requires flexibility of the managers in altering 
output levels as well as the input mixes in response to changes of both input and output 
prices. 
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For the corporate farm it could be that these assumptions are not applicable, and this would 
result in the moral hazard between the parties that Allen & Lueck (1998) advocate. The result 
would be allocative inefficiencies for these farms. Bojnec & Latruffe (2013) seem to confirm 
this result and they argue that allocative efficiency is reduced when farmers resort to external 
factors of production, i.e. hired land and labour.  
An example of this allocative inefficiency of corporate farms is rent. A company that doesn’t 
own land and has to rent the land should view land as an input into production and not a 
factor of production. This is because firstly they do not own the land and secondly they have 
to compete in the market place for land. As a result it is suggested that land rent would have 
an effect on the allocative efficiency, as there is an optimal proportion of the total input cost 
for land that can be achieved. The same can be said for hired management. 
Therefore, if the producers are hired managers and not owners one would expect the manager 
or agent to maximize his own objectives and not those of the principle. As shown before, this 
results in a considerable moral hazard between the contracted parties. One of the possible 
reasons for the low allocative efficiency of input use according to Liefert (2005) is poor 
decision-making by farm managers, which is complicated by the corporate structures and this 
limits the flexibility of the managers. This argument is confirmed by Cherchye & Van 
Puyenbroeck (2007) who found that the managers directly suggesting the wrong input mixes 
were an important source of inefficiency for East German farms.  
It is argued then that all the stages within the cycles, in this case, could generate a moral 
hazard between the two contracted parties in the various stages of production. It is suspected 
that it is these moral hazards that have a large impact on the allocative efficiency at which 
these farms operate. The short stages in this case could be viewed as the symptom and the 
moral hazards generated the cause of these symptoms. This problem is perpetuated by the 
difficulty in monitoring any unfavourable behaviour of the agent which generates 
considerable transaction costs between the two contracted parties which would have a 
negative impact on the allocative efficiency of these farms.  
From the above discussion it can be seen that there are various factors favouring the family 
owned, or commercial farm in the South African context. The majority of these benefits are 
derived from the owner-operated farms ability to avoid certain principle agent issues and 
transaction costs. There are also factors that favour the larger farms and these are mainly 
derived from the size of the operation, and these extremely large farms are generally thought 
to be corporate farms. It is important to remember however that it is not the size of the farms 
that determine the organizational form; it is rather the management structure. Therefore the 
owner-operated farm that has the ability to take advantage of “economies of size”, would be 
expected to be both technically and allocatively more efficient than a corporate farm.  
Chapter 3 describes the data that was used in this thesis, while Chapter 4 serves as the 
empirical analysis. This empirical analysis will determine both the technical and allocative 
efficiency with which these farms operate, with the hope of identifying in line with the above 
literature certain issues inhibiting the corporatization of crop farming. 
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Chapter 3: Data sources 
3 Introduction 
Chapter 3 will firstly discuss the Farmsecure Optimized Farming model so as to give the 
reader a bit of background on the model that is going to be analysed throughout the remainder 
of the thesis. Secondly the data obtained from the company and used in the thesis will be 
discussed whereby the various aggregations and statistical tests used will be explained. Lastly 
the preliminary data analysis will be performed on the data; this preliminary data analysis 
will then be used in Chapter 4 to determine the allocative, technical and economic efficiency 
with which the various farms operate at. 
 Introducing the Farmsecure Optimized Farming Model 
The Farmsecure group is a privately owned company that was founded in 2004 on four 
operational principles. These were Scientific Farming, Working Capital, Risk Mitigation and 
Price guarantee (Farmsecure Holdings, 2013). Between 2004 and 2011 the Farmsecure group 
provided finance to farmers, offering the farmers input finance and using the crop on the land 
as security for the funds. These farmers were required to take out multi-peril insurance, where 
the insurance companies would issue a percentage guarantee of the long term yield i.e. if the 
farmer’s long term average yield was 4 tons per hectare and the insurance guarantee was 60% 
of the long term yield, Farmsecure would thus provide finance up to 2.4 tons per hectare. The 
grain produced would thus be delivered on behalf of Farmsecure to the Co-op, and 
Farmsecure would thus generate their income from providing finance as well as the selling of 
grain.  
After the 2010/2011 season the Farmsecure group decided to go into an agreement with 
selected farmers from the Contract Growers (CG) model into what would be known as the 
Farmsecure Optimized Farming (FOF) model. The idea behind this new arrangement was 
that Farmsecure Grains (FG) would mandate certain farmers based on specific selection 
criteria to conduct farming activities for and on behalf of FG as the principle farmer on the 
cropland. The company thus decided to move towards primary agriculture so as to be able to 
fulfill their vision or mission statement which was to be “a meaningful contributor to 
securing the world’s food supply by creating sustainable and profitable agricultural 
enterprises, where the process is optimized from ‘farm to shelf’” (Farmsecure Holdings, 
2013). With this the contractor (farmer) was to, on the date of commencement, discontinue 
occupying the land on his own behalf and instead occupy the land on the behalf of FG. These 
were not forced sales however and the arrangement was entered into willingly by both 
parties. This sustainability for the farmer was thus derived from the company’s ability to 
obtain discounts on the majority of the farms inputs by owning input companies26.  
                                                 
26 The main input companies under the Farmsecure banner included amongst others Kynoch fertilizers who 
provided the fertilizer for the farmers as well as Intellichem who provide amongst other things the chemicals for 
the farmers. 
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Together with these input companies Farmsecure Holdings owned a grain marketing or 
trading company known as Farmsecure Global Markets. The company also had other 
subsidiaries such as Farmsecure Agri Science (FAS) who employed roughly 140 agricultural 
scientists from eleven different fields including Agronomists and Soil Scientists amongst 
others (Farmsecure Holdings, 2013). The idea behind the FOF model was thus to optimize 
each transaction in the value chain as in their mission statement “from farm to shelf”, with 
the company taking a cut from each link in the chain. These farmers would thus to act as an 
agent of FG in the sense that the farmers were to carry out the day to day running of these 
farms on behalf of FG who decided on what was to be produced at what time, and how the 
produce was to be marketed. The advantage for the farmers was thus to an extent “risk free” 
production as the company paid for all of the farmers running costs, but not their overhead 
costs such as machinery finance and so on. They were however remunerated for the usage of 
their machinery via a contractor’s fee as well as for their land via rental agreements. Lastly 
the farmers were remunerated for their management via a management fee which will be 
discussed later on. 
Farmsecure in the year of study 2011/2012 rented roughly 90 000ha of crop land from 51 
different farmers, and produced grains such as soya-beans, white maize, yellow maize, 
sunflowers and to a lesser extent peanuts. Farmsecure thus provided an integrated and holistic 
service with various subsidiaries under the Farmsecure banner. These subsidiaries for the 
most part operated internally and each made profits one way or another out of the farming 
operations i.e. FAS would do consulting work for FG and FG would pay FAS for the 
services. With the high level of expertise within the organization most of the focus was on 
producing or maximizing output, which does not necessarily relate to or result in profitability 
which is a common misconception.  
The company’s focus was thus put onto the technical aspects of agricultural production, while 
assuming that the incentives for all of the parties involved would be aligned with the broader 
goal of the company i.e. if the farmers had the incentive to encourage maximum yield as they 
got remunerated for doing so, while the input companies also had the incentive to aim for 
maximum output and thus input usage as they had a name or reputation to build. This was all 
carried out at the broader expense of the company as in trying to achieve their goals of 
maximizing output; they neglected the profitability side of their operations. This will be 
shown later on with the efficiency study of these farms, as it will be shown that the technical 
efficiency of these farms is relatively high while the allocative and subsequently economic 
efficiency of these farms is not. 
The farmers joining the model could thus to an extent have been considered to be “risk 
averse” as the majority of the production and marketing risk was absorbed by the company. 
The financial standing of these farmers prior to the study was unfortunately not known to the 
Author, however from the discussion of the selection criteria discussed later on it could be 
assumed that there were a few relatively strong farmers in good financial standing as FG did 
target the more prosperous farmers in certain regions so as to create a positive stigmatism 
about the model. This will be discussed later on. 
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 Farmsecure Optimized Farming Framework Agreement 
The selection criteria were to a large extent subjective in the sense that farmers who were 
identified to be trustworthy, certain farmers were identified by FG based on their ability to 
work with FG over a longer time frame without intensions of being dishonest thus requiring 
less supervision, would go over into the new model. The other criteria for selection were 
based on geographical location, where farmers were chosen that farmed in an area best suited 
to the crops FG wanted to be grown; mainly maize, soya-beans and sunflowers. Farmsecure 
Grains also selected a few large farmers as they believed they were prominent members in 
their communities as well as the broader farming communities. For example, some of these 
farmers won the SA grain farmer of the year competition; these farmers were assumed to 
create a positive impression about the group so as to encourage other farmers to join the 
model. 
The farmer however was not appointed by FG as a representative or employee of FG. The 
agreement was thus not intended to constitute a partnership between FG and the farmer in 
question. It was structured in such a way that it meant, amongst other things neither party 
would be liable for another party’s debts incurred in any way, other than that specified by the 
agreement (contract) between FG and the farmer.  
With regards to employment and labour on the specific farms, the responsibility of employing 
suitably qualified and experienced staff to conduct farming activities was placed upon the 
farmer and, per the contract; the farmer had an obligation to do so. These employees were to 
remain the responsibility of the farmers and FG would not accept any responsibility for such 
employees if given orders and or instructions by the farmers. The employees of these farmers 
were to be paid by the farmer who would then be reimbursed by FG. This in short meant that 
the farmer would be responsible for the employee’s and FG would foot their labour bill, and 
there was no means of guarding against the over-employment of labour on these farms.   
The farmer was thus kept so as to conduct the farming activities on the cropland by applying 
their skills and expertise. This would be done by applying their farming know how and 
manage their human resources by applying best farming practices. The agronomical services 
and advice however was to be carried out by the Agronomical team (FAS) on behalf of FG. 
The Agronomical team (FAS) together with FG would draw up these production plans by 
having inputs into each stage of the production. These are as follows: 
3.2.1 Planting Season 
Farmsecure Grains would have the sole and exclusive right to unilaterally determine which 
lands would be planted to what, and after these decisions had been made the seasonal 
production plan as well as the seasonal budget would be amended accordingly.  
3.2.1.1 Management and Accounting Procedures 
The Farmer’s would then meet with a representative of FG on a monthly basis to discuss the 
management accounts and to compare the seasonal budget with the actual 
expenditure/income and monitor the progress of the crop in terms of the seasonal production 
plan and agronomical reports. This was carried out to an extent to monitor the farmer. 
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3.2.1.2 Best Farming Practices 
The Agronomical team was thus appointed to perform agronomical services for and on behalf 
of FG in accordance with the seasonal production plan; these included but were not limited 
to:  
 The planning of the Planting Season; 
 Pre-plant inspection; 
 Emergence inspection; 
 Progress inspections; 
 Pre-harvest inspections; and  
 Crop Yield estimates. 
The agronomical teams therefore advised the company as to the levels of inputs to be applied 
and the company applies the levels and types of inputs recommended. The decisions as to the 
operations of the farms were not given to the farmers rather they were structured in a 
corporate fashion involving various processes. 
3.2.1.3 Marketing and Hedging of Crop 
Throughout the season, with regards to pricing, marketing and hedging of the crop, FG had 
the sole right to and was obliged to determine and establish the price at which the entire Crop 
was hedged and/or sold at. This right was to be exercised with reasonable care and expertise 
to ensure that the crop was hedged and/or sold at the best price possible under the current 
circumstances.  
3.2.2 Payment 
The payments were to be structured as follows; Farmsecure Grains would pay for the various 
inputs into production, directly to the suppliers of such inputs, as well as pay rental for land 
as well as machinery calculated in various ways, this was to be either paid on a monthly or 
yearly basis. Farmsecure Grains on top of these payments to be made for the inputs would 
pay the farmers for their efforts in the form of a management fee or contractors profit, for the 
work he had done on the farm. 
The work the farmer was required to do on the farm to earn this management fee and 
contractors profit was to ensure that the best farming practices were carried out during the 
season; these included but weren’t limited to: 
 The timeous preparation of the Cropland for the planting of the Crop; 
 The establishment of the Crop in correctly prepared soil with sufficient moisture;  
 Clearing the lands of weeds by sufficient spraying and/or hoeing; 
 The application of sufficient pest control to safeguard the Crop; 
 Assisting Farmsecure Grains and the Agronomical Team with the harvesting of the 
Crop speedily, adequately and efficiently at the due time;  
 Only if directed by Farmsecure Grains, to assist with the delivery the Crop to the silo 
or storage facility, and 
 Any further practices which the Farmsecure Agronomical Services may, in its sole 
discretion, prescribe from time to time. 
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The farmer was also obligated to protect the crop against theft, damage, disease, pests, 
parasites, bacteria and viruses. Below is a discussion and description of calculations made for 
the various fees and rentals the farmer would receive. 
3.2.2.1 Contractors Profit (Management Fee) 
The farmer was to receive a “contractor’s profit” or management fees which was a 
predetermined amount per ton of yield delivered. This amount was predetermined based on 
the type of crop grown and the amounts for the different crops were as follows; 
 Maize: Yellow and White R 300/ton produced, 
 Soya beans R 550/ ton 
 Sunflowers R 600/ton; 
These amounts were to be paid by FG in three installments based on the Long Term Average 
Yield (LTAY). These payments were structured in such a fashion that there would be two 
advance payments and one final payment and these payments were calculated on the 
following basis; 
An advance payment of one third would be paid out upon the opening of the season, and this 
payment was determined according to the LTAY, another advance payment of one third was 
to be paid out seven days after the crop emergence, this payment was to then be calculated on 
the actual yield estimated after emergence of the crop, this was amongst other things based on  
the stand or percentage of the plants that actually germinated, and would be adjusted upwards 
or downwards to accommodate for any variances between the LTAY and the crop yield 
estimate. 
The remainder of the contractor profit was to be paid thirty days after the harvesting and 
delivery of the crop and after the actual Yield was determined. This payment was to be 
calculated on the actual yield, and the amount would be adjusted upwards or downwards to 
accommodate for variances between the crop yield estimates and the actual yield delivered, 
this was then adjusted for any under or over payment received by the farmer with regards to 
the second payment made to them. However if the farmers were over paid so that the value 
they received after the second payment was more than they should have received after the 
third payment, i.e. the crop estimates were horribly off, the farmer was not required to pay 
back the deficit.  
3.2.2.2 Profit Sharing 
Together with the above mentioned Contractors Profits (management fees), the farmer was 
entitled to an additional profit sharing, if any, after the completion of the fifth planting season 
as set out in the contract. These profits according to the contract were to be determined as 
follows; 
By deducting (i) the expenses incurred in terms of the Seasonal Budgets over the first to fifth 
Planting Seasons; (ii) the contractor’s profits paid out  in the description of the management 
fees above over the first to fifth planting seasons; and (iii) any seasonal losses carried over 
from planting season to planting season over the first to fifth planting seasons. The farmer 
and FG would each be entitled to half (50%) of the Additional Profits.  
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3.2.2.3 Losses 
With regards to any losses that might have occurred from season to season, the losses 
together with accrued interest were to be carried over to the next planting season, and if these 
losses were incurred the farmer would not be liable for any proportion of such losses, and the 
farmer would be entitled to have access to the accounting records used to determine the 
additional profits or losses. In the event of the farmer disputing the additional profits or losses 
the farmer could at his own expense, be entitled to have it verified by an independent auditor. 
3.2.2.4 Rental of the Land 
The Cropland was to be let to FG for the purpose of farming activities and the rent of the crop 
land was to be determined in the following fashion. Should the farmer be held by a current 
rental agreement with a third party, FG would simply take over this rental contract and pay 
the amount agreed upon before FG came onto the scene. For the farmers own land a 
negotiation process was entered into and a fair rental for both the farmer as well as FG was 
aimed for. In many instances the rental was market related however in many instances this 
was a price floor as FG stated that they would not pay less than this. Another method used to 
calculate a fair rental value was that the rent would equal the amount of monies the farmers 
would be able to borrow from the bank against this land. For example it was said that the 
farmer would be able to get finance to the value of 50% of his entire lands value over a ten 
year period, and FG would thus pay rental equal to the repayment required for such a loan at 
the prime interest rate, this value however was a price ceiling for land, and FG would have 
paid some value between these two values for the rental of this land. 
This seasonal budget would be revisited by both FG as well as the farmer on a yearly basis, 
and in the contract it states that the rental may be revisited. In the event of a failure to revise 
the seasonal budget the rental amount in the last agreed upon seasonal budget would be 
deemed to be the rental payable until such time that the seasonal budget be revisited between 
the two parties. The cost of water, electricity and or gas used on the cropland was to be paid 
directly to whoever provided such services and would be borne by the farmer. 
The farmer at his own expense would be responsible for maintaining in good order and 
condition the infrastructure, and promptly repair or make good any damages to the 
infrastructure. If the farmer failed to carry out any of his obligations of maintenance and 
repair in terms of the contract, FG would be entitled to cause the necessary maintenance or 
repair to be carried out and then recover the reasonable costs from the farmer on demand. 
3.2.2.5 Rental of the Equipment 
The farmer was appointed by FG as an independent contractor to conduct the farming 
activities on the croplands to produce the entire crop for FG as well as to manage and operate 
the croplands. This would be achieved by FG ensuring that the farmer had the necessary 
equipment to enable the farmer to perform the farming activities by paying the farmer a usage 
fee for the use of the farmer’s equipment.  
This usage fee was to be determined in the following fashion; the rental was set at eight 
percent of the machines value, and five percent of the implements value. This was then paid 
to the farmers as rental for their equipment. The repairs and maintenance as well as the diesel 
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for these machines were also paid for by Farmsecure, and so the eight and five percent of 
value was only paid for the usage of the machines and implements respectively. Also taken 
into consideration when determining these amounts was the farmers ability to furbish the 
repayments for such machines, i.e. the values required for hired purchase agreements from 
banks was also taken into account (HP is over 5 years and the calculations are determined 
over 10 years thus paying double for the machines) when deciding on a fair value to be paid 
to the farmer for the usage of his machines. 
The duration of this rental agreement would be on a yearly basis after which the contract 
would be reviewed and renewed thirty days prior to the expiration of the agreement. Once an 
agreement between the two parties had been reached, the farmer was to discontinue using the 
equipment on his own behalf, and commence doing so for and on behalf of FG.  
The farmer was thus solely responsible for and would bear the full costs of the regular 
servicing of the equipment per the normal servicing plans. There was however an amount set 
out in the seasonal budget to be paid by FG for the repairs and maintenance and the farmer 
was to be, within limits reimbursed for the monies spent on such repairs and maintenance. 
The farmer was however responsible for and obligated to keep the equipment insured. This 
was changed later as the farmers misused it. 
3.2.2.6 Production Input Costs 
Production input costs was for the purpose of the contract mean to be the amount that FG 
would pay in accordance with the seasonal budget. This budget specified the administrative 
fees, the contractor’s profits (management fees), the maximum production input costs, the 
amount paid in terms of the equipment usage agreement as well as the amount to be paid in 
terms of the rental agreement. This budget was to be revised on an annual basis before the 
opening of every season by the parties concerned.  
Farmsecure Grains would during the course of the agreement pay the production input costs 
set out more fully in the seasonal budget, and the payments were to be paid out on behalf of 
FG directly to the suppliers of the farmer unless the seasonal budget expressly stated 
otherwise. 
3.2.2.7 Replanting  
Should the need for replanting have arisen, the farmer together with a representative from the 
Farmsecure Agronomic team would jointly decide whether the crop had to be replanted 
during the course of the season. This decision was still heavily dependent on the decision 
made by the representative of the Farmsecure Agronomical team, as it stated in the contract 
that should the decision be given timeously and justified in accordance with the best farming 
practices in the area by the Farmsecure representative be made not to replant, and the farmer 
carried on with the replanting of the crop, the farmer would be replanting the crop at his own 
risk and expense.  
3.2.2.8 Rights and Obligations of the Farmer 
The farmer had various rights and obligations to FG as will be discussed in this section. With 
regards to land owned and leased by the farmer, they were to disclose all farming activities 
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conducted on such land. They also had to offer and make available all of their agricultural 
properties to FG for the inclusion in the rental agreement as cropland. Farmsecure Grains in 
their sole discretion was to accept the offer to include such properties as it deemed suitable 
for the inclusion as cropland. It was also stated in the contract that for the duration of the 
contract, the farmer would conduct all farming activities on the cropland exclusively with 
FG. The farmer was thus prohibited from conducting for his own account or in terms of any 
commercial agreement with a third party, any farming activities that were the same as those 
conducted in the agreement, on any property for the duration of the agreement.  
3.2.2.9 Alienation or Addition of Property 
Thus for the duration of the contract between FG and the farmer, the farmer would not be 
entitled to alienate, dispose or encumber the crop lands and/or equipment in any way by 
means of mortgage or bond without the written consent of FG. In the event of the farmer 
wanting to hire additional property for inclusion as cropland, the farmer would need to make 
a request to FG in writing, and FG would in its sole discretion decide whether to include such 
additional property as cropland and on what terms and conditions the property would be 
included.   
3.2.2.10 Ownership of Crop 
Once this was determined it was established that the ownership of any crop planted by or on 
behalf of FG on the cropland for the duration of the agreement should pass to FG on 
severance from the cropland irrespective of how or by whom or on whose behalf it was 
severed before or after the termination of the contract. The farmer thus had to confirm that 
upon severance of the crop from the cropland it would hold, receive and take delivery and 
possession of the crop for and on behalf of FG, and no third party would have a claim on such 
harvest. Farmsecure Grains would also have the exclusive right to the Cropland during crop 
resting periods, and the Contractor would not be entitled to allow livestock to feed on the 
Crop rests without prior written consent of Farmsecure Grains.   
3.2.2.11 Harvesting and Delivery 
The crop was only to be harvested in the presence, and under supervision of an authorized 
representative of FG and or the Farmsecure Agronomical team, and FG would ensure that 
such a representative be available in a timeous fashion to supervise the harvesting of the crop. 
To monitor the yields it was stated that FG would be entitled to equip all harvesters that are 
used to harvest the crop with a yield monitor to be installed at the farmer’s expense. 
The farmer would thus as a representative of FG hold, receive and take delivery and 
possession of the harvested crop for and on behalf of FG as the owner of the crop. It was also 
stated that when the farmer received authorization by FG in writing, the farmer would deliver 
the harvest, or assist in the delivery of the harvest, at the times and places of delivery as 
directed by FG. This delivery was to take place in the name of FG, and the silo certificates 
were to strictly be in the name of FG. The farmer was to inform FG without delay of such 
deliveries, failing which the farmer would be held liable to FG for payment of any additional 
costs associated with failure to do so. Any payment received by the farmer for and in respect 
of the delivered crop, was to be immediately paid to FG and any attempt to harvest or deliver 
the crop in such a way that deprived FG from the benefits of the crop would constitute a 
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criminal offence. The purpose of this clause in the contract was to oblige the farmer to deliver 
the tonnage of the entire crop, by trying to limit the capacity for any deviation or unfavorable 
behavior on the farmer’s part. 
 Data 
The data used in this dissertation was gathered from FG in the form of management accounts, 
which had detailed financial information on the production for the various farms. This was 
cross sectional data with 51 farmers spread out in six different areas of the maize belt in 
South Africa, namely the North West Province, the Eastern, Southern and Western Free-state, 
Mpumalanga and Northern Natal. The data was measured and recorded in the 2011/2012 
production season and the management accounts therefore included only one year’s worth of 
production records, making the data one dimensional. 
The next step was to edit the data; this was done so as to remove errors and or outliers that 
would seriously affect the end results of the efficiency analysis to be performed on the data. 
This step involved identifying outliers and or errors in the data in the form of either 
typographical errors, or observations that were unusual. There were not many of these errors 
however and in total five typographical errors were found and corrected accordingly. Other 
data editing that took place was that of the aggregation of the various outputs, and in most 
cases inputs as discussed below. 
There were five different types of outputs produced by various farms, these were white 
maize, yellow maize, sunflowers, soya-beans and in some cases peanuts. The majority of the 
farms however produced either white and or yellow maize and the other three crops 
mentioned either made up a small portion of the farming activities or were not produced by 
the farms at all. Since the  amount of farmers that produced Soya-beans, Sunflowers and 
Peanuts were in such a minority, these outputs were all added using their weights in the form 
of the total productive area as well as their respective prices, so as to be able to compute one 
output per farm for all of the farms.  
The aggregation of the outputs was made easy by the fact that the management accounts had 
detailed accounting information for the various quantities of the specific crops harvested as 
well as the prices received for their respective commodities. That is, there was detailed price 
and quantity information available so as to be able to combine the value of these products 
using the output price and quantity vectors respectively and, because of the fact that the data 
was cross sectional; there was no need to deflate prices. The output was thus calculated in the 
form of total revenue earned by either the whole farm or on a per hectare basis if the total 
output was to be divided by the total area of production.  
The reason for aggregating these outputs was simply because not all the farms produced all 
the commodities, and in most cases the largest portion of production for any given farm was 
the production of either white or yellow maize, or a combination thereof. The aggregation of 
these various outputs then gave a weighted value of revenue per hectare that the various 
farms produced, and it was assumed that it would be better and easier to analyze the various 
farms from the same base. Another important reason for calculating the output in this way 
was because of the way the management accounts for the inputs were prepared.  
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The management accounts calculated the value of inputs applied as an overall average value 
as well as a value per commodity. However in the process of calculating the farm inventories, 
if there were certain inputs left over after the planting season, the value of the input left over 
was subtracted from the total value of the input. That is say for example a farm produced 
1000 hectares of yellow maize, 200 hectares of soya-beans and 300 hectares of sunflowers 
and there was 100 tons of fertilizer leftover after the planting season, this amount was 
subtracted in equal shares as opposed to proportional shares from each enterprise. This then 
seems to affect the total amount used by each enterprise, as the specific usage of the input 
then gets “crowded”27 by the total and or final amount reported. This possibly tends to 
understate the share of the left over inputs of the largest enterprise, while over stating the 
share of leftover inputs of the smallest enterprise. Although this is an acceptable measure in 
accounting, this is not a useful measure in efficiency analysis. Therefore by aggregating these 
values the chances of errors as mentioned above as well as typographical errors was reduced 
as there was less chance of incorrectly subtracting inventory from any specific enterprise.   
The management accounts were therefore very helpful in the sense that they contained 
detailed information on the area of land hired and planted, as well as the amounts paid for the 
various inputs applied to this land. That is they contained information on the average level of 
inputs applied (R/ha) for the production of the total output, and these values per definition 
took into account both the price paid for the inputs as well as the quantities of the various 
inputs applied. It was assumed that the difference between the amounts paid for inputs by the 
various farms could be attributed to the difference in quality of the inputs used, especially for 
the intermediate inputs such as fertilizer and chemicals. This assumption was safe to make as 
all the inputs were acquired from input companies owned by Farmsecure, and thus all the 
prices for the various products would be assumed to be the same, and any difference in price 
would be as a result of the formulation or quality of the product being applied.  
The advantage of working with the data in this form is that you take away the various 
complications of having many different outputs and variables, which in some cases tend to be 
collinear, and you combine them into one making the comparisons between the farms 
possible, as now you are measuring and comparing everything from the same basis. That is 
for an aggregated output at a Gross Margin per hectare level.  
The disadvantage however is that because of the fact that the data is represented in such a 
manner there is a difficulty in identifying efficient farms from inefficient farms. This is partly 
because of the fact that the units of measurement become very unspecific as a result of the 
various varieties of the inputs that are being used. It would thus be suggested that quantities 
as well as prices be recorded in future so as to be able to identify the inefficient farms, by 
being able compare both the amounts of inputs used in the production as well as the prices 
paid for the various inputs in production. 
Being that as it may, these variables were then split into the following subsections; Directly 
Allocatable Variable Inputs and Indirectly Allocatable Variables Inputs. In doing so, it was 
                                                 
27 Crowded in the sense that the true amount of input used to produce that commodity cannot be determined as 
the leftover inputs are pooled together and subtracted from the total amount of input used, and not in the same 
proportions as the crops planted. 
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hoped that it would facilitate the identification of the possible variables to be used firstly in 
the production function, and then secondly to identify variables that could potentially be used 
in the Cost Function when trying to establish both Technical Efficiency (te), and secondly 
Allocative Efficiency (ae), so as to try and identify possible issues with the model. The 
variables were grouped into the following sub-headings; 
 Directly Allocatable Variable Inputs: Chemicals (R/ha), Diesel (R/ha), Fertilizer 
(R/ha), Seed (R/ha), Precision (R/ha), Labour (R/ha), Land Rent (R/ha), Machinery 
Rent (R/ha) and Lime Corrections (R/ha). 
 Indirectly Allocatable Variable Inputs:  Management Fees (R/ha), Hedging Costs 
(R/ha), Crop Insurance (R/ha), Silo Costs (R/ha), Admin Costs (R/ha), General 
Expenses (R/ha), Contractors Fee’s (R/ha), Repairs and Maintenance (R/ha), 
Accounting Fee’s (R/ha) and lastly Interest (R/ha). 
This distinction seemed the best, because of the difficulty in assigning non-directly 
allocatable variable costs directly to the production of various outputs. It was thus assumed 
that the production function would be best represented by the directly allocatable variable 
inputs, which include the original factors of production as well as intermediate inputs into 
production, simply because without these variables production is not possible, or it is 
severely diminished.  
Similarly for the non-directly allocatable variable costs (Indirect Expenses), such as the 
management fees paid to the farmers, these costs are just as important to production from the 
company’s perspective, and it is these variables that have a large bearing on the 
profitableness of the model. These variables are thus used together with the directly 
allocatable variable costs in the determination of the cost function, and later on the 
determination of allocative efficiency of the farms. 
The distinction between the above variables is made because of the fact that in many cases 
the non-directly allocatable inputs, contributed roughly half of the total costs of production, 
and it was thus assumed that leaving these costs out of the efficiency analysis of the various 
farms would be a grave mistake that grossly underestimated the true allocative efficiency of 
the various farms in question. Although the data from the management accounts, was perhaps 
not specific enough in certain aspects, such as those of detailed price and quantity 
information of the intermediate inputs. It could be that these values or hectare amounts of the 
various inputs could be a better measure to use in the efficiency analysis of Agriculture, 
especially in the production of field crops, because of the industry specific pre- and co-
requisites of the use of certain inputs.  
 Inputs used in the Production Function 
The inputs to be used in the production function encompassed the original factors of 
production, which were land in hectares as well as price paid for the land i.e. land rental, and 
labour. The price paid for the land or the land rental was assumed to be indicative of the 
market for land in the specific area, as well as a quality adjusted value, as represented by the 
area in which the farming activities were to take place. That is land in the Eastern Freestate 
for example was cheaper than land in the Western Freestate, and within districts certain farms 
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were cheaper than others, and it is because of this fact that it was assumed that the price paid 
for the land was a good reflection of the market for land, as well as the quality of the land to 
be hired.  
It is important to remember however, that only crop land was to be hired, and thus land that 
could be too steep to farm, or any other inhibiting factor to crop production was not taken 
into account, and thus the only differences in quality between the farms would be as a result 
of differences in soil quality, and not physical aspects of the farms per se. The farms in the 
broader sense could thus be viewed as being heterogeneous with regards to the soil quality of 
the specific farms, however they are relatively homogenous in the sense that only crop land 
was to be hired, and thus all geographical differences between the farms could be to a large 
extent ignored. 
The labour measure used in this case was the amount paid out to the workers on the various 
farms. This was taken as an amount paid out per hectare, and it encompassed the presence or 
absence of farm managers, which might not be an ideal measure. However since the type of 
data was collected from the management accounts, this was the nearest estimate to the 
amount of labour used in production, and any assumptions made around this fact to try and 
decompose the labour bill lead to issues in the regression analysis such as multi-collinearity. 
Data deconstruction with regards to labour was thus to a large extent not possible. That being 
said, it was still assumed to be a relatively good measure because of the fact that the total 
value paid out in wages was a quality adjusted value that took into account both general farm 
workers as well as farm managers. Therefore it was a reflection of the total use of labour into 
the production of the output, even though the exact distinction between the two different 
types of labour, i.e. blue or white collar labour was not or could not be determined.  
Intermediate inputs into production included inputs such as fertilizer, chemicals, seed, lime 
corrections and diesel. Diesel was used together with the value paid for the hire of machinery 
or the use thereof. This was done because of the fact that the use of diesel without machinery 
is not to a large extent possible, and similarly machinery use without diesel is also not 
possible. The diesel was used because of the fact that an accurate measure of firstly the kilo-
watts (KW) or size of the tractor fleet was almost impossible to determine from the available 
data, and thus it was assumed that the diesel use coupled with the value of machinery rent 
would be a better and more accurate measure of the machinery used in the production of the 
outputs. 
Another intermediate input used in the analysis of the production function, and subsequently 
the determination of technical efficiency was that of “precision”. This was a service supplied 
to the grain farms by one of the mother company Farmsecure subsidiary companies 
Farmsecure Agri Science. This was taken to be a directly allocatable or intermediate input, 
because of the fact that the advice offered by these industry specialists was for each 
productive unit or on per hectare basis. It was therefore assumed that this was a form of 
specialized labour used in the production of the various crops. 
An important point to take into consideration is the use of capital inputs into production, 
which generally poses a problem. This is because of the fact that capital items generally 
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represent stocks, while intermediate inputs are flows. Thus it is generally necessary to 
calculate the service flows that are generated by the capital stocks, and these generally 
include the depreciation on the capital stock plus the running costs. The problem with assets, 
and the correct selection of assets to be used and accounted for in the FOF model, is thus 
either an extremely difficult or easy concept to consider. 
It is a difficult concept to consider if one tries to identify, what the actual assets employed 
are, however if one considers the following it suddenly seems to make the distinction 
somewhat easier. If the company hires the land as well as machinery from the farmers, and 
pay different prices for these (one assumes because of quality), the reality is that perhaps the 
company does not view these investments as assets, rather they view these investments as 
inputs into production. It was therefore assumed that the difference in price would provide a 
quality adjusted measure for both the machinery used as well as the land rented. Therefore 
this measure of “capital” was again measured in an amount per hectare format, and it was this 
value that was used in the efficiency analysis of the farms.  
 Preliminary data Analysis 
The variables used in the determination of the production function are summarized in table 1 
below. Table 1 shows the maximum, minimum and mean values of the variables for the 
sample, as well as the standard deviations for the year in question. There is generally plenty 
of variation between the variables, and this is a positive result as it allows for estimation. The 
large standard deviation (as measured by a per hectare amount), would tend to indicate a high 
level of heterogeneity surrounding the production decisions of the various farmers. Therefore 
when running the analysis, it was also important to keep in mind that there is quite possibly a 
high level of heterogeneity between the various farms in the model; this is as a result of the 
farms being in different areas facing different weather conditions and having differing soil 
characteristics. It is important to remember however, that because of the fact that the data is 
cross-sectional, panel-data techniques were of little consequence and time was thus assumed 
to have random effects that produce only variance and not bias, and this is the variance upon 
which the analysis was done.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Production Function variables 
 
The large variation between the variables, as well as the relatively large differences between 
the minimum and maximum values could possibly be as a result of varying weather 
conditions, between the production areas. This could be expected because of the fact that 
there is such a vast difference in the areas with which the grains are produced. The Output is 
measured in R/ha and is simply calculated by dividing the total income the farms received by 
the area produced on the farm as discussed above. The same can be said for almost every 
Variable Observations Mean (R/ha) Std. Dev. (R/ha) Min (R/ha) Max (R/ha)
Output 51 8413.01 3427.33 1619.70 15742.25
Land 51 1046.67 659.46 310.44 3592.36
Labour 51 421.00 179.31 135.14 1017.01
Precision 51 117.26 85.08 0.00 347.99
Fertilizer 51 1984.16 601.18 833.17 3479.61
Seed 51 822.42 292.33 297.53 1578.20
Chemicals 51 647.29 333.51 139.13 1556.64
Machinery 51 757.04 484.64 125.13 2207.31
Diesel 51 835.13 217.02 252.28 1345.40
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
36 
 
single other input used in the production function, and as can be seen from table 1, the 
amounts paid for the various inputs also vary widely from farm to farm, and this could again 
be as a result of the area these farms are producing in, as well as the types or varieties of the 
inputs being used in the production by the various farms.  
Since the variables are being reported in a value per hectare or R/ha amount it could be 
assumed that these variables are quality adjusted, as is reflected by the price paid for the 
labour and land. Other intrinsic differences such as the slope of the land or the quality of the 
soil might not be a completely reflected in the data, as the price could be indicative of the 
area that the land is being hired in rather than a true reflection of the quality of the soil. 
In the case of FOF however, this could be slightly different, as it was written in the contract 
that only crop land was to be hired, and secondly an agronomic team was to be used, and thus 
it was assumed that they could improve the soil quality, maybe not to exact levels as a result 
of the innate differences between the farms, but improve it none the less. It is therefore safe 
to assume that the soil qualities of farmers in similar areas would be of a similar standard. 
Similarly for the use of inputs applied, this was an aggregated measure of different types of 
inputs, which may vary in quality as well as composition, and thus price. From an agronomic 
perspective in crop production, this is to be expected, as plants have certain requirements of 
certain elements at scientifically determined rates, and this is determined by the quality and 
type of soil being cultivated, this will be discussed later on in the dissertation.  
Table 2 below completes this preliminary analysis of the data by reporting the correlation 
coefficients for the various variables that were to be used in the determination of the 
production function, and subsequently the determination of the technical efficiency of the 
various farms in question. 
Table 2: Correlation Coefficients for Production Function variables 
 
From table 2, it can be seen that the majority of variables are behaving quite well. Variables 
such as land and labour seem to be behaving in the manner expected, in the sense that they 
are positively correlated with the output. The only variable that is negatively correlated with 
output is that of precision. This for the most part does not make sense, as one would expect 
the precision farming to be enhancing production, not the opposite as is observed. The 
negative correlation between precision and the other intermediate inputs also makes sense as 
one would expect the amounts of inputs being used to decrease with an increased use of 
precision farming. However since this is a service which is supposed to lead to the optimal 
use of these inputs perhaps the inputs have been reduced too much which would possibly 
explain the negative correlation with production. The diesel is another variable that is not 
really behaving, in the sense that it is for the most part negatively correlated with quite a few 
ouptut land labor precis~n fert seed chem machinerydiesel
ouptut 1
land 0.2687 1
labor 0.5225 0.0654 1
precision -0.1728 0.1719 0.013 1
fert 0.5437 0.3999 0.2393 -0.1691 1
seed 0.4174 -0.0195 0.3179 -0.3181 0.4574 1
chem 0.4505 -0.1337 0.3928 -0.1143 0.3081 0.637 1
machinery 0.3438 -0.1009 0.3737 0.1282 0.1135 0.1386 0.3134 1
diesel 0.13 -0.0858 0.0299 -0.2159 0.1148 -0.0227 -0.1555 -0.0345 1
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variables for which diesel is used to apply, especially seed and chemicals, and more 
importantly the use of machinery and land. That being as it may for the most part the 
variables are positively and more importantly correctly correlated with the output. This is 
what is expected, as it is these fixed factors of production, and various intermediate inputs 
that one would expect with the production of field crops per se. 
Cross-sectional data with limited observations however, presents some immediate restrictions 
or limitations as to the level or types of analysis that can be performed on the data. Tests or 
inferences made about the effects that time would have on the results cannot be made because 
of the fact that the estimation of time series is not possible. An option however is to attempt 
to estimate the production function by estimating the specific year, in the cross-section, for 
which we have data. This approach however could be hampered because of the fact that the 
sample size is rather small with only 51 observations.  
Keeping that in mind then, the production function is investigated by using the aggregated 
output measured against the use of both the fixed factors of production as well as certain 
intermediate inputs, into producing this output. This will hopefully enable the decision 
between the uses of the functional form that will best describe the production function, i.e. is 
the data set best described by a linear relationship, such as the restrictive Cobb-Douglas, or is 
it better described by a more flexible functional form such as the Translog? This will be 
discussed first, after which the technical efficiency for the various farms will be determined 
by using both the parametric (Stochastic Frontier Analysis) and non-parametric (Data 
Envelopment Analysis) approach while discussing the advantages and disadvantages of using 
both methods, as well as the interpretation their results.  
3.5.1 Production Function  
Since all the data are recorded for the 2011/2012 production season running form August up 
until August the next year, it was assumed that no inputs or outputs crossed over into the 
2012/2013 season, and therefore it was not necessary to lag any of the variables. It is because 
of this fact that from the company’s perspective, any costs incurred or revenue realized 
during the production season would be accurately reflected in Gross Margin analysis at the 
end of the financial year. Keeping this issue in mind the variables that were to be used in the 
production function are discussed below. 
The variables used in the analysis of the various farms’ production were a subset of all the 
variable inputs into the production, because the variables were divided into their respective 
groups as discussed above. The production function explains a single output with all the 
important inputs used in the production of this output. Since there are in some cases four 
outputs, these outputs need to be aggregated as to have a larger number of observations in the 
sample. The output was thus a combination of all the quantity of output produced multiplied 
by the price received for the various outputs produced by the farm, this value was then 
considered to be an aggregate output produced by the farm, and could be calculated back into 
a per-unit (per hectare) value by simply dividing the aggregated outputs of each farm, by their 
respective land areas. This is a necessary step in the analysis of the data, as now comparisons 
are possible across farms, as suddenly the measure of outputs is the same for each of the 
farms, as this was not the case prior to aggregation. 
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The variables used in the production function were taken to be the directly allocatable 
variable costs or what we shall call “productive inputs”, in the sense that they contribute 
directly to the production of the output. These were assumed to be as follows in-line with 
agronomic norms and necessities; 
 Land Rent (R/ha),  
 Labour (R/ha), 
 Precision (R/ha), 
 Fertilizer (R/ha), 
 Seed (R/ha),  
 Chemicals (R/ha), 
 Machinery Rent (R/ha),      
 Diesel (R/ha),   
In using the variables this way there was not much construction of the data required save that 
of aggregating the input as well as the amounts paid to produce a hectare of maize 
equivalents as discussed earlier on in the chapter, and the correlation between these variables 
is shown in Table 2. 
It is important to note however, that before this analysis was performed, the log of all the 
variables was taken. The advantages of such an approach are the following; 1) logged models 
are invariant to the scale of the variables, since they are measuring percentage changes; 2) 
they give a direct estimate of elasticity of the variables; 3) for models with y > 0, the 
conditional distribution is often heteroskedastic or skewed, while ln(y) is much less so, and 
lastly 4) the distribution of ln(y) is narrower, and this tends to limit the effects that outliers 
might have even though the data was edited for outliers. For these reasons, throughout the 
thesis the log of the variables is used in the analysis of the data.  
Apart from the advantages of using the logarithms above, this approach was also followed 
because of the fact that, if these variables are assumed to be linear in logarithms, the 
coefficients that are then calculated can be interpreted as the elasticities of these variables in 
producing the output because the units of measurement have been removed. That is if the 
elasticities or coefficients were to sum up to one, it would imply constant returns to scale, and 
a one per cent increase in the inputs would ceterus paribus, result in a one per cent increase 
in the output. Another important implication of taking the logarithms of the variables before 
running the regression is that since production theory limits the range of the output elasticities 
to be between zero and unity, the t-tests may be taken to be one tailed. As a result if this, the 
statistical testing, especially that of the t-tests is made less stringent because of the fact you 
are testing for the possibility of the relationship in one direction and completely disregarding 
the possibility of a relationship in the other direction. 
Keeping this in mind an Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) analysis of the production 
function and the specific variables was none the less carried out. Table 3 below shows the 
results obtained from running this regression. 
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Table 3: OLS regression of Production Function Variables 
 
From table 3 it can be seen that the variables as discussed above do not predict or describe the 
output in a good manner, which is surprising after the establishment of the correlation matrix 
in table 2. The implication of these results then is that 1) the variables used do not adequately 
explain the production of the output; this can be seen by looking at the R-squared and 
adjusted R-squared values of the model. The R-squared value for the model is 0.4884, i.e. 
48.9% of the variation between the outputs is explained by the model, the adjusted R-squared 
is even less at only 0.3909, suggesting that only 39.09% of the variance in the output can be 
explained by the variables used. This is a better measure than the R2 because of the fact that it 
takes the number of variables used in the model into account, while the R2 does not and 
would tend to increase as the number of variables used increases. Secondly when looking at 
the t-statistics for the various variables in explaining their role in the production of the output, 
these are for the most part statistically insignificant, leaving only land, labour, fertilizer and 
chemicals being positive and statistically significant between the 1% and 10% level.  
After having found these results with little meaning to the exercise particularly because of the 
low adjusted R2, as well as the variables low levels of statistical significance. These results 
are therefore not in the broader sense sensible. It thus was assumed that it would be better to 
aggregate the variables together, as the amount of data was already severely limited. The 
variables thus became the following: 
 Y= Logarithm of output, output in this case is the aggregated output as discussed 
above and is the dependant variable. 
 X1=Logarithm of Labour + Precision (LLabprec), Grouped because precision is 
essentially a consulting service added by FAS and consists of the advice of Skilled 
Labour. 
 X2= Logarithm of Land +Fertilizer (Llandfert), Grouped because fertilizer is used to 
make up for nutrient shortages in the soil, it is therefore an ameliorant and would act 
as a function of the land’s quality as well as the land’s growing potential28.  
                                                 
28 therefore it could be assumed that an increase in land would result in an increase in the application of 
fertilizer the opposite could be assumed for soil quality, the worse it is the more you apply and vice versa.  
Source SS df MS Number of obs 51
Model 1,061737 8 0,132717 F(  8,    42) 5,01
Residual 1,112349 42 0,026484 Prob > F 0,0002
Total 2,174085 50 0,043482 R-squared 0,4884
Adj R-squared 0,3909
Root MSE 0,16274
loutput Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
lland 0,172791 0,1148928 1,5* 0,14 -0,059072 0,404654
llabour 0,407842 0,1343777 3.04** 0,004 0,1366564 0,6790268
lprecision -0,02248 0,038501 -0,58 0,563 -0,1001733 0,0552232
lfert 0,342355 0,2260693 1,51* 0,137 -0,1138711 0,7985817
lseed -0,05051 0,2008876 -0,25 0,803 -0,4559167 0,3548985
lchem 0,218073 0,1481964 1,47* 0,149 -0,0809994 0,5171457
lmachinery 0,067599 0,0973706 0,69 0,491 -0,1289027 0,2641009
ldiesel 0,091644 0,2097201 0,44 0,664 -0,3315885 0,5148761
_cons 0,327706 0,840754 0,39 0,699 -1,369005 2,024416
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level
[95% Conf.Interval]
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 X3=Logarithm of Machinery + Diesel (Lmacdiesel), Grouped because machinery 
uses diesel in performing its tasks as well. Also older machines would use more diesel 
and the cost of both renting and operating these machines should strictly speaking be 
a function of each other. 
 X4=Logarithm of Seed + Chemicals (Lseedchem), Grouped together because seed is 
used to produce the crop, and chemicals are used to protect the seed’s (plants), they 
are thus complementary. 
Below is the correlation matrix for the newly aggregated variables as discussed above; 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix for Aggregated Production Function Variables 
 
From table 4, it can be seen that the log of the variables are now all positively and quite 
highly correlated with the output as well as each other. One would expect this because of the 
nature of agriculture, for example consider the use of all the intermediate inputs into the 
production of output. Labour, land, fertilizer, seed and chemicals are all an integral part into 
the production of field crops, without some of these inputs production is either not possible or 
it severely diminished. Diesel and machinery on the other hand although positively 
correlated, is not as strongly correlated with output, and other variables except for the labour 
and precision variable, which is to be expected because of the need for labour when operating 
machinery. 
An interesting point is the lower level of correlation between the variable Lmacdiesel (which 
is the combination of machinery and diesel) and the output, compared to the correlation of the 
other variables to the output. This is to an extent to be expected because of the way the 
machinery variable is constructed, i.e. new machines although more efficient are more 
expensive, and the “capital” or rental would be higher, however the diesel use and repairs and 
maintenance would be expected to be lower, the opposite however would be true for older 
machinery. The difference then between the farms would be as a function of the age and 
efficiency of the machines, and this information cannot be inferred from the data because of 
the way in which it is recorded and presented. It is important however that these variables are 
positively correlated with the output as well as with each other because of their importance in 
producing output. 
These variables would then seem to be a sensible choice, in order to run a regression so as to 
determine the variables to be used in determining the optimal functional form that will 
facilitate the efficiency study to be performed on the data. The regression results are shown in 
table 5, below; 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
loutput llandfert llabprec lseedchem lmacdiesel
loutput 1
llandfert 0.459 1
llabprec 0.464 0.1505 1
lseedchem 0.4097 0.1965 0.1906 1
lmacdiesel 0.3196 0.0203 0.3489 0.2193 1
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Table 5: OLS Regression of Aggregated Production Function Variables 
 
From table 5 it can be seen that the majority of the variables are now statistically significant 
from zero, with two (Llabprec and Lseedchem) out of the four variables being statistically 
significant at the 5% level, and Llandfert statistically significant at the 1% level which is to 
be expected. The only variable now that is not statistically significant is that of machinery + 
Diesel which is also the most liable for miss-measurement, this could be because of the 
difference between the types and costs of the machines on the various farms, resulting in a 
large variation between observations. This would suggest then that there is a large variation 
between the prices paid for the rental of the machines, and this could affect the level of 
significance this variable has on the output.  
Because of the fact that the variables have been assumed linear in their logarithms as 
discussed above, the coefficient which in turn is the elasticity of 0.46 for Llandfert would 
suggest that a 1% increase in Llandfert would ceterus paribus, increase the output by 0.46% 
on average. The other variables can also be interpreted in the same way. The sum of the 
coefficients gives a value of 1.36 which implies increasing returns to scale. It is important to 
remember however, that because of the lack of data together with the pooling of the data, this 
high level of increasing returns to scale could be as a result of the data being cross-sectional. 
This is fairly typical of results for individual years, and it adds to the complication of running 
regressions and performing statistical tests of such data. This however cannot be avoided as a 
result of the lack of data, and the implication of this result would be that if the all the inputs 
were to be increased by 1% there would ceterus paribus be an increase of 1.36% in output. 
This could suggest then that on average these farms are experiencing increasing returns to 
scale. 
The F-statistic shows that jointly the variables have explanatory power over the model, and 
the adjusted R2 shows that the above variables explain roughly 41% of the variance in the 
output. Although R2 value is only slightly higher than the first model whose results are 
reported in table 3 its Root MSE value is also lower suggesting a better fit of the model to the 
data. It is because of these reasons that these variables and this model are preferred to the 
model obtained or described in table 3. 
3.5.2 Choice of Functional Form 
Since the above variables are assumed to be linear in logarithms, the production function 
generated from the analysis was in the form of the Cobb-Douglas (CD) production function. 
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 51
Model 0.997104 4 0.249276 F(  4,    46) = 9.74
Residual 1.176981 46 0.025587 Prob > F      = 0
Total 2.174085 50 0.043482 R-squared     = 0.4586
Adj R-squared = 0.4116
Root MSE      = 0.15996
loutput1 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
llandfert 0.465949 0.144211 3.23*** 0.002 0.175667 0.756231
llabprecision 0.37265 0.141307 2.64** 0.011 0.0882125 0.657086
lseedchem 0.319932 0.147711 2.17** 0.036 0.0226049 0.617259
lmacdiesel 0.227609 0.178643 1.27 0.209 -0.1319798 0.587199
_cons -0.46071 0.752962 -0.61 0.544 -1.976345 1.054922
[95% Conf.Interval]
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level
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The advantages of such a model are the ease with which the results are estimated and 
interpreted. This is as a result of only having to estimate a few parameters of the production 
function. The disadvantages of the Cobb-Douglas production function however is that it is 
perhaps an overly simplistic and restrictive functional form. This is because of the fact that 
the “elasticity of substitution between any pair of variables is always equal to one or unity” 
(Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005)(pg. 19), and the “output elasticities do not vary 
with variations in input levels” (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005)(pg. 19).  
The restrictiveness of the Cobb-Douglas production function then seems to be embedded in 
the fact that the elasticities of substitution are imposed on the variables, rather than being 
estimated by the variables. It is therefore necessary to test whether the Cobb-Douglas 
production function, is an adequate representation of the data as compared with a flexible 
functional form such as the translog production function, abbreviated from the 
“transcendental logarithmic production function” as proposed by Christianson, Jorgenson and 
Lau (1973).  
The Translog is less restrictive because of the fact that it adds a squared term for each of the 
variables to allow for non-linearity between the variables, and cross products which would 
allow for interaction between the variables. After these additions were made there were an 
additional four squared terms, and six cross product terms added to the original Cobb-
Douglas production function. Because of these two additional terms the Translog production 
function is quadratic in logs, with the advantages being that it is a more flexible functional 
form with fewer restrictions on the production elasticities as well as the elasticities of 
substitution. It is capable of representing any unknown underlying production function. The 
disadvantages however is that it is firstly more difficult to interpret and it requires the 
estimation of many more parameters, which could give rise to econometric difficulties such 
as multi-collinearity.  
That being said, it was necessary to perform OLS estimates for the constrained model (Cobb-
Douglas) as well as the unconstrained model (Translog) in which the constrained model is 
nested, so as to be able to test for the functional form that will most adequately represent the 
data this will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 4. The OLS estimates of the two 
respective models are therefore defined as follows (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005, 
p. 211); 
Cobb-Douglas:  𝒚𝒊 = 𝜷𝟎∏ 𝒙𝒏
𝜷𝒏𝑵
𝒏=𝟏        (1 ) 
And 
Translog:  𝒚𝒊 = 𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝜷𝟎 + ∑ 𝜷𝒏𝒍𝒏𝒙𝒏 +
𝟏
𝟐
∑ ∑ 𝜷𝒏𝒎𝒍𝒏𝒙𝒏𝒍𝒏𝒙𝒎)
𝑴
𝒎=𝟏
𝑵
𝒏=𝟏
𝑵
𝒏=𝟏    
 (2 ) 
In the above equations 𝑦 is the dependant variable and is calculated as the logarithm of 
output. The four independent variables (𝑥𝑗) are the logarithms of the aggregated variables as 
discussed above, i.e. they are the logarithms of landfert (land + fertilizer), Labprec (labour + 
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precision), Seedchem (Seed + Chemicals) and lastly Macdiesel (Machinery +Diesel). The 𝑖 
subscripts represent the individual farmer or the observation within the data set.  
Before the OLS estimates were determined the data was mean centred, this involves 
subtracting the mean from each variable before running an OLS regression model on the data. 
If this step is not carried out one would have to perform complex calculations, if one were to 
want to calculate the output elasticities as well as their standard errors. This is because of the 
fact that if the elasticities are calculated at the sample means, and the means are zero due to 
mean centring the data for these variables, the output elasticity with regards to the inputs 
would simply be equal to their first order coefficient (Mkhabela T. , 2011). This step has no 
effect on the results obtained however, as it simply changes the units of measurement of each 
variable, but as can be seen the advantages of performing this step are immense.  
After having performed these steps of readying the data, the OLS estimates of the parameters 
from equation one and two were determined using FRONTIER 4.1 (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, 
& Battese, 2005), the results for which are shown in table 6 below. 
Table 6: OLS estimation of the Trans Log production Function 
 
From table 6, it can be seen that the adjust R2 value is slightly higher for the Translog than 
that of the Cobb-Douglas production function. This higher adjusted R2 would suggest then 
that a larger proportion of the variance between the dependant variable and independent 
variables would be explained by the translog model and it suggests that the model possesses 
significant explanatory power. The adjusted R2 test is of particular importance in this 
instance, because of the fact that the adjusted R2 value penalizes the addition of variables as 
well as the significance of the variables as a result of the loss of degrees of freedom in 
performing this test. 
As a result of the data being mean differenced as explained above, one is able to estimate the 
output elasticities for the Cobb-Douglas terms i.e. Llandfert (X1), Llabprecmd (X2), 
Lseedchemmd (X3) as well as Lmacdiesel (X4), can be read directly from the coefficients 
Translog Cobb-Douglas
Loutputmd Loutput
llandfertmd 0.4127 (2.54)*** 0.4659 (3.23)***
llabprecmd 0.3149 (1.96)** 0.3726 (2.64)***
lseedchemmd 0.2844 (1.61)* 0.3199 (2.17)**
lmacdieselmd 0.2686 (1.33)* 0.2276 (1.27)
x1x2 0.0730 (0.08)
x1x3 -1.7306 (1.20)
x1x4 -0.3310 (0.23)
x2x3 0.9914 (0.89)
x2x4 3.7437 (1.69)**
x3x4 0.3432 (0.21)
x12 0.2348 (0.22)
x22 -1.7023 (2.25)**
x32 0.6345 (0.84)
x42 -1.8172 (0.89)
_cons 0.0330 (0.65) -0.4607 (0.61)
sigma-squared 0,0244 0,0256
Observations 51 51
Adj. R squared 0,4393 0,4116
log likelihood function = 31,22463 23,740392
Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses
Dependant Variable: Output
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level
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estimated for these variables within the Translog function. The elasticities in this instance 
sum to 1.28, which would suggest that a 1% increase in inputs would ceterus paribus, result 
in a 1.28% increase in output. It can thus be seen from the results that one average there is a 
possibility that these farms are experiencing increasing returns to scale, which could imply 
that it could be beneficial for the average farm to increase its scale of production. 
If one considers the cross product terms, or the interaction terms for the interactions between, 
llandfertmd and Lseedchemmd (X1X3) and the Llandfertmd and Lmacdieselmd (X1X4), 
variables these do not make much sense. The implication of these interactions would suggest 
that a 1% increase in the use of input X1(Llandfertmd) would, ceterus paribus, result in a 
1.7% decrease in the use of input X3 (Lseedchemmd), similar results can be observed with 
the interaction between the variable X1(Llandfertmd) and variable X4(Lmacdieselmd) 
(Boland & Marsh, 2006). These two interaction terms between these four variables do not 
make much sense; one would rather expect the usage of these inputs to increase with an 
increase in the amount of input Llandfert (the use of land and fertilizer in production) used. 
Another odd result is that of Llabprecmd and Lmacdieselmd (X2X4) which suggests that 
these variables are complements for one another. Similar unusual behaviour is observed in 
the squared terms. It is these terms that would give an indication as to the relationship the 
variable has with the model, i.e. if the variable has a linear or non-linear relationship with 
output. 
The majority of these variables are also statistically insignificant indicating that they do not 
significantly differ from zero. The exceptions are the variables X1 (Llandfertmd), X2 
(Llabprecmd), X2X4 (interaction term between Llabprec and Lmacdiesel) and lastly X2
2 
(squared Llabprec term) which is the product term that tests for non-linearity within the data 
set. If one considers the variable X2X4, this interaction term would suggest that a 1% increase 
in the use of labour would ceterus paribus, increase the use of Lmacdiesel. This could be a 
counterintuitive result, as it would seem as if an increase in the use of labour should be as a 
result of a decrease in the use of machinery and vice versa. However if one considers the use 
of machinery and diesel, the only way in which these machines can be used is with labour, 
and thus it could be assumed that an increase in the use of machinery and diesel would more 
often than not involve an increase in the use of labour, there thus seems to be a causal issue 
with this variable as it is hard to determine which causes which. The implication then is that 
there is a positive and significant association between these variables. 
As a result of the majority of the interaction terms and squared variables not being 
significantly different from zero, it would suggest that this functional form would not 
accurately represent the fit the data, and it would seem as if the nested Cobb-Douglas 
functional form would be a better fit. That being said however it is still important to perform 
the test on which the functional form is chosen, i.e. the generalized likelihood ratio (LR) test. 
The likelihood ratio test is given by, 𝜆 = −2{(log(𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑(𝐻0)) − (log(𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑(𝐻1)))} 
which has a 𝜒𝑣
2 distribution with 𝑣 being equal to the number of parameters assumed to be 
zero in the null hypothesis. This produces a value of LR 𝜒2(10) = 14.96 this value is then 
compared to the tabulated value or critical value at a 5% significance level which is 
𝜒10,0.05
2 =18.307. Since the calculated value is less than the critical value, the null hypothesis 
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that the Cobb-Douglas is an adequate representation of the data ( 𝐻0: 𝛽𝑖𝑗 = 0, 𝑖𝑗 = 1,… ,4) is 
not rejected, and subsequently the translog model is rejected in favour of the more restrictive 
but simpler Cobb-Douglas model. This conclusion is drawn strictly from the test which 
indicates that the Cobb-Douglas is a better fit of these data, it is important to note however 
that the translog model would seem to have better results. 
It is has thus been determined that the Cobb-Douglas production function best describes the 
data and this functional form will then be used for the rest of the analysis of the production 
function, and subsequently the Technical Efficiency with which these farms are operating. 
Chapter 4 that follows, includes the empirical estimation and analysis of both the production 
function as well as cost function using both a parametric (SFA) and non-parametric approach 
(DEA) with the aim of determining the underlying efficiency’s, both technical as well as 
allocative, with which these individual farms in the broader model are operating at. 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Analysis of the Production and Cost Function 
4 Introduction 
After having found the functional form that best describes the data, it seems pertinent to 
discuss the various techniques available to one when trying to determine the efficiency of the 
various farms, before continuing. This will form part of the theoretical discussion as to the 
most popular methods and approaches available in the theory used for determining these 
efficiency measures. These approaches can be either deterministic, where all deviations from 
the frontier are attributed to inefficiency, or stochastic which allows for the discrimination 
between random errors and differences in inefficiency (Piesse & Thirtle, 2000). The 
following chapters purpose then is to discuss these various theoretical approaches so as to be 
able to proceed to the empirical analysis and estimation of firstly the technical efficiency, and 
secondly the allocative efficiency of the farms.  
In microeconomic theory a production function is defined as the maximum29 output that can 
be produced from a given set of inputs, using the particular technology available to that firm 
at that point in time30. Before Farrell’s pioneering work done in 1957, the majority of the 
empirical studies used the lest-squares methods to estimate the production functions, which 
resulted in response or average functions (Battese G. , 1991). These functions began with the 
estimation of a production function, where producers were assumed to be operating on their 
production functions therefore maximizing the output obtainable from the inputs they used. 
The error terms were assumed to be symmetrically distributed with zero means and the only 
source of departure from the estimated function were assumed to be as a result of statistical 
noise. There was however a large amount of empirical evidence suggesting that not all 
producers were always successful in solving their optimization problems (Kumbhakar & 
Lovell, 2000), and this lead to the notion that it was perhaps better to move away from the 
traditional production function towards production frontiers31 (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2000).  
 
We will now move on to the Farrell’s measure of productive efficiency built on the work of 
Debreu (1951)32, and Koopmans (1951) in which he showed how to define cost efficiency, 
and decompose it into its technical and allocative components using distance functions in an 
empirical application on U.S Agriculture. He did not however use econometric methods, and 
instead chose those of a linear programming nature. The next section draws on his work, and 
discusses the implications thereof. 
Farrell considered a firm, under constant returns to scale, that used two factors of production 
(X1, X2), to produce a single output (Y) under constant returns to scale to explain his ideas. 
                                                 
29 (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2000) Page 25-26 suggest that the production function can also be defined as the 
minimum amount of inputs required to produce any given output vector. 
30 Forsund et al. (1980:21) state that the “theoretical definition of a production function holds that it gives the 
maximum possible output which can be produced from given quantities of a set of inputs”. 
31 (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2000) Page 3-4 defines the production frontier “as the minimum input bundles 
required to produce various outputs, or the maximum output that is producible with various input bundles and a 
given technology”.  
32 (Debreu, 1951) Introduced distance functions as a way of modelling multiple-output technology, as well as a 
way of measuring the radial distance of a producer from the frontier in an output expanding direction. 
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He also assumed that the efficient production function, the output that a perfectly efficient 
firm could obtain from any given combination of inputs, was known. If one has a look at 
figure one below, inputs X1 and X2 are represented on the horizontal and vertical axes 
respectively.  
 
Figure 1: The simple case of Efficiency (Source: (Farrell, 1957) page 254) 
The above figure then could be viewed as an isoquant for the industry, this production 
function is therefore a frontier as this “isoquant” or production function represents the 
maximum output that is producible from this given input bundle (Aigner & Chu, 1968). The 
isoquant SS’ represents the combination of the two inputs (X1 and X2) a perfectly efficient 
firm would employ in producing a given level of output. Point P on the above figure 
represents the production of a firm that is producing the same level of output produced that is 
being produced by say firm Q on the isoquant SS’. The producer at point P then is using 
higher levels of both factors of production (X1 and X2) than say the efficient firm producing 
at point Q on the isoquant SS’.  
Therefore point Q is producing the same level of output as point P, using only a fraction 
(0Q/0P) as much of each input as point P (Farrell, 1957). Farrell (1957) suggests that point Q 
can also be thought of as producing (0P/0Q) as much output from the same amounts of 
inputs, and this would then suggest that (0Q/0P) the Technical Efficiency 33 (TE) of point P 
would then be equal to the ratio of the distance from point Q to the origin, divided by the 
distance of the point P to the origin therefore TE= 0Q/0P. 
The assumptions around this example is that technical efficiency would take the value of 
unity for a perfectly efficient firm, and will become infinitely small if the amounts of inputs 
used to produce a unit of output become infinitely large. Another important aspect of the 
above example is that as long as the isoquant SS’ has a negative slope, an increase in the unit 
input per unit output of one of the factors will ceterus paribus, imply a lower technical 
efficiency (Farrell, 1957). This measure therefore adheres to the law of diminishing returns. 
                                                 
33 (Koopmans, 1951) Provide a definition of technical efficiency: “A producer is technically efficient if, and only 
if, it is impossible to produce more of any output without producing less of some other output or using more of 
some input”. 
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Continuing with the above figure as proposed by Farrell, if there is sufficient information as 
to the prices for these inputs, then the Allocative Efficiency34, or the ability of the frim to 
choose these factors of production in optimal proportions, may also be determined. Therefore 
if there was sufficient price information, then the iso-cost line AA’ which has a slope equal to 
the price ratio of the two factors of production can be determined and drawn tangential to the 
isoquant SS’.  
According to Farrell then point Q’ and not Q would be the optimal method of production, 
because of the fact that, the cost of producing Q’ will only be a fraction (0R/0Q) of those at 
point Q,  and therefore the cost of producing (RQ) a unit of output, can be reduced without 
reducing the level of output. This ratio then is defined as the Allocative Efficiency (AE) in 
production AE= (0R/0Q) (Farrell, 1957). After having obtained values for the technical as 
well as allocative efficiencies from the above figure, we can define Economic or Cost 
Efficiency which is defined as the product of Technical and Allocative Efficiency, i.e. CE= 
(0Q/0P)(0R/0Q)= (0R/0P). 
 
A producer operating on the frontier was then said to be technically efficient, while a 
producer operating below the production frontier was said to be technically inefficient. The 
implication of this shift away from production functions towards production frontiers was 
that the symmetrically distributed errors with zero means were no longer appropriate when 
studying producer behavior. These error terms were rather replaced with the “composed” 
error terms which took the traditional symmetrical random noise component found in the 
response or average functions, as well as a one-sided inefficiency component into account. It 
was this addition in 1977 by Aigner, Lovell & Schmidt as well as Meeusen & van Den Broek 
that lead to the development of the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) which will be 
discussed later on in the chapter. 
Technical, Allocative and Economic or Cost efficiency can be predicted using a non-
parametric approach such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and other linear 
programming methods or the parametric approaches that follow in the discussion. In the DEA 
model technical efficiency is calculated using the input-orientated variable returns to scale 
(VRS) model, and this model based on (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005) and will be 
discussed later on in the chapter.   
 Deterministic Production Frontier 
Farrell’s work inspired Aigner & Chu (1968) to argue that the differences between values 
firms achieved, and an “industry” production function could be as a result of differences in 
scale of operation, varying organizational structures and other factors that were within the 
control of the firm. This suggested then that any deviations between the observed output and 
the industries “best practice” frontier would be as a result of the firm’s inability to use the 
optimal values of the various parameters in the industry resulting in inefficiencies into 
production (Aigner & Chu, 1968). They considered a parametric frontier production function 
                                                 
34 Price efficiency or allocative efficiency (ae) is the measure of the firm’s success in choosing an optimal set of 
inputs (Farrell, 1957). 
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of Cobb-Douglas form, using the data on a sample of N firms (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & 
Battese, 2005). The model was defined by; 
𝒍𝒏𝒚𝒊 = 𝒙𝒊𝜷 − 𝒖𝒊          ( 3) 
Where ln(𝑦𝑖) is the logarithm of the (scalar) output for the i-th firm; 𝑥𝑖 is a (K+1) row-
vector, whose element is “1” and the remaining elements are logarithms of the K-input 
quantities used by the i-th firm; 𝛽 = (𝛽0 + 𝛽1, …… , 𝛽𝑘)
′ is a (k+1) column-vector of 
unknown parameters to be estimated; and 𝑢𝑖 is a non-negative random variable, associated 
with the technical inefficiency in production of the firms in the industry involved (Coelli, 
Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005).  
The model above is termed a deterministic frontier because of the fact that the function sets a 
limit as to the range of possible observations. This can be seen by the fact that the error term 
𝑢𝑖 has a non-positive disturbance. The implication of this then is that since all firms in the 
model share a common family production function one may only observe points that lie 
below the frontier, representing firms that produce less than the maximal possible output, and 
no points lying above the frontier (Forsund, Lovell, & Schmidt, 1980).  
This would imply then that any deviations from the frontier relative to the common family 
frontiers are as a result of inefficiencies that are within the control of the firm and no account 
is taken of measurement errors. That is given the input vector, 𝑥𝑖 the technical efficiency of 
say firm i, is equal to the ratio between the observed output of firm i, relative to the potential 
output as given by the frontier (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005): 
𝑻𝑬𝒊 =
𝒚𝒖
𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝒙𝒊𝜷)
=
𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝒙𝒊𝜷−𝒖𝒊)
𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝒙𝒊𝜷)
= 𝒆𝒙𝒑(−𝒖𝒊)        ( 4) 
This output orientated Farrell measure of technical efficiency, which takes the value between 
zero and one (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005) is used to give an indication as to the 
level of technical efficiency with which the firm is operating, and is determined by estimating 
the ratio of the observed output 𝑦𝑖, to the estimated value of the frontier output exp (𝑥𝑖𝛽). In 
Aigner & Chu’s (1968) model the 𝛽 parameter are estimated using linear programming, 
where ∑ 𝑢𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  is minimized, subject to the constraints that 𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑖 = 1,2, … . , 𝑁 (Coelli, 
Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005).  
A serious criticism of the above deterministic frontier model, is that there is no account taken 
of the possible influences measurement errors or other statistical noise might have upon the 
frontier, and all deviations from the frontier are assumed to be as a result of technical 
inefficiency of the firms being considered. This idea of a deterministic frontier shared by all 
firms ignores the possibility then that a firm’s performance could be affected by factors that 
are entirely out of the firm’s control, and rather assumes that all factors are under the control 
of the firm (Forsund, Lovell, & Schmidt, 1980). This will result in efficiency estimates being 
lower than those estimated by say a stochastic frontier, because of the fact that it will be 
estimated in such a fashion that no output values may exceed the frontier, as a result of the 
non-positive error component as well as the output 𝑦𝑖 being bound by the deterministic 
frontier exp(𝑥𝑖𝛽) (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). 
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This method of lumping the measurement errors, and other statistical noise together with 
inefficiency into a one sided error term was unfavorable and as a result an alternative 
approach to this deterministic frontier was developed simultaneously by Aigner, Lovell & 
Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen & van Den Broek (1977). Here they suggested that the error 
term be made up of two components, one normal and the other from a one-sided distribution 
(Aigner, Lovell, & Scmidt, 1977) it was proposed that this would offer a solution to the 
majority of the issues with the deterministic approach. Below is a discussion on the stochastic 
frontier model.  
 Stochastic Production Frontier 
Aigner, Lovell & Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen & van der Broeck (1977) drew on the 
assumption that the maximum output may not be obtained because of inefficiency effects as 
well as random errors outside of the manager’s control. They therefore used the same 
function as Aigner & Chu (1968), the only difference being that they added an extra error 
term to account for this random error, i.e.; 
𝒍𝒏𝒒𝒊 = 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷+ 𝒗𝒊 − 𝒖𝒊           (5) 
Here again ln(𝑦𝑖) is the logarithm of the (scalar) output for the i-th firm; 𝑥𝑖 is a (K+1) row-
vector, whose element is “1” and the remaining elements are logarithms of the K-input 
quantities used by the i-th firm; 𝛽 = (𝛽0 + 𝛽1, …… , 𝛽𝑘)
′ is a (k+1) column-vector of 
unknown parameters to be estimated; and 𝑢𝑖 is a non-negative random variable, associated 
with the technical inefficiency in production of the firms in the industry involved (Coelli, 
Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005).  
This addition to the error term as independently proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) and 
Meeusen & van Den Broeck (1977), would mean that since the output values are bounded 
from above by the stochastic (i.e. random) variable exp (𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖) (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, 
& Battese, 2005). The new error term, (𝑣𝑖)35, as well as an non negative random variable 
associated with the technical inefficiency (𝑢𝑖), could then vary about the deterministic part of 
the model, exp (𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005) since (𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖) can be 
positive or negative there was therefore some specified proportion of the observations that 
were allowed to lie above the frontier in this new stochastic frontier approach (Aigner, 
Lovell, & Scmidt, 1977). Fried, Lovell & Schmidt (1993) provide a rather comprehensive 
survey of these methods and applications.  
These important features of the stochastic frontier model are illustrated graphically in figure 
9.1 of Coelli et al (2005, pg.244). In this case it is assumed that a firm produces output 𝑞𝑖 
                                                 
35 The additional parameter is the parameter, 𝑣𝑖 which represents the symmetric component that would account 
for pure random factors in production as well as any statistical noise within the data set (Battese G. , 1991) these 
purely random factors of production were assumed to be out of the farmer’s control. The statistical noise would 
arises from any inadvertent omission of relevant variables from the vector 𝑥𝑖 as well as from measurement and 
approximation errors that could be associated with the choice of functional form (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & 
Battese, 2005).  
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using only one input 𝑥𝑖 i.e. in the case of the Cobb-Douglas stochastic frontier model, the 
frontier takes the form (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005); 
𝒍𝒏𝒒𝒊 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒍𝒏𝒙𝒊 + 𝒗𝒊 − 𝒖𝒊        (6) 
Or  𝒒𝒊 = 𝐞𝐱𝐩 (𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒍𝒏𝒙𝒊 + 𝒗𝒊 − 𝒖𝒊)                   (7) 
Or           𝒒𝒊 = 𝐞𝐱𝐩 (𝜷𝟎 +𝜷𝟏𝒍𝒏𝒙𝒊)⏟           
𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕
× 𝐞𝐱𝐩 (𝒗𝒊)⏟    
𝒏𝒐𝒊𝒔𝒆
× 𝐞𝐱𝐩 (−𝒖𝒊)⏟     
𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚
          (8)   
In figure 9.1 of Coelli et al (2005, pg. 244), Firm A lies above the deterministic part of the 
production frontier because of the fact that the noise effect is positive (i.e. 𝑣𝐴 > 0 ), while the 
opposite is true for Firm B where the noise effect is negative (i.e. 𝑣𝐵 < 0 ) (Coelli, Rao, 
O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). If one considers Firm A it can be seen that the observed output 
lies below the deterministic part of the frontier, this is because of the fact that the sum of the 
noise and inefficiency effects is negative i.e. 𝑣𝐴 − 𝑢𝐴 < 0 (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 
2005). The frontier model therefore identifies firms that represent best practise, and their 
inefficiencies are explained via Maximum Likelihood Estimates by estimating the unknown 
parameters, while simultaneously estimating the stochastic frontier and inefficiency effects 
(Mkhabela T. , 2011). 
The fundamental difference between the two approaches i.e. the deterministic and stochastic 
frontier model was then that there was an addition to the error term of a symmetric 
component that permitted random variation of the frontier across firms. This variation 
therefore took into account factors such measurement errors, as well as other statistical noise 
and random shocks that were outside of the manager’s control, as well as inefficiency effects 
(Forsund, Lovell, & Schmidt, 1980). However there were certain issues with this model as 
proposed by Aigner, Lovell & Schmidt (1977), and these were that the selection of the 
proportion of the observations that were allowed to lie above the frontier was essentially 
arbitrary, lacking explicit economic or statistical justification.  
Technical efficiency then is calculated as the ratio between the observed output to the 
corresponding stochastic frontier output (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005), this gives 
the measure of technical efficiency as; 
𝑻𝑬𝒊 =
𝒒𝒊
𝐞𝐱𝐩 (𝒙𝒊
′𝜷+𝒗𝒊)
=
𝐞𝐱𝐩 (𝒙𝒊
′𝜷+𝒗𝒊−𝒖𝒊)
𝐞𝐱𝐩 (𝒙𝒊
′𝜷+𝒗𝒊)
= 𝐞𝐱𝐩 (−𝒖𝒊)       ( 9) 
Again this measure takes the value between zero and one (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 
2005), and it again measures the output of the i-th firm relative to the output that could be 
produced by a fully efficient firm or best practise firm using the same vector of inputs 
(Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). The first step in predicting the technical efficiency 
according to Coelli et al. (2005) is to the estimate the parameters of the stochastic production 
frontier (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). This is often done using the Maximum 
Likelihood estimates, which use the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results as a starting point. 
The use of the MLE in estimating the production frontier however is dependent on the 
selection of certain distributional assumptions concerning the two error terms of the frontier. 
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The MLE estimates are preferred over the corrected ordinary least squares (COLS) method 
because of the fact that they have many desirable large sample (i.e. asymptotic) properties 
(Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). Aigner, Lovell & Schmidt (1977) obtained ML 
estimates under the assumptions (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005) that the;  
𝒗𝒊~𝒊𝒊𝒅𝑵(𝟎, 𝝈𝒗
𝟐)          ( 10) 
And  𝒖𝒊~𝒊𝒊𝒅𝑵
+(𝟎, 𝝈𝒖
𝟐)          ( 11) 
That is the 𝑣𝑖’s are independently and identically distributed normal random variables with 
zero means and variances 𝜎𝑣
2 (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005), and the, 𝑢𝑖’s are 
independently and identically distributed half-normal random variables with scale parameter 
𝜎𝑖
2 (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). Coelli et al. suggest that the finding made by 
Battese & Cora (1977) who parameterise the log-likelihood in terms of 𝜎2 and 𝛾 = 𝜎𝑢
2/𝜎2,  
is the most appealing because if 𝛾 = 0 then all deviations from the frontier are due to noise, 
while 𝛾 = 1 means all deviations are due to technical efficiency.  
The main criticism against the use of the stochastic frontier is that there is no a priori 
justification for the selection of any particular distributional form for the inefficiency effects 
or the 𝑢𝑖’s (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005).  That being said, this is still one of the 
most preferred parametric approaches to determining efficiency with which firms produce. 
Then next section shows the empirical results obtained from this stochastic frontier analysis. 
4.2.1 Estimation of the Production Function and Technical Efficiency using SFA 
Table seven below is a summary of the OLS estimates used in deciding which functional 
form best fits the data. The functional form chosen was the Cobb-Douglas and the Beta 
coefficients are the same as those defined earlier on in chapter 3. The different coefficients 
are as follows, Beta 1= Land and fert, Beta 2 =Labour and precision, Beta 3 = seed and chem 
and Beta 4 = Machinery and diesel. The fact that these values have been logged prior to the 
analysis, results in the coefficients showing the output elasticity of these variables. That is 
should the variables all be increased by 1% the output ceterus paribus, should increase by 
1.08 %. 
Table 7: OLS estimates using Stochastic Frontier Analysis (Front. 4.1) 
  
These results are important as it is these OLS estimates that are used as a starting point for the 
Maximum likelihood Estimates (MLE) model. The Log Likelihood function obtained in the 
OLS estimates are then compared to the Log Likelihood function obtained for the MLE 
estimates, this comparison will aid in deciding whether the data is better described by a mean 
response function or a frontier. This is done by testing the hypothesis that the technical 
coefficient standard-error t-ratio
beta 0 -0.46 0.75 -0.61
beta 1 0.47 0.14 3.2310199***
beta 2 0.37 0.14 2.6371569**
beta 3 0.32 0.15 2.1659312**
beta 4 0.23 0.18 1.27
sigma-squared 0.03
log likelihood function = 23.74
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level
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efficiency effects are not simply random errors. The key parameter in this case is 𝛾 =
𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎2
 
which lies between zero and one. As found by Battese & Cora (1977), if 𝛾 = 0 then all 
deviations from the frontier are due to noise, which would indicate that the mean response 
(OLS) function is an adequate representation of the data, while 𝛾 = 1 means all deviations 
are due to technical efficiency (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005) indicating that the 
data is better represented by the frontier model.  
The test for this is then the likelihood ratio test which is given by, 𝜆 =
−2{(log(𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑(𝐻0)) − (log(𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑(𝐻1)))} which has a 𝜒𝑣
2 distribution, with 𝑣 
being equal to the number of parameters assumed to be zero in the null hypothesis. This 
produces a value of LR 𝜒2(1) = 8.24 this value is then compared to the tabulated value or 
critical value at a 5% significance level which is 𝜒1,0.05
2 = 3.841 . Since the calculated value 
is higher than the critical value the null hypothesis that the technical efficiency effects are 
simply random errors ( 𝐻0: 𝛾 = 0) is rejected. This result therefore suggests that technical 
inefficiency is present in the model, and subsequently the Mean Response Function model is 
rejected in favour of Frontier model. This conclusion drawn, is reaffirmed by the fact that 
𝛾 = 0.98 with a t-statistic of 43.48, suggesting that this value is significantly different from 
zero at the highest confidence level. Since this value is so close to unity, this would indicate 
that the majority of the deviations are due to technical inefficiency, and the data is therefore 
best represented by the Frontier model. 
Table 8: Final MLE estimates of Stochastic Frontier Analysis (Front. 4.1) 
 
As a result of the variables being logged before being fed into the FRONTIER 4.1 
programme, all of the estimated coefficients values represent “share parameters” or 
elasticities. Looking at the coefficients in table 8 then they can be interpreted in the following 
fashion, a 1% increase in the use of variable one i.e. land and fertilizer will results in a 0.5% 
increase in output, and so on for the rest of the variables used. The difficulties of the analysis 
of these variables lies in the fact that these variables have been aggregated, therefore the 
proportion of each individual variable within the aggregation cannot be determined. 
Therefore it would be better to interpret the sum of the coefficients, which would give an 
indication as to the scale of production that is increasing, constant or decreasing returns to 
scale. It can thus be seen that the coefficients given by the MLE estimates as shown in table 8 
add up to 1.05. This implies then that a 1% increase in all the inputs would result in a ceterus 
paribus, 1.05% increase in outputs. This would suggest then that the average farm in the 
sample experiences slight levels of increasing returns to scale, suggesting that there are gains 
coefficient standard-error t-ratio
beta 0 0.6325 0.5640 1.1215
beta 1 0.5007 0.1032 4.85***
beta 2 0.1095 0.1174 0.9322
beta 3 0.2826 0.1034 2.73***
beta 4 0.1578 0.1248 1.2645
sigma-squared 0.2005 0.2899 0.6917
gamma 0.9842 0.0226 43.4849
log likelihood function = 27.86
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level
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to be had should the scale of production be increased slightly. Thus for the average farm in 
the data set, the farm experiences a slight case of increasing returns to scale.  
The estimate of 𝛾 is 0.98 correct to the second decimal place, and the estimated standard error 
is 0.04, correct to two significant digits with a t-ratio of 43.48 this would suggest that this 
value is significantly different from zero at the highest level of confidence. These results 
indicate that the vast majority of residual variation is due to the inefficiency effect, 𝑢𝑖, and 
the random error, 𝑣𝑖, is approximately zero (Coelli, Prasada-Rao, & Battesse, 1998). The 
variables used in this analysis are for the most part significantly different from zero as 
indicated by their t-ratios, suggesting that the variables used in the model would be an 
accurate representation of the production frontier. This would be expected, as one would 
expect the fixed factors of production as well as the intermediate inputs into production, to 
accurately explain the output. We could thus deduce that we have a model that accurately 
describes the production frontier. This frontier is statistically significant and it can therefore 
be used in determining the level of technical efficiency for the various farms within the 
sample. Table 9 below gives an indication as to the levels of technical efficiency with which 
these farms are operating.  
Table 9: Efficiency Estimates from Stochastic Frontier Analysis (Frontier 4.1) 
 
From table 9 it can be seen that for the most part the farms are operating at relatively high 
levels of technical efficiency. With the high levels of expertise that are being applied to these 
farms throughout the production cycle, this is to be expected, these high scores also suggest 
that the production technologies for the various farms are relatively homogenous. It is 
important to keep in mind however that these efficiency scores are relative to one another, 
and are not a reflection of the level of technical efficiency of these specific farms relative to 
the industry as a whole.   
firm         eff.-est. firm         eff.-est.
1 0.854 27 0.478
2 0.939 28 0.877
3 0.808 29 0.963
4 0.809 30 0.943
5 0.921 31 0.917
6 0.891 32 0.765
7 0.979 33 0.951
8 0.883 34 0.807
9 0.976 35 0.938
10 0.958 36 0.839
11 0.674 37 0.912
12 0.677 38 0.967
13 0.918 39 0.789
14 0.938 40 0.954
15 0.947 41 0.940
16 0.952 42 0.778
17 0.567 43 0.924
18 0.708 44 0.874
19 0.884 45 0.772
20 0.961 46 0.951
21 0.734 47 0.786
22 0.828 48 0.950
23 0.704 49 0.897
24 0.823 50 0.926
25 0.889 51 0.800
26 0.820
Mean Efficiency = 0.857
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The average efficiency can be seen as being nearly 86% this means that the average farm has 
the propensity to increase efficiency by roughly 14%. This figure of 86% however is reduced 
as a result of a few outliers, namely farm number 11, 12 and 27. These farms generally have 
low levels of output relative to what was spent on the inputs; this could have been as a result 
of drought, poor management or incorrect advice for the production season. That being said 
however for the most part, these farms all used their inputs well to generate outputs with the 
best practise farm having a rather limited scope for possible improvement of only 2.1%. 
There is however some scope for improvement and this could be brought about by reducing 
certain costs of the inputs used in production. This will be discussed a little bit later on. 
The estimation of the stochastic production frontier and the associated technical efficiencies 
was therefore performed so as to establish the importance of the various inputs used for crop 
production within the FOF model. The results therefore indicate that the output can indeed be 
explained by the variables used in this analysis. It is important to note however that the 
efficiency results obtained can be sensitive to the type of method selected to estimate these 
efficiency scores. 
The two most popular methods used to measure farm efficiency are the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) (Charnes, Cooper, & Rhodes, 1978) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
(Aigner, Lovell, & Scmidt, 1977) and (Meeusen & van Den Broeck, 1977) as discussed 
above. The choice of which method is used however has to be determined in every case 
because it is not always that obvious. The advantage of the DEA approach compared to the 
SFA approach is that the DEA approach firstly does not require any functional form to be 
selected, and secondly no behavioural assumptions are needed (Piesse, 1999).  The 
disadvantage of using DEA however is that it is a deterministic approach, which means that 
the model does not take measurement errors and other statistical noise into account and 
therefore any deviations from the frontier are assumed to be as a result of inefficiencies 
(Mkhabela T. , 2011). Below is a discussion of the theory taken from Coelli et al. (2005) 
behind this approach. 
 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
Data Envelopment Analysis as proposed by Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes (1978) is both a non-
parametric as well as deterministic approach that uses linear programming techniques to 
construct a piece-wise frontier over the data. Efficiency measures are then calculated as 
distances between the observed inputs and outputs relative to this frontier as proposed by 
Farrell (1957) (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). The model that Charnes, Cooper 
and Rhodes (1977) proposed had an input orientation and they assumed constant returns to 
scale (CRS). 
According to Coelli et al. (2005) the DEA model can be thought as a ratio of all outputs 
compared to all inputs, such as 𝑢′𝑞𝑖/𝑣
′𝑥𝑖 where 𝑢 is an M x 1 vector of output weights and 𝑣 
is an N x1 vector of input weights (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). The optimal 
weights for each farm are then obtained by solving the following mathematical programming 
problem (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005): 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
56 
 
𝒎𝒂𝒙𝒖,𝒗 (
𝒖′𝒒𝒊
𝒗′𝒙𝒊
)
𝒔𝒕36.
𝒖′𝒒𝒋
𝒗′𝒙𝒋
≤ 𝟏, 𝒋 = 𝟏, 𝟐… , 𝑰 
𝒖, 𝒗 ≥ 𝟎
          ( 12) 
Where 𝑞𝑖 is a column vector of M outputs, and 𝑥𝑖 is a column vector of N inputs, therefore 
the Nx1 input matrix, X, and the Mx1 output matrix, Q, represent the data for all I firms. The 
mathematical programming problem is then to find values for u and v, so that the efficiency 
measures for each i-th farm is maximised, this is subject to the constraints that all efficiency 
measures must be less than or equal to one (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005).  
The scale of these weights then gives information about the relevant reference groups (known 
as benchmarks) for each inefficient farm, with the largest weight being the most appropriate 
efficient farm for the inefficient farm to be benchmarked against (Mkhabela T. , 2011). The 
DEA model therefore determines which farms within the sample the inefficient farms can 
benchmarked against, rather than benchmarking these farms against an average. The problem 
with the above mathematical programming problem however is that it has an infinite number 
of solutions, Coelli et al. suggest a constraint be imposed so as to limit the amount of possible 
solutions. Using the preferred envelopment form of this problem it yields the following 
(Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005); 
𝒎𝒊𝒏𝝁𝒗 𝜽,
𝒔𝒕.  −𝒒𝒊 +𝑸𝝀 ≥ 𝟎
𝜽𝒙𝒊 −𝑿𝝀 ≥ 𝟎
𝝀 ≥ 𝟎
          ( 13) 
Where 𝜃 a scalar and λ is is a 𝐼 × 1 vector of constants, the linear programming model must 
therefore be solved I times so that a value of 𝜃 is obtained for each farm (Coelli, Rao, 
O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). The 𝜃 value that is obtained is then the efficiency score for the 
i-th farm, and it satisfies the property 𝜃 ≤ 1, with a value of 1 indicating that the farm is on 
the efficiency frontier, according the Farrell (1957) definition, and is therefore technically 
efficient. (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). 
This linear programming problem therefore takes the input vector 𝑥𝑖 for the i-th farm, and 
seeks to radially contract the input vector as much as possible so as to obtain a the minimum 
input required to produce a given level of outputs for the input orientated measure. For the 
output orientated measure however measures the maximum amount of output that can be 
produced from a given level of inputs. According to Coelli et al. (2005) This radial 
contraction therefore generates a projected point (Xλ, Qλ), on the surface of this technology, 
which is defined by Färe et al.(1994) as 𝑇 = {(𝑥, 𝑞): 𝑞 ≤ 𝑄𝜆, 𝑥 ≥ 𝑋𝜆} and exhibits constant 
returns to scale and strong disposability. 
The use of the above constant returns to scale specification when not all firms are operating at 
the optimal scale, because of factors such as imperfect competition or constraints on finance 
etc., however can result in technical efficiency scores that are affected by scale efficiencies 
                                                 
36 The notation “st” stands for subject to. 
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(Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). If any of these factors are expected then it is 
important that the Variable Returns to Scale specification be used, as this specification takes 
into account any scale efficiency effects. Coelli et al. (2005) show that this Constant Returns 
to Scale (CRS) linear programming problem can be modified to account for these scale 
efficiency effects by adding the convexity constraint: I1′𝜆 = 1 to equation 13  this gives;   
𝒎𝒊𝒏𝜽,   𝝀 𝜽,
𝒔𝒕.  −𝒒𝒊 +𝑸𝝀 ≥ 𝟎
𝜽𝒙𝒊 −𝑿𝝀 ≥ 𝟎
𝐈𝟏′𝝀 = 𝟏
𝝀 ≥ 𝟎
          ( 14) 
Where I1 is a Ix1 vector of ones. Coelli et al. (2005) suggest then that this approach forms a 
convex hull of intersecting planes that envelope the data points more tightly than the CRS 
conical hull, and therefore provides technical efficiency scores that are greater than or equal 
to those obtained using the CRS model. This convexity constraint ensures then that an 
efficient farm is only benchmarked against a farm of similar size, as opposed to the CRS 
model which benchmarks all farms in the sample to each other irrespective of the size of the 
farm (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005).  
This measure can then be used to determine the scale efficiencies37 of each farm, which result 
from the differences between the CRS and VRS model, i.e. if there is a difference between 
these two measures it would indicate then that the firm has scale inefficiency. This example 
can be illustrated with the use of a figure, which represents a one input one output frontier.  
 
Figure 2: Scale Efficiency Measurement in DEA  
Source: Adapted from (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005, p. 174) and (Mkhabela T. , 2011, p. 119)) 
                                                 
37 (Nicholson, 1985, p. 247)Defined returns to scale as: “in intuitive terms, if a proportionate increase in inputs, 
increase outputs by the same proportion, the production function exhibits CRS. If the output increases less than 
proportionately, the function exhibits diminishing returns to scale, and if the outputs increase more than 
proportionately then there are increasing returns to scale”. 
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As shown by Coelli et al. (2005) in figure 2 under CRS, the input-orientated technical 
efficiency of the point A is the distance AB. Under VRS however, the technical efficiency 
would be only BC the difference between these two technical efficiency measures, AC then is 
due to scale efficiency (SE) (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). For the output 
orientated measure of technical efficiency (TE), in the VRS model, the technical efficiency is 
equal to the ratio of HB/HD and HB/HE in the CRS model, outputs can therefore be 
expanded by HD/HB in the case of VRS, and HE/HB in the CRS case. According to Coelli et 
al. (2005) these concepts can be expressed in ratios such that; 
TECRS=FA/FB (input-orientated model) and TECRS=HB/HD (output orientated model) 
TEVRS=FC/FB (input-orientated model) and TEVRS=HB/HE (output orientated model) 
SE=FA/FC (input orientated model) and SE = HD/HE (output-orientated model) 
All of these measures are bounded by zero and one (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 
2005). The CRS technical efficiency measure is therefore decomposed into “pure” technical 
efficiency as well as scale efficiency, and this measure can be roughly interpreted as the ratio 
of the average product of a farm operating at the point C to the average product of a firm 
operating at a point of (technically) optimal scales (point I) (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & 
Battese, 2005). A problem with this measure however is that the values obtained do not give 
an indication whether the firm is operating at increasing or decreasing returns to scale, this 
issue can be addressed by imposing non-increasing returns to scale, thereby replacing the 
I1′𝜆 = 1 restriction with a I1′𝜆 ≤ 1 in equation 14 (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 
2005).  
Coelli et al. (2005) suggest then that the nature of the scale inefficiencies can be determined 
by comparing the technical efficiency scores for the non-increasing returns to scale with the 
VRS technical efficiency score. If they are unequal, then increasing returns to scale are 
implied while if they are equal then decreasing returns to scale apply, this constraint insures 
that the i-th firm is not “benchmarked” against firms that are substantially larger than it, but 
may be compared to farms that are smaller than it (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005).  
It is important to note however that the piece-wise linear form of the non-parametric frontier 
in DEA can cause a few difficulties in the efficiency measurement. This problem arises as a 
result of sections of the piece-wise frontier running parallel to the axes (Coelli, Rao, 
O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). Consider the following example of producers using two inputs 
𝑥1 and 𝑥2 to produce a given level of output, 𝑞, taken from Coelli et al. (2005); 
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Figure 3: Efficiency Measurement and Input Slacks (Source: (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005, p. 165)) 
In the above figure firm using input combinations of D and E are the efficient firms that 
define the frontier, while firms F and G are inefficient as they are not on the frontier. The 
Farrell measure gives the efficiency of firms F and G as 0𝐹′/0𝐹 and 0𝐺′/0𝐺 respectively. 
The issue then is that the point 𝐹′ is still not an efficient point because of the fact that you can 
reduce the use of input 𝑥𝑏, by the amount DF’ and still produce the same amount of output, 
this is known as the input slack (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). If these models 
contain multiple inputs and/or outputs, the possibility of the output slack can also occur, refer 
to Coelli et al. (2005, pg. 165) for a further discussion. The computer programme used in 
determining these technical efficiency scores however takes these slacks into account. 
Lastly DEA can also be used to determine the Allocative Efficiencies of the various farms, 
provided that there is price data available as well as a behavioural objective assumed, i.e. 
either cost minimisation or revenue or profit maximisation (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & 
Battese, 2005). In this case we will assume that the behavioural assumption employed for this 
specific data set is that of cost minimisation. For the case of VRS cost minimisation, the 
input-orientated DEA model given by equation 14, is used to determine the technical 
efficiency of the i-th firm. The next step is to solve the cost minimising DEA model defined 
by Coelli et al.(2005) as; 
𝒎𝒊𝒏 𝝀,𝒙𝒊∗ 𝒘𝒊
′𝒙𝒊
∗,
𝒔𝒕.  −𝒒𝒊 +𝑸𝝀 ≥ 𝟎
𝒙𝒊
∗ − 𝑿𝝀 ≥ 𝟎
𝐈𝟏′𝝀 = 𝟏
𝝀 ≥ 𝟎
          ( 15) 
Where 𝑤𝑖 is a N x1 vector of input prices for the i-th farm and 𝑥𝑖
∗ (which is calculated by the 
LP) is the cost-minimising vector of input quantities for the i-th firm, given the input prices 
𝑤𝑖 and the output levels 𝑞𝑖 (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). According to Coelli et 
al. (2005), the total cost efficiency of the i-th farm is then calculated as CE= 𝑤𝑖
′𝑥𝑖
∗/𝑤𝑖
′𝑥𝑖 i.e. 
the cost efficiency is the ratio of minimum cost to the observed cost, for the i-th farm. The 
input mix or allocative efficiency is then calculated residually as AE=CE/TE, where all three 
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of these measures take a value between 0 and 1, where a value of 1 indicates full efficiency. 
This measure implicitly includes any slacks into the allocative efficiency measure, and is 
often justified on the grounds that slacks reflect inappropriate input mixes (Coelli, Rao, 
O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005, p. 184). 
An important factor to consider when using the DEA approach, is since farms are compared 
to one another it is important that the input mixes, output mixes as well as production 
technologies are comparable. This is the case in this study, as the outputs as well as the inputs 
have been aggregated to form an average income per hectare in monetary terms, and the 
inputs have been treated in a similar fashion. The DEA model is used in this study because 
unlike the regressions required for the stochastic frontier analysis, which determines a 
statistical relationship between the dependant and independent variables at the conditional 
mean, DEA determines optimal solutions for every observation in a specific data set. This 
this will therefore facilitate the determination of the appropriate benchmarks for the 
inefficient farms rather than an exogenous source such as the mean (Mkhabela T. , 2011). 
The following section discusses the results obtained from the DEA model. 
4.3.1 Technical Efficiencies using DEA 
DEA in this instance could be a better method of measurement because of the fact that there 
are no statistical trends as a relation to actual happenings. This was as a result of having to 
construct a large amount of data from the recommendations as well as the management 
accounts, it would then not seem completely correct to compare the farms to the exogenous 
mean, but rather to one another using the amounts spent on each input. It therefore seemed 
safer to assume that everyone was the same, rather than assuming that everyone is different, 
which could have led to there being a bias in selection. This could be because of the fact that 
the majority of the decisions that used to be made by the farmer, have now been taken away 
from the farmer, and are now made by the experts in the field under the same management. 
The farmer specific attributes then could be taken out of the inefficiency terms, as the 
majority of their decision powers have been taken away, and their management ability would 
now have less of a bearing on the final outcome.  
The DEA measure can then be used to compare all of the “productive inputs” as established 
in the data chapter as a high degree of aggregation is not required, which is often the case 
with the parametric approach as it seeks to employ a functional form that best describes the 
data (Piesse, 1999). The results obtained are presented in table 10 below. The efficiency 
scores were determined using both the constant returns to scale as well as variable returns to 
scale models, and the difference as mentioned above give an indication as to the scale 
efficiencies with which these farms are operating, i.e. either increasing, decreasing or 
constant returns to scale. 
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Table 10: CRS and VRS technical Efficiency Scores using DEA 
 
The results show that out of the sample of 51 farms for the 2011/2012 production season 
there were 18 farms on the efficiency frontier if constant returns are assumed while there are 
34 farms that are on the frontier if variable returns to scale are assumed. The farms that 
defined the frontier would then be the “best practice” farms meaning that they are the most 
efficient at transforming their inputs into outputs. As a result of these farm being the “best 
practice” farms within the model, it is these farms then that the DEA38 model would 
benchmark the inefficient farms against, this will however be discussed a little bit later on. 
If one has a look at the actual individual scores obtained when the constant returns to scale 
model is relaxed it can be seen that the efficiency scores obtained under variable returns to 
scale model are higher than those obtained from the model in which constant returns to scale 
are assumed. One could then deduce that there are indeed scale efficiencies or inefficiencies 
within the sample. More importantly as was observed in the parametric approach, it would 
seem as if on average these farms are all faced with increasing returns to scale, i.e. there are 
32 farms experiencing increasing returns to scale, 18 farms experiencing constant returns to 
scale and only one farm experiencing decreasing returns to scale, and herein lies the 
advantage of using the DEA approach to determining these efficiency scores as one can now 
have a look at each individual and determine what the best course of action would be so as to 
improve the efficiency of these farms. The conclusion that can be drawn from this then is that 
the majority of these farms could have considerable gains if they increase the size of their 
operations. 
                                                 
38 Hockmann and Svetlov (2006) states that “The key idea of DEA is that the location of a firm outside a 
production frontier indicates that the firm is experiencing a specific problem that does not hamper the activities 
of firms located on the frontier” (Hockmann & Svetlov, 2006, p. 2) 
firm crste vrste scale firm crste vrste scale
1 0.973 0.978 0.995 irs 27 0.321 1 0.321 irs
2 0.992 1 0.992 irs 28 0.726 0.812 0.894 irs
3 0.601 1 0.601 irs 29 1 1 1 -
4 0.676 1 0.676 irs 30 1 1 1 -
5 1 1 1 - 31 0.761 0.89 0.855 irs
6 0.766 1 0.766 irs 32 0.716 1 0.716 irs
7 1 1 1 - 33 1 1 1 -
8 0.887 0.9 0.985 drs 34 0.661 0.795 0.832 irs
9 1 1 1 - 35 1 1 1 -
10 1 1 1 - 36 0.73 0.979 0.746 irs
11 0.568 1 0.568 irs 37 1 1 1 -
12 0.416 0.807 0.515 irs 38 1 1 1 -
13 0.879 0.923 0.953 irs 39 0.57 1 0.57 irs
14 1 1 1 - 40 1 1 1 -
15 1 1 1 - 41 1 1 1 -
16 1 1 1 - 42 0.576 1 0.576 irs
17 0.258 0.845 0.306 irs 43 1 1 1 -
18 0.509 1 0.509 irs 44 0.832 0.936 0.889 irs
19 0.794 0.843 0.943 irs 45 0.718 1 0.718 irs
20 1 1 1 - 46 1 1 1 -
21 0.786 1 0.786 irs 47 0.685 0.945 0.725 irs
22 0.703 0.917 0.766 irs 48 0.972 0.992 0.98 irs
23 0.483 1 0.483 irs 49 0.781 0.883 0.884 irs
24 0.683 0.74 0.924 irs 50 0.779 0.8 0.973 irs
25 0.895 1 0.895 irs 51 0.623 1 0.623 irs
26 0.561 1 0.561 irs mean 0.802 0.96 0.834
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As can be seen in table 10 the majority of these efficiency scores are rather high with the 
average efficiency scores obtained under variable returns to scale is roughly 96%, i.e. for the 
majority or average farm there is only scope to improve efficiency by roughly four percent. 
This result however is not surprising, as in the majority of case the farms received production 
advice from specialists in the fields of agronomy and soil science. One could assume then 
that the advice offered by the technical expert is valuable to the model, and is indeed helping 
these farms with obtaining these high efficiency levels. Again an important point to keep in 
mind is that these farms are compared to one another, and not to the entire industry or even to 
other farms that are outside of the model.  
Another advantage of using the DEA method in determining the technical efficiency scores 
for the various farms, under the input orientation model is that the DEA model uses linear 
programming to determine by what amount the various inputs can be reduced so as to 
maintain a given level of output. It does this by firstly determining the amount of radial 
contraction that is possible, and then determining if there are any slacks in the use of the 
inputs, refer to the discussion above. Below is a discussion of these slacks followed by a 
discussion on the summary of input targets generated by the DEAP (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, 
& Battese, 2005) program. 
4.3.2 Slacks  
Figure 3 can be used to explain slacks for firm F FF’ is the radial reduction possible while 
F’D is the slack. The slack therefore gives an indication as to the amount xb can be reduced 
by without reducing the output. It therefore represents the “waste” or portion of redundant 
input that is being used to generate the output represented by the efficiency frontier ZZ’. 
The difficulty in Agriculture and the determination of output maximization, cost reduction, 
and by definition profit maximization, of an input vector has some serious challenges when 
determining the input mix or input vector that maximizes output. For example, in maize 
production there are certain agronomic norms that need to be adhered to in order to 
sufficiently supply the plants with the nutrients they need in order to successfully grow. If 
then the production function or vector of inputs that produces outputs is measured in Kg/ha, 
the input quantities could be reduced to below the level of agronomic norms and this would 
then change the dynamics of the potential production.  
It would thus seem more relevant to calculate these values in the Rand per hectare, especially 
using DEA since unlogged variables are used, form as a reduction in the input (slacks) could 
be achieved by simply changing the type39 of fertilizer applied. Therefore a reduction in the 
use of an input can improve the efficiency with which the farms operate while still satisfying 
agronomic norms so as to not reduce the level of output which is decided on ex ante. This is 
because of the fact that agronomic norms can be achieved via a large variety of perfectly 
substitutable goods40. This method of measuring the inputs would then seem to be the most 
                                                 
39 For example you could apply a cheaper source of fertilizer, that achieves the agronomic requirements for 
production, but because the product is cheaper it would account for the slack or radial movement to get onto the 
isoquant, or production possibility frontier (PPF) for that specific level of output. 
40 That is the level of nitrogen required to produce one ton of grain in this case is, 𝑥, then this level of 𝑥, can be 
achieved by varying combinations of the various formulations 𝑞1𝑥1, … . , 𝑞𝑛𝑥𝑛. 
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appealing because of the fact that the various levels of inputs required, as given by the level 
of output being aimed for, can be searched for over a wide range of inputs that satisfy the 
agronomic norms while at the same time minimize cost. The same can be said for inputs such 
as seed, chemicals as well as diesel as in most cases a reduction in the total amount applied 
i.e. Rand per Hectare seems more useful than a reduction in the quantity of the input to be 
applied. 
If these levels of inputs were to be measured in a cost per hectare value, this would seem to 
quality adjust the input being used, and any slacks that result from the use of this input could 
then practically be achieved without altering the level of production rendering these 
observations both pertinent and applicable. Table 11 below gives an indication of these input 
slack for the various farms, farms 11-39 have been cut out to save space. 
Table 11: Summary of Input Slacks using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEAP) 
 
In table 10 it was shown that there were 34 farms that had an efficiency of 1 indicating that 
they were technically efficient, and it was these farms that defined the frontier and 
represented the “best practice” farms. Therefore since these farms were on the frontier there 
was no radial reductions possible, and these farms did not have any slacks.  
The remaining 17 farms however had efficiency scores of less than one suggesting that these 
farms had inefficiencies in the use of some of the inputs, radial reductions were therefore 
possible, and there were slacks present. The slacks that were common to ten out of the 17 
inefficient farms were machinery, precision and seed. This is an interesting point, as this 
highlights the possibility that these farms are over inflating the values of their machinery 
fleets, and this is resulting in the company overpaying for the hire of these machines. This is 
indicative of the model, as the farmer often has the incentive to inflate their costs affirming 
the suspicion of their existing significant moral hazards within the model. The precision is 
another interesting slack; this slack would either indicate that these farmers were over 
charged for the precision services supplied to them or that the precision services supplied to 
them did not generate any significant difference in the output generated by these farmers. The 
firm  input: Land (R/ha) Labor (R/ha) Precision (R/ha) Fert (R/ha) Seed (R/ha) Chem (R/ha) Machinery (R/ha) Diesel (R/ha)
1 876.668 0 0 0 218.999 329.535 559.942 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 29.17 991.33 377.75 365.065 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
44 0 8.497 0 19.188 0 183.774 734.649 0
45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
47 724.651 0 0 0 63.205 172.247 192.776 0
48 0 0 47.457 0 79.946 0 55.818 0
49 19.401 26.938 0 0 0 0 79.105 0
50 0 0 79.748 0 0 0 90.869 92.711
51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
mean 40.04 13.541 13.353 53.031 28.217 37.32 66.116 8.765
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seed as a slack could be an indication that the farmers used expensive varieties that did not 
generate any extra benefit from the use of these varieties. 
Therefore from the above table it can be seen that for the most part these farms generally 
require a reduction in either two or more of the costs spent on the various inputs. For inputs 
such as seed, chemicals and fertilizer this can be easily achieved without changing the 
dynamic of production by simply finding a formulation or variety of inputs that still 
maintains any agronomic norms, but that at the same time reduces the cost of applying and 
achieving these agronomic norms. 
The results obtained from the DEA studies, can therefore be immensely useful for the 
managing of these various farms because of the fact that management can simply make 
changes where any inefficiencies exist. These inefficiencies in the use of inputs or the 
shortfall of outputs produced generate slacks these slacks can then be used to quantify the 
amount of excess inputs that are being used by that specific farm to produce the same level of 
output as their peers (Mkhabela T. , 2011). As a result of the DEA model having an input 
orientation, there were no output slacks; this is because of the fact that the model measures 
the efficiency of employing those given input levels to produce the measured level of outputs.   
Another useful set of results generated by the DEA model is the summary of the input targets. 
Table 12 gives a summary of these results; farm 11-39 has been cut out of the results so as to 
save space. 
Table 12: Summary of Input targets Data Envelopment Analysis (DEAP) 
 
Input targets refer to the desirable level of each input that each farm should use to produce 
the observed level of output optimally. They would therefore represent the levels of inputs 
required after the radial reductions and slacks have been subtracted from the values of the 
various inputs. This would then serve as an indication as to the levels of the inputs that should 
be used by the various farms so as to bring the various farms onto the frontier. The values can 
therefore serve as a limit to the amount the company should pay for the various inputs, and 
this would seem to be a great tool for management.  
firm  input: Land (R/ha) Labor (R/ha) Precision (R/ha) Fert (R/ha) Seed (R/ha) Chem (R/ha) Machinery (R/ha) Diesel (R/ha)
1 1122.447 711.717 51.445 2586.415 1192.631 953.229 802.274 674.706
2 541.004 370.646 0 1622.784 1213.952 1113.021 767.419 1242.086
3 476.013 309.955 18.604 1316.963 708.364 525.531 273.997 620.059
4 359.713 273.322 236.923 1450.256 561.774 893.622 577.773 548.464
5 717.171 458.081 245.046 1104.037 297.527 139.13 791.494 855.094
6 609.03 366.315 40.089 1125.921 520.095 545.173 438.398 1124.122
7 310.438 425.208 0 1956.715 982.44 375.143 603.613 1013.433
8 635.46 433.284 74.734 2026.237 1043.331 760.777 756.407 859.584
9 2200 389.333 113.469 2221.095 725.581 534.536 441.897 939.684
10 1485.776 162.76 195.548 2096.405 464.778 423.496 210.821 746.213
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
40 1128.654 586.972 128.249 1982.627 623.209 616.022 1593.014 977.596
41 1092.065 597.577 105.472 2629.971 583.615 731.217 1887.933 1015.883
42 843.478 368.821 119.938 2356.555 613.015 348.074 335.731 661.088
43 490.134 369.258 189.104 2896.275 1415.032 1517.233 1276.222 919.512
44 722.035 368.119 170.568 1785.63 513.112 519.762 825.588 705.815
45 3592.362 567.057 347.985 2013.887 534.501 359.452 573.86 621.036
46 1653.26 234.84 48.2 2121.906 980.639 490.928 942.377 822.596
47 1025.424 201.103 137.588 1903.037 709.547 548.364 523.563 654.678
48 826.985 479.903 97.825 1877.938 804.269 632.977 863.978 677.383
49 1192.502 309.944 129.621 1864.662 606.542 283.423 466.849 752.227
50 400.41 444.176 52.867 1560.37 820.07 528.053 625.147 828.397
51 345.401 221.78 34.634 1058.757 1020.352 348.584 593.93 1071.874
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A useful feature of DEA is that it allows for benchmarking between the various farms. This 
can be an immensely useful tool for managers and farmers alike. This is because of the fact 
that farms of similar size and similar technology can be benchmarked against each other, this 
would then give an indication or a starting point to improving the efficiency with which these 
farms operate. DEA does this by identifying the actual efficient farm that each inefficient 
farm can be compared against, rather than some arbitrary average. The identification of these 
efficient (often called peers) farms then makes it possible for the inefficient farms to observe 
how to best utilize their inputs to generate outputs. Below is a summary of the top two peers 
for each of the farms. 
Table 13: Summary of Peer Counts from DEA analysis 
 
One can interpret table 13 in the following fashion. If farm 1 is used as an example, farm 37 
is its best benchmark to model itself against. In other words farm 1 should emulate farm 37 in 
the way it structures and conducts its business, including the way in which it applies and uses 
inputs to generate outputs. This information can therefore be extremely useful to management 
as it provides a starting point for the various farms to improve the efficiencies with which 
they operate. 
The results obtained from the production frontier, and subsequently the efficiency scores 
obtained would suggest that for the most part the FOF farms are performing, when it comes 
to using inputs to generate outputs. If this is the case why then would the model, aside from 
droughts and unfavorable production conditions be losing money. It appears that this is 
because of the farms inability to choose inputs in optimal proportions i.e. their allocative 
efficiencies. 
firm Peer #1 Peer #2 firm Peer #1 Peer #2
1 37 33 27 27
2 2 28 3 35
3 3 29 29
4 4 30 30
5 5 31 5 7
6 6 32 32
7 7 33 33
8 38 33 34 29 27
9 9 35 35
10 10 36 7 4
11 11 37 37
12 25 3 38 38
13 7 9 39 39
14 14 40 40
15 15 41 41
16 16 42 42
17 51 29 43 43
18 18 44 16 5
19 15 7 45 45
20 20 46 46
21 21 47 25 10
22 3 38 48 16 25
23 23 49 5 9
24 10 35 50 9 5
25 25 51 51
26 26
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 Cost Function 
After having established the technical efficiencies of the various farms within the model, we 
will now have a look at the allocative efficiencies or inefficiencies with which these farms are 
operating. DEA will again be used for this. DEA is chosen because of the fact that it seems to 
allow fixed costs to be taken into account, which is extremely important especially in this 
case as in the majority of the cases the fixed costs make up roughly half of the total costs into 
production. The quantities of these fixed costs are hard if not highly improbable to accurately 
assign to any enterprise on a farm that has more than one enterprise. But by assuming that 
these fixed costs are applied on a per unit basis (1 unit per hectare), it then seems that these 
costs would also then be able to be included in the analysis, and these too would affect the 
allocative efficiency and therefore the economic efficiency of the production.  The 
calculations of allocative efficiencies in this way are not possible with a parametric approach 
because of issues such as multi-collinearity. 
In this instance the linear programming problem is one of minimizing costs, where the total 
cost efficiency of the i-th firm is calculated as CE= 𝑤𝑖
′𝑥𝑖
∗/𝑤𝑖
′𝑥𝑖 i.e. the cost efficiency is given 
by the ratio of the minimum cost to the observed cost given the output level (Coelli, Rao, 
O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). The allocative efficiency is then calculated residually as 
AE=TE/CE, all three of these values take a value between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates a fully 
efficient farm that is on the frontier, as was discussed in the previous section. Below is the 
linear programming problem as given by Coelli et al. (2005); 
𝒎𝒊𝒏 𝝀,𝒙𝒊∗ 𝒘𝒊
′𝒙𝒊
∗,
𝒔𝒕.  −𝒒𝒊 +𝑸𝝀 ≥ 𝟎
𝒙𝒊
∗ − 𝑿𝝀 ≥ 𝟎
𝐈𝟏′𝝀 = 𝟏
𝝀 ≥ 𝟎
          (16) 
Where 𝑤𝑖 is a N x1 vector of input prices for the i-th farm and 𝑥𝑖
∗ (which is calculated by the 
LP) is the cost-minimising vector of input quantities for the i-th firm, given the input prices 
𝑤𝑖 and the output levels 𝑞𝑖 (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). This measure 
implicitly includes any slacks into the allocative efficiency measure, and is often justified on 
the grounds that slacks reflect inappropriate input mixes (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 
2005, p. 184). 
The use of this approach is then justified by the following. If say for example a level of input 
𝑥* based on an agronomic norm was the same for everyone, this level of input can be viewed 
as a per hectare application. Then the price of that input or the level at which you apply this 
input would be given by the price of that input multiplied by the quantity of that input, for 
that specific application that is; 
𝐶𝑥 = {(𝑥, 𝑤)} 
Where 𝐶𝑥 is the cost of the input 𝑥 multiplied by the price vector 𝑤.  
The assumptions here is that there is a vector of the specific input 𝑥 together with its vector of 
prices 𝑤. The amount of input applied then is represented by the amount used of that input, 𝑥𝑖 
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multiplied by the price of that specific input 𝑤𝑖. In the case of fertilizer this is not hard to 
conceptualize because of the fact that there are various different formulations of fertilizers at 
various different prices, and thus any difference in the amount applied could be as a result of 
this, assuming the agronomic norm for production was applied. The next assumption is that 
of constant returns to scale (CRS), so that any differences between the farms is as a result of 
the farms ability to efficiently choose a level of input rather than differences in the scale of 
the various farms. 
This could be a better because of the differences in the quality and prices of various inputs 
therefore it would seem more practical for intermediate inputs such as fertilizer, because you 
can maintain agronomic norms while still reducing costs by using a different formulation of 
the input. This can reduce the costs of the inputs to increase the allocative efficiency (AE) 
and thus per definition the economic efficiency (CE) because you can make changes without 
changing the dynamic of the production. 
If this is true, values like land rent and the management fee cannot be used in Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis because of issues of multi-collinearity in assigning the quantities of the 
various inputs and therefore these costs are completely ignored which could have drastic and 
grave implications on the final analysis. It is assumed for this reason that a non-parametric 
approach such as that of DEA would be better, as in DEA you are able to use a constant (the 
level of the input applied based on a per-unit application such as a hectare), to arrive at an 
allocative efficiency, technical efficiency and economic efficiency score for the various 
farms. 
In this example, this result is shown by correlating the Return on each of the 51 farms with 
the allocative and economic efficiency scores obtained with the DEA analysis. If this measure 
can then be used to explain low or negative returns (viz. by a high correlation between AE 
and Return), then one could assume that returns or profitability could be improved by 
improving the AE. This is because of the fact that there is a large variety of inputs available 
in the market, therefore inputs (groups and suppliers) are perfect substitutes for each other 
and different combinations could be used of the inputs so as to reduce the costs of production 
while still maintaining critical agronomic norms for plants, which are pre-determined and 
non-alterable ( this would rely on the assumption that the agronomist/consultant/farmer are 
rational producers and want to maximize output and thus per definition profit). Then any 
reduction in value is reflected by the allocative efficiency score of the farm in producing the 
pre-determined level of output, or the output to which the field technician is going to apply 
inputs for. 
The disadvantage of this measure however, is that 1) it is not a statistically sound measure, as 
a result on the measure relying on the use of the non-parametric approach DEA, and 2) it 
does not take any scale effects into account, as constant returns to scale are assumed. This last 
point could not be as serious because one could assume that this measure is taken from a 
view of the production being in the short run, and thus it would assume that none of the 
variables are “variable” and thus any scale effects cannot be considered.  
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These allocative efficiency scores were therefore determined by comparing the output 
(R/farm) to the entire range of inputs used into the production of the output i.e. they 
contained all 18 inputs ranging from land rent to accountants fees. The quantities of the 
intermediate inputs into production such as the fertilizer, diesel and seed were given by the 
management accounts and agronomists recommendations together with their respective 
prices. For all other inputs whose quantities and prices were not available, it was assumed 
that these were applied on a per hectare basis, as discussed above, and their prices were the 
amounts that were paid towards the total costs of production, i.e. their total costs.  
The advantage of this method like mentioned above is that one is able to use all of the costs 
into production to determine the allocative and economic efficiency, and any reductions 
required can be achieved by reductions in the amounts paid for each of the inputs. The 
technical efficiency scores in the figure below can largely be ignored, as the scores obtained 
in table 2 would be a better representation of the true efficiency scores although these 
efficiency scores are very close to one another, we are therefore only interested in the 
allocative efficiency scores from table 15 below. 
Table 14 below gives an indication as to the levels of allocative efficiency being achieved by 
the various farms. It is important to again remember that these levels obtained are relevant to 
the farms included in the analysis, and are not a comparison to the industry norms. 
Table 14: Allocative Efficiency Scores using DEA 
 
 
If one considers how these scores relate to the industry in which Farmsecure grains were 
operating in for the 2011/2012 season, these scores were not to a large extent impressive. The 
mean Allocative efficiency of the farms was sitting at 63.2%, i.e. the average FOF farm lies 
Firm te ae ce Firm te ae ce
1 1 0.826 0.826 27 0.709 0.24 0.17
2 0.85 0.69 0.586 28 0.847 0.757 0.641
3 0.684 0.582 0.398 29 0.799 0.63 0.504
4 0.727 0.525 0.382 30 1 0.824 0.824
5 0.912 0.535 0.488 31 0.757 0.645 0.488
6 0.684 0.588 0.402 32 0.846 0.543 0.46
7 0.96 0.86 0.825 33 1 0.813 0.813
8 0.976 0.705 0.688 34 0.868 0.483 0.419
9 1 1 1 35 1 0.739 0.739
10 0.906 0.723 0.656 36 0.715 0.629 0.45
11 0.827 0.41 0.339 37 1 0.924 0.924
12 0.802 0.437 0.35 38 1 0.767 0.767
13 0.905 0.69 0.624 39 0.677 0.482 0.327
14 0.924 0.718 0.664 40 0.989 0.822 0.813
15 1 0.674 0.674 41 1 0.789 0.789
16 0.965 0.648 0.625 42 0.82 0.425 0.349
17 0.725 0.245 0.177 43 0.952 0.833 0.793
18 0.738 0.381 0.281 44 0.789 0.651 0.513
19 0.719 0.624 0.448 45 0.884 0.531 0.47
20 0.977 0.926 0.904 46 0.937 0.817 0.766
21 0.797 0.473 0.377 47 0.886 0.575 0.509
22 0.888 0.605 0.537 48 0.934 0.788 0.736
23 0.677 0.372 0.252 49 0.896 0.605 0.542
24 0.827 0.672 0.556 50 0.918 0.619 0.568
25 1 0.504 0.504 51 0.812 0.414 0.336
26 0.725 0.469 0.34 mean 0.867 0.632 0.561
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quite some distance from the production frontier as discussed above, suggesting that there are 
sufficient gains to be had should this allocative efficiency be improved. The low allocative 
efficiency score could be as a result miss-allocation of resources, which could present 
themselves as a result of moral hazards within and around the model. The above inference 
can be made because of the fact that if one considers the marketing aspect of the 2011/2012 
production season one of the highest prices for maize was recorded in the history of South 
Africa. This should mean then that a low price could not be a factor in these low allocative 
efficiency scores.  
 
Together with this fact is the fact that the level with which the farms operated at from a 
technical efficiency perspective was rather impressive, as this was between 83 and 90% 
depending on the models with which these scores were determined. These scores were 
calculated in such a way that the “quantities” of these inputs used were of a Rand per hectare 
amount. This makes the reduction or increasing of certain inputs possible, as this would allow 
a combination of a different formulation at a different price to be used so as to satisfy any 
agronomical norms, as well as satisfy the reduction of the cost of the said input. This would 
indicate that although there was room for improvement with regards to the reduction in the 
usage of certain inputs to generate outputs, they were generally efficient with only one or two 
outliers dragging the average score for the group down, the farms for the most part were 
producing at near an optimal level when comparing them between one another. This is to be 
expected, as a result of the level of expertise provided for these farms throughout the 
production season.  
 
The allocative efficiency scores obtained in table 14 are correlated against the returns these 
farms made using Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient. This was calculated as a percentage that 
is total income less expenses, divided by the expenses. Table 15 gives an indication of the 
results obtained using Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient. 
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Table 15: Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient between Allocative Efficiency and Return. 
   
From table 15 it can be seen that there is a 62.4% correlation between the Allocative 
Efficiency scores and the percentage return. The t-ration for Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
is given by 𝑡 =
𝑟
√(1−𝑟2)÷(𝑁−2)
 where N is the size of the sample, and r is the Pearson’s 
product moment Correlation Coefficient. The calculated t-ratio is then 5.59 with 49 degrees 
of freedom. The tabulated t-value is at a 1% significance level is 2.68, since the calculated 
value is greater than the tabulated value we can conclude that the Pearson’s Correlation 
Coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 1% level of significance. The 
interpretation of the above results are then that there is a 62.4% chance of having a low return 
if there is a low allocative efficiency score. 
That would suggest then that an increase in Allocative Efficiency would result in increased 
returns for the various farms. It is important to note in this instance however that the exact 
level of Allocative Efficiencies could not be determined as a result of the fact that the data 
was not in a suitable format (quantities and prices) for the various statistical models. This 
however does give some statistical evidence that these two are correlated, and it could be 
viewed as a perfectly acceptable method of determining these scores, as this measure uses 
linear programming and considers all of the costs into production from the company’s 
perspective so as to maximize profits. This would therefore give an accurate representation to 
the true underlying cause of the low and in most cases negative returns achieved by the 
farms. 
The next section of the dissertation will then discuss the findings of both the technical and 
allocative efficiencies, and what impacts these results have on the model. It will also consider 
the implications of the above findings on the model. These findings will be used to try and 
identify possible principle agent issues that present themselves as moral hazards within the 
model. The incentives the farmers are faced with will also be scrutinized to possibly identify 
Farmer AE Score Return Farmer AE Score Return
1 6 17 27 51 50
2 19 24 28 14 4
3 33 35 29 26 29
4 38 40 30 7 32
5 36 21 31 25 36
6 32 39 32 35 8
7 4 3 33 10 14
8 18 30 34 40 10
9 1 18 35 15 7
10 16 15 36 27 13
11 47 51 37 3 12
12 44 47 38 13 28
13 20 37 39 41 45
14 17 9 40 8 22
15 21 25 41 11 11
16 24 27 42 45 26
17 50 48 43 5 6
18 48 43 44 23 2
19 28 31 45 37 49
20 2 1 46 9 23
21 42 34 47 34 33
22 30 20 48 12 42
23 49 46 49 31 5
24 22 38 50 29 16
25 39 19 51 46 44
26 43 41
62.4%
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how these incentives might be encouraging these moral hazards. Lastly using the findings in 
the above analysis as well as those found by Van Zyl (1996) will be used to discuss Allen & 
Lueck (1998) findings on the smaller family farm and the inability to corporatize because of 
the inability to specialize., this will be done with the help of Sender & Johnston (2004) paper 
on Land Reform in Africa where they argue against the Inverse Relationship, as a reason for 
Land Redistribution in Africa. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
5 Discussion 
After having performed the empirical analysis in the previous chapter it was determined that 
these farms operate at high levels of technical efficiency, while for the most part the 
allocative efficiency with which these farms operate is rather poor. The identification of 
factors that lower this allocative efficiency is of utmost importance in trying to find viable 
solutions to the issues hampering these farms. It is therefore important to study both the 
technical as well as allocative efficiency as these are both pre- and co-requisites for economic 
efficiency. The technical efficiency with which these firms operate is according to Allen & 
Lueck (1998) expected to be low because the production cycles of these farms are 
characterized by few cycles, with many stages i.e. crop farming.  
Contrary to Allen & Lueck (1998) argument and rationalization, the technical efficiency of 
these farms was found to be on average 96%41. This high level of technical efficiency would 
suggest that the production technologies were relatively homogenous for these farms. This 
finding was expected because of the fact that the majority of these farmers used technical 
field agents, which specialized in fields such as Agronomy and Soil Science, for the 
production as well as Trading and Hedging for the marketing of the crop. These specialists 
were hired by the company and organized in a hierarchical fashion and provided extension 
services to the farmer. Therefore the farmer only had to supply his management skills to the 
farm by making production and timing decisions for the general management of the farm.  
 Technical Efficiency and Transaction Costs 
The way in which the farming model was set up was such that individual farmers would 
partner up with Farmsecure. This would suggest that all farms in the model would have the 
ability to take advantage of being large and therefore have “economies of size” to their 
advantage. The benefits of being larger than a certain size lay in the concept of “economies of 
size” as discussed in the literature review. These benefits imply that the farms have the ability 
to reduce their transaction costs by reducing several costs which include the costs of finance 
as well as the cost of inputs by receiving certain discounts on purchased inputs for these 
farms.   
An equally important benefit of being larger than a certain size is the ability of these farms to 
take advantage of the various technologies available in the agricultural industry in the present 
day. Machinery is an important part of the technology of the modern day farmer and is often 
given as a reason for the increase in yields of these farms. This is said to be largely as a result 
of the advent of Global Positioning Systems (GPS), which gives the farmer the tools to 
monitor and reduce input costs as well as identify other problematic areas of the production 
stages such as soil deficiencies42.  
                                                 
41 This was determined using the DEA VRS method while the SFA method gave an average efficiency of 
85.7%, please see chapter 4 for an explanation of the advantages and disadvantages of the various methods used. 
42 These Soil deficiencies can be identified through yield maps, they do however need to be examined by an 
industry specialist to determine the cause. The GPS technology therefore supplements the specialist’s advice.  
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Machinery alone however does not imply increased yields rather it is the combination and 
management of all production process that increase yields. The improvement in the 
mechanical technology concerned with this, is the ability to monitor the machines and their 
efficiencies with which they are operating. It could be argued then that the manager has 
excess time, for example time that used to be devoted to fixing and monitoring machines, 
which can now be devoted to another task. If each task in production is stream lined and 
made efficient, then the farmer will have all his time to just manage and delegate tasks. 
Therefore one could say that the manager with the aid of technology and services can now 
specialize in the day to day planning and general management of his/her business. 
Another important benefit of being larger than a certain size is that these farms could access 
the services of industry specialists in both the production as well as marketing phases of their 
production cycles, to such an extent that these farmers can hire specialist’s services from the 
market place for all the tasks that might require certain specialist knowledge. However for the 
most part it would be these larger farms that would be able to take advantage of their size, 
such that their transaction costs in obtaining and making use of technological developments 
and specialists within agriculture would be reduced. Throughout the literature this is an often 
argued point against the existence of there being an “Inverse Relationship” between farm size 
and efficiency.  
The benefits that “economies of size” infer for these farmers are an important explanation for 
the often noticed trend of increasing farm size. Perhaps Balmann (1999) notion of their 
existing a path dependence in agriculture such that the larger farms will continue to grow 
larger while the smaller farms will continue to decrease in size would be an appealing 
explanation except for the fact that this notion does not take managerial ability into account. 
Management’s ability would seem to have an impact on the negative effect of random 
shocks, such that superior managers would have the ability to better prepare for random 
shocks while less competent managers would not. The result would be that the farmer’s 
management ability to account for these shocks would result in the size of the farm 
increasing. Within the literature it is argued that this is as a result of the farmers desires to 
earn an income that is comparable to incomes from off-farm activities.  
It is argued then that if the level of the Technical Efficiency (TE) with which the farms 
produce at is high, one could conclude that some form of specialization must have been 
attained either in the management of the cycles or the stages. This is because of the fact that 
many of the stages in production can be hired out to specialists in the market place. The 
findings would then suggest that contrary to Allen & Leuck (1998) argument for the lack of 
ability of the farmer to specialize, with sufficient market access these farmers would have the 
ability to specialize43. As such, one could argue that it is not the technical efficiency (TE) 
which was 96%, that would encourage the form of organization chosen rather it is the 
Allocative Efficiency (AE) and economic efficiency (CE), which was 63.2% and 56.1% 
respectively, that would have a larger bearing on the organizational form chosen. Throughout 
                                                 
43 Specialization in this sense would refer to the farmer’s ability to specialize in the management processes and 
decisions on his farm, due to the fact that he can hire industry specialists from the market place to advise and 
maximise production on his farm. 
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the literature it is suggested that this dominant organizational form is the owner-operated 
farm. A widely discussed reason for this is that the family owned farm avoids the moral 
hazard as the family are the residual claimants to profit and would not have any incentives to 
shirk. 
The moral hazard as argued by Allen & Lueck (1998) would still be present in the sense that 
the behaviour of the contracted parties would respond to various incentives created by the 
contract between them. This moral hazard could be as a result of adverse selection, in the 
sense that the parties had information not known by the other party which would have an 
impact on the outcome of the contract. This incentive to misrepresent information and shirk 
according to Liefert (2005) resulted in poor decision making by the managers and 
subsequently lowered the allocative efficiency of the Russian corporate style farms. The 
reason given for this was that the objectives of the farm managers were to achieve mandated 
output targets and not maximize profit. The success of the corporate organization in the 
production of grain then seems to be hampered by certain increased costs which manifest in 
the form of principle agent issues resulting in there being an incentive compatibility issues 
between the principle and agent. These issues will be discussed next.   
 Allocative Inefficiency and Agency Theory Approach 
When uncertainty and complexity of the production process increase so too does the 
difficulty of predicting what performance will be desirable and contracting becomes a very 
complicated process (Roberts & Milgrom, 1992). The complexity in structuring these 
contracts could possibly be the result of a principle agent issues in the form of a moral hazard 
between the two parties, in the sense that the owner (principle) cannot determine if the 
manager (agent) is maximizing their own self interests. This post contractual opportunism 
could be lowering the allocative efficiency scores and would arise because of the fact that the 
contracts between the parties are incomplete. This contractual incompleteness is perpetuated 
by the complexity and uncertainty in the production of these field crops44.  
The level of completeness of these contracts involves the tradeoff between ex-ante costs of 
crafting more detailed contracts and the ex-post costs of inefficiencies (Chiappori & Salanié, 
2002). These ex-ante costs could arise in situations of incomplete information, the detection 
of which is complicated and reduced by uncertainty and complexity of the process involved. 
The ex-post costs of inefficiencies on the other hand would increase with the likelihood of 
opportunistic behavior. These ex-post costs of inefficiencies are influenced by the nature of 
the production and the inability to detect amoral behavior by the agent. 
The Agency theory in this situation is used to explain the negative impact this amoral and 
opportunistic behavior has on the incentives for the farmers, which could have negative 
effects on the efficiency with which these farms operate at. While the technical efficiency 
scores were high, the economic efficiency scores were rather poor. This economic efficiency 
score is calculated as the product of the technical efficiency and allocative efficiency scores. 
It is therefore these allocative efficiency scores that would therefore have a larger bearing on 
                                                 
44 Grain farming especially in dry land production is filled with this uncertainty in the form of random weather 
shocks, while at the same time it is an extremely complex production system that relies on the simultaneous 
interaction between many different aspects. 
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the profitableness of these farms. This was shown by the high level of correlation between the 
allocative efficiency and the return of these farms from the company’s perspective. 
When one considers the return and variables to include in the calculation of the return it could 
be assumed that the construction thereof is a lot easier for a company renting land than for an 
individual that owns the land. This is because of the fact that the company does not view 
variables like land as an asset rather it views it as an input into production. Therefore the 
company finds certain characteristics in certain districts and chooses the farmers that match 
their requirements, consider the land for example. The company pays rent under all 
circumstances; the only aspect that differs is the amount of rent that is paid, as well as the 
area rented. 
While the organization makes use of the local managers, they do not allow these farmers 
autonomy in the implementation of these production plans and the local managers are in 
many instances required to just oversee the various operations. This is because of the fact that 
he majority of the production and marketing decisions are made by the company and the 
specialists the company employs. As such, there are various instances where there are 
considerable incentives for the farmer or agent to fulfill his own self-interests above those of 
the company. These incentives for the most part are as a result of the complexity and 
unpredictability of the production process, which reduces the ability to monitor and 
subsequently reward or punish unfaithful partners. There is thus a need for formal 
mechanisms to enforce these agreements between the company or principle and agent or farm 
owner in this instance. 
These counter-productive or negative incentives in this instance are thought to arise from pre-
contractual opportunism of the farmers in the sense that there is adverse selection, and 
secondly in the form of post contractual opportunism in the form of a moral hazard between 
the principle (company) and the agent (farmer). These two phenomena are both thought to 
have an effect on the allocative efficiency with which these farms operate at from the 
company’s perspective. An appealing way to consider this is that since the company hires 
both the land and general management from the farmer as well as pays for all of the inputs 
used in production one could consider these as inputs into production which would suggest 
that there is an optimal proportion of the input required such that the output is maximized45.  
There are various moral hazards that seem to dominate the model, and for the most part these 
are thought to be as a result of there being adverse selection in the screening process for these 
farms. Below is a discussion of firstly this adverse selection followed by a discussion of a 
few of the most important moral hazards and incentive issues these farmers face.  
5.2.1 Adverse Selection: Farmers in the Model 
The adverse selection in this sense would be related to the quality of firstly the land the 
farmer owns and secondly the management ability of the farmer joining the model. If there 
was adverse selection one would expect the land quality to have a positive and somewhat 
large correlation to the price paid for the rental of the land. However this is not the case and it 
                                                 
45 Refer to the motivation for the use of the cost function used in the calculation of the Allocative Efficiency 
using the program DEA in Chapter 4. 
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could therefore be assumed that there are other factors guiding the company in choosing 
farmers for their model, and this is thought to result in adverse selection. This adverse 
selection is initiated by the company through their desire to farm in any specific area because 
of geographical risk, with a specific farmer possibly because of the prestige of having the 
farmer in the model or alternatively the company’s belief in forging a beneficial relationship 
with the said farmers.  
This is an argument that can be made because unlike farmers who have a fixed and given 
resource the company chooses whether or not to rent any specific piece of land. The price the 
company is willing to accept is just as much a function of their willingness or desire to farm 
in a specific area with a specific farmer as it is to get good quality land in their model. While 
both of these factors, i.e. obtaining good “quality land” or good “quality famers”, could 
generate the adverse selection the one that carries the most weight in the decision is the one 
generating the adverse selection. This can be seen from table 16 below which shows the 
correlation between the prices paid for land, as well as the correlation between the size of the 
farm and the rental paid. If the potential yield that is obtainable for a given piece of land is a 
measure of the quality of the land, then one would expect farms with higher Long Term 
Average Yield’s (LTAY’s) to have higher rents as a result of the assumption that the quality 
of the land is superior to that of a farm with a lower LTAY’s.  
If one looks at table 16 it can be seen that using Pearson’s Correlation Co-efficient this is not 
the case.  There is only a 2.79% correlation between LTAY and rent paid for the land. Rather 
there seems to be a larger correlation between the farm size and the rental paid (17.09%) 
which would seem to indicate that it is not the LTAY that drives the price of rent, rather other 
factors such as those mentioned before. This would suggest then that the contracts are given 
out endogenously as opposed to exogenously as often assumed throughout the literature. An 
interesting point in table 16 is that the yield is positively related to size. This could be either 
because of the fact that one could assume that better manager would be on larger farms 
through evolution. However these farmers are all under the same management teams and it is 
therefore more likely that these farmers use more advanced technology which they have 
access to because of their size. 
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Table 16: Pearson’s Correlation between Rent, Yield and Size  
 
The low correlation between the yield and rent or the size and the rent, it would seem to 
suggest that perhaps yield was not the most important factor in choosing these farmers. It 
would rather seem as if the size of the farm, where the farm was and who the farmer was 
would have an influence on the farmers being chosen for the model. Therefore one could 
assume that the company’s desire to farm in a specific area with a specific farmer suggests 
firstly the contracts are given out heterogeneously and secondly there is adverse selection in 
choosing these farmers. This adverse selection would therefore contradicts the conclusion 
that the contracts are given out randomly, rather they are given out based on the company’s 
belief that they can maximize their profit from that given relationship. 
Imperfect information of the farmers however limits the ability to choose these partners by 
sending false signals to the company. Figure 3 depicts a scenario where farmers have been 
assigned to various quadrants according to their soil quality’s and their management abilities. 
For simplicity this figure draws on the assumption that there are two types of soil and two 
types of farmers within a farming district, and these are divided equally throughout the 
district. The second assumption is that farmers in quadrant one are assumed to be more risk 
neutral, while farmers in quadrants two to four are assumed to be risk averse such that they 
would seek arrangements that would minimize the variability of their income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ProvinceDistrict Farmer ID Size Rank Yield Rank Rent Rank Province District Farmer ID Size Rank Yield Rank Rent Rank
WF Sasolburg. 23 1 40 12 EF Bethlehem. 6 25 12 36
NW Schweizer-Reneke. 37 2 7 9 WF Bultfontein. 10 26 24 22
NW Schweizer-Reneke. 27 3 14 44 WF Hoopstad. 43 27 19 19
NW Vryburg.          12 4 16 24 WF Welkom. 38 28 36 46
EF Frankfort. 47 5 42 8 WF Hoopstad. 8 29 18 23
NW Vryburg.          15 6 20 18 WF Bultfontein. 9 30 28 47
NW Wolmaransstad. 44 7 5 40 EF Frankfort. 46 31 37 39
EF Vrede. 25 8 34 6 WF Wesselsbron. 31 32 32 27
NW Lichtenburg. 35 9 45 26 WF Wesselsbron. 45 33 30 34
NW Schweizer-Reneke. 13 10 21 7 WF Marquard. 3 34 46 13
MP Ermelo. 2 11 13 37 EF Reitz. 36 35 33 41
MP Balfour. 7 12 4 2 WF Bultfontein. 41 36 25 11
WF Viljoenskroon. 30 13 6 21 EF Reitz. 21 37 43 33
WF Ficksburg. 5 14 35 15 WF Koppies. 29 38 17 31
NW Lichtenburg. 1 15 41 28 EF Bethlehem. 17 39 38 42
MP Middelburg. 39 16 15 16 EF Frankfort. 18 40 39 1
WF Hoopstad. 11 17 23 3 MP Vryheid.           34 41 10 38
MP Bethal. 4 18 31 43 MP Carolina. 33 42 9 17
WF Winburg. 16 19 47 20 WF Bothaville. 32 43 22 4
WF Clocolan. 24 20 44 45 WF Wesselsbron. 20 44 26 30
WF Hoopstad. 14 21 27 14 MP Ermelo. 40 45 1 29
MP Balfour. 22 22 8 5 WF Hoopstad. 19 46 29 10
MP Middelburg. 26 23 3 25 EF Harrismith. 28 47 11 35
WF Hoopstad. 42 24 2 32
2,79% 17,08% 19,21%Yield and Rent Size and YieldSize and Rent 
Pearsons Correlation Co-efficient
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Figure 4: Farms and Farmers within any given district 
If for simplicity these farmers and soil qualities are assumed to be in equal share, i.e. 50 % 
good and bad farmers and 50% good and bad soil, so there would be a situation in which 
there are;  
 25% in Quadrant 1, 
 25% in Quadrant 2, 
 25% in Quadrant 3, 
 25% in Quadrant 4, 
Assuming the farmers all have the equal incentive to join the model, statistically one would 
have a 75% chance of getting farmers from quadrants two to four in the model and only 25% 
chance of getting farmers from quadrant one in the model.   
This has been shown in the calculations carried out by the DEA program. It was shown that 
there are 32 farmers with increasing returns to scale (farmers from Quadrants two or three) 
the increasing returns to scale. This could suggest that the managers are good as they have 
applied the right amounts of inputs, but have not kept up with technological trends, even 
though their soil quality does lend itself to this level of technological commitment. The other 
possibility is that the farmers have good soil quality, but are using too little inputs as a result 
of poor management. There is one farm with decreasing returns to scale and this farmer is 
likely to be in quadrant four as he has either over capitalized in technology, as a result of poor 
soil, as well as applied to many inputs as a result of their poor management abilities. Lastly 
there are 18 farms with constant returns to scale, suggesting these farmers have applied the 
right level of inputs as well as adopted the right level of technology as a result of their 
management abilities as well as soil qualities. This result would not vindicate that these 
farmers are from quadrant one because it is equally likely that farmers from quadrants two 
and three could have favourable conditions in the year studied. 
Rather the incentives for joining the model would be related to the farmer’s belief in their 
ability to do better with or without the model, stated in another way a function of the farmer’s 
attitude towards risk. That is if the farmer believes he can do better on his own, as is the case 
with the farmers in the first quadrant, they will have a less of an incentive to join the model. 
Should these farmer’s join the model the company would most likely find that it is paying too 
much to these farmers, as they would want to receive more from the model than they could 
on their own. This is as a result of the assumption that individuals are profit maximizing.  
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Should this be the case it would be safe to assume that the company is either paying too much 
for the land in cases where farmers have poor land quality, the farmers in this quadrant would 
have the incentive to overstate the quality of their land so as to be accepted into the model. Or 
the farmers would inflate their management ability which would mean that the company is 
paying too much for the farmer’s management, as in the cases where the managers of the 
farms are poor. Or lastly they are over paying for both land and management in the case of 
farmers lying in the last quadrant. Although the company have tried to give the contracts out 
randomly there has possibly been unintentional adverse selection as a result of the 
unobservable imperfect information these farmers have prior to joining the model.  
A possible solution would be to offer a fixed level of land rent per unit of output produced. 
This value would have to be high enough to allow for farmers in quadrants 2 and 3 to join 
into the model, as it would seem in either of these cases either the negative effects caused by 
either land quality or management ability could to a certain extent be ameliorated by the high 
level of technical ability within the company. The price should also be low enough so as to be 
able to exclude the farmers in the quadrant four, as these farmers would generally not be 
beneficial for the company. Farmers in quadrant one, like mentioned before might be willing 
to join the model, and this would be a reflection of that farmer’s belief in his abilities. The 
price set per unit output should not be planned around attracting those farmers to the model, 
for the obvious dangers of paying too much to the farmer. 
This method of land rent would then seem to act as a quality adjusted value for paying the 
rent, and the best land would then cost the most therefore the rent would be determined on the 
productive capacity of the land, and not the district in which the land is situated in per se. 
Because of its allocation of risk, the model would suggest that farmers in Quadrants two to 
four would most likely join the model, as they are then suddenly guaranteed constant returns 
while the company carries the possibility of varying returns. Therefore the company is 
effectively taking the risk away from the farmers, and placing it upon itself which could lead 
to a sub-optimal outcome for the company resulting in an almost unavoidable moral hazard. 
5.2.2 Agency Theory 
It would seem then that it is these costs that would have a large bearing on the model, as in 
many cases the means with which these payments are determined as well as structures that 
are put into place result in a moral hazard. It was shown that the farmer has the incentive to 
overstate the quality of his land by means of falsely reporting his Long Term Average Yield 
(LTAY), as well as his fleet of machines and the costs thereof. It is also in the farmers best 
interests to overstate firstly his costs with regards to amounts payable directly to him viz. 
labour and other inputs that FOF does not have direct control over, such as diesel. All of 
these factors are extremely difficult to monitor, and would therefore result in large 
monitoring costs for the FOF model, as was the case with the Bonanza farms mentioned in 
the introduction.  
5.2.2.1 Moral Hazard: The Case of Inputs 
As a result of these difficulties in monitoring the farmers there are often incomplete and 
unenforceable contracts. This occurred in this case and resulted in a moral hazard between 
the principle which is the company and the agent or the farmer. This moral hazard could stem 
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from the selection process in the form of imperfect information that the farmers have about 
their land quality as well as their management ability, the price and quantities to be 
announced would therefore be based on the planners incorrect estimate. The result is then that 
there is a possibility of self-interested misbehaviour that generates the moral hazard problem 
which according to Roberts & Milgrom (1992) limits the contracts that can be written and 
enforced between the principle and the agent.. 
Throughout the literature it is argued that the use of prices to co-ordinate behaviour avoids 
any loss on account of imperfect cost estimates. In other words the fixing of prices performs 
better than fixing quantities. This is an interesting point with regards to the FOF model, 
which is often guided by the LTAY as the desired level of output quantity per hectare 
produced. This resulted in a similar situation as those of the soviet farms (Liefert (2005) and 
Roberts & Milgrom (1992)) in which the farmers jobs were made easy by adopting wasteful 
production plans.  
5.2.2.1.1 Management Fee 
In order to motivate the farmers to achieve this level of output the company used a 
management fee per ton of grain produced from a given piece of land. No matter what the 
production was that was generated from the farm, a fixed amount was to be paid out on the 
expected yield which was based on the LTAY for that farmer46. The moral hazard was then 
imbedded in the fact that these farmers would overstate their management ability and use 
excessive amounts of inputs to produce these outputs. This moral hazard would then seem to 
have a direct impact on the allocative efficiency as a result of the wrong proportions of inputs 
being used. 
If the farmer had ex ante imperfect information on the quality of his land as well as his 
management abilities such that he misrepresented his LTAY, ex post there will be a situation 
in which the farmer has the incentive for self-interested misbehaviour in the sense that any 
under production could be blamed on a number of factors that are extremely difficult to 
monitor. There thus seems to be little motivation to produce more than the LTAY and the 
management fee in this instance could be creating an incentive to miss-represent the farms 
LTAY. However it is also likely that the management fee structured in this way has a 
disincentive for excess effort.   
This could be the case when high rents are being paid to the farmers for soil and equipment, 
as the level of profit that they could be expecting from a hectare of land could already be 
exceeded (exceeding their utility curves) with the rents they receive. They would therefore be 
indifferent to the income generated from a 7 ton yield as opposed to a 6 ton yield while this is 
very much the opposite for FOF.  
However these management fees are beneficial to both the farmer and the company, 
especially in the sense that they firstly attract farmers to the model suggesting that better 
                                                 
46 This management fee was structured in such a way that 2/3 of the management fee was paid out prior to 
harvesting. In the event of the farmer producing less than the management fee owed to him because of a poor 
yield the company had no recourse against him and could not demand the excess monies back, they would 
however not pay the final third over to the farmer. 
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managers with better soils and higher beliefs in their abilities would join the model and 
secondly they can create an incentive to produce more profitably. How these management 
fees are structured and paid out however could be the most important factor affecting the 
different incentives these farmers are faced with. The incentives for the farmers to produce 
could be paid out in a sliding scale format, i.e. if they make x% profit then they receive y% of 
the profit as a management fee or a bonus so that the higher the level of production the higher 
the level of reward. As such, it would seem to be better to make this incremental increase in 
payment to be in line with profits rather than production, as it is the profits at the end of the 
day that are important to the company.  
Management fees that would reward and motivate the farmers for higher yields and punish 
farmers for unprofitable production will create a positive incentive for the farmers to monitor 
their input costs as well as generate higher yields and profits. This could greatly improve the 
profitability of the model. If the management fees do not act as a disincentive to using excess 
levels of inputs, as was the case during this study, there will be a situation in which the 
farmers overuse inputs to produce mandated levels of outputs. This is discussed in the 
following section with help of the on farm employment as an example. 
5.2.2.1.2 On Farm Employment 
A possible explanation for the farms poor allocative efficiency scores could be as result of 
over paying on certain fixed costs of the model, viz. Labour, Management Fee, Land Rental 
etc. it would seem then that it is these costs, which are possibly generated by moral hazards 
of the principle agent nature47, that are hampering the profitability of the FOF model. In some 
instances it would seem, with the fortunate power of hindsight, as if the incentives for the 
farmer to produce as well as operate within the model could be counterproductive with 
regards to the ideals of FOF, in achieving both sustainability and profitability in agriculture. 
  
Let us consider labour, the same can be said for the majority of the fixed costs for the 
company such as rent etc., as an example of this statement. Let us assume that the labour 
multiplier48 is 0.01 people per hectare, and the average farm laborers wage is at R 2500 per 
month, the per hectare cost of labour would be R30049 per hectare regardless of the size of the 
farm. If one then considers the section of the contract devoted to the employment of labour. 
The employees of these farmers were to be paid by the farmer who would then be reimbursed 
by FG. This in short meant that the farmer would be responsible for the employee’s and FG 
would foot their labour bill. 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 Refers to situations in which one individual (the agent) acts on behalf of another (the principle) and is 
supposed to advance the principles goals. The moral hazard problem arises when agent and principle have 
differing individual objectives and the principle cannot easily determine whether the agent’s reports and actions 
are being taken in pursuit of the principles goals or are self-interested behaviour. 
48 (Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy (BFAP), 2011, p. 88). 
49 R 2500/ month = R113.63/ day well above the minimum wage. Then the per hectare cost would be equal to 
(R2500 x 12) x 0.01 = R300 /ha. 
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Table 17: Actual Spending on Labour (R/ha) 
 
The moral hazard that presents itself would have a large bearing on the costs for these various 
farms. In the worst case, if one considers the possibility that the farmer is dishonest he will 
have the incentive to overstate his labour bill on the farm thus acting as a broker to FOF in 
the whole situation and making a direct profit for brokering labour to FG. The alternative and 
more likely scenario would be that such farmers would have an incentive to have labour 
intensive enterprises on the farm such as dairies, feedlots or even cattle50 enterprises. If this is 
the case the value of labour that is normally spent on these other enterprises is now received 
at no cost, as FG bears the labour costs as well as the risk. The per unit costs for each farmer 
to the company is now higher, as he has hired labour to such an extent that the marginal cost 
of producing that “private unit” has effectively been driven to zero. This is indicative of most 
of these costs that are difficult to monitor, and therefore present themselves as moral hazards 
within and around the FOF model. 
There is this increased incentive to shirk because the benefits from shirking are higher than 
the benefits of not shirking51. This is because of the fact that the chance of being caught is 
low because of the need for high monitoring and transaction costs, the contract between the 
parties is therefore for these reasons difficult to enforce. The smaller family owned farms on 
the other hand rely on family contracts, and one could therefore conclude that they are not 
under the same constraints. It is for these reasons one would expect the allocative efficiency 
scores to be higher for the family owned farms as the owner operated farm is often not faced 
with these same incentive issues and moral hazards.  
                                                 
50  The BFAP labour multiplier for a cattle enterprise is roughly 0.015 (Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy 
(BFAP), 2011, p. 88), this would mean a per hectare cost, using the same reasoning as above of R 450/ha, that is 
an increased overall cost to the model of R 15 000 000. 
51 For example if managers were to hire additional land on behalf of say a company, if the farmer gets rewarded 
for the level of land farmed. Due to the moral hazard between the principle and agent in this instance one would 
not expect the manager to hire the best land as it is in their interests to hire any available land as they receive 
additional benefits for doing so. 
 
Farmer ID Actual (R/ha) Farmer ID Actual (R/ha) Farmer ID Actual (R/ha)
1 727.81R           18 563.20R           35 371.51R           
2 370.65R           19 288.56R           36 370.43R           
3 309.96R           20 407.38R           37 1 017.00R       
4 273.32R           21 354.44R           38 691.52R           
5 458.08R           22 456.28R           39 214.37R           
6 366.31R           23 384.03R           40 586.97R           
7 425.21R           24 511.81R           41 597.58R           
8 481.19R           25 408.23R           42 368.82R           
9 389.33R           26 270.71R           43 369.26R           
10 162.76R           27 135.14R           44 402.42R           
11 143.80R           28 567.15R           45 567.06R           
12 393.12R           29 237.83R           46 234.84R           
13 737.82R           30 767.32R           47 212.73R           
14 676.88R           31 503.76R           48 483.93R           
15 187.47R           32 391.04R           49 381.32R           
16 556.71R           33 323.75R           50 555.03R           
17 317.58R           34 275.83R           51 221.78R           
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5.2.2.1.3 Horizontal Integration 
An argument for these corporate farms is their ability to horizontally integrate in the sense 
that the company, because of its size, has the ability to own amongst other things input 
companies so that they can supply the farms with the necessary inputs. This is thought to be 
beneficial because of the fact that these farms could now receive and use these inputs at a 
discounted price, and have the specialist knowledge and services that come with these inputs. 
Therefore by owning these input companies, each stage of production is organized as a 
separate firm and the transactions between the stages are intermediated by the market 
(Roberts & Milgrom, 1992).  
This is happening but company seems like it is trying to manipulate the market to suite 
themselves52 thus the stages between production are not being intermediated by the market. 
Rather they are being controlled by the company and the company with the strongest will, 
will survive and dominate the other companies. The “economic activity” within the company 
is thus approaching the extreme where all transactions are made at an arms-length basis. 
While this is true for the inputs, this is not the case for the outputs and here the company 
faces significant competition. This is because the company does not produce a large enough 
amount of maize so as to have an influence on the market. 
It would seem as if there is a significant moral hazard for the company and its subsidiaries. 
On the input side the input specialists such as the area specialists have the incentive to sell 
expensive inputs to the farmer who does not have a choice but to use the inputs offered to 
him. This happens as a result of making one decision maker and taking away farm level 
market forces that are driven by price. Therefore co-ordination and any benefits derived from 
the free market in co-ordinating the firm is lost.  
Consider the following argument. If you make the farmers buy inputs from your input 
companies, you firstly lose price competition and secondly you lose cost considerations as 
neither the farmers nor the agronomical team is co-ordinated nor motivated to maximise FG 
interests rather they are going to maximise their own interests, as now they are not co-
ordinated through market forces, nor price but rather their own self-interests either in their 
personal capacity, fees the farmers receive. These farmers are not given the incentive to 
produce profitability rather they are given the incentive to produce maximally and this could 
result in the over use of inputs by the farmers.  
The subsidiaries and the specialists have a reputation to build and uphold, and this could have 
resulted in them using inputs that negatively affect the allocative efficiency of the company, 
for example supplying unnecessarily expensive inputs to these farmers. If on the other hand 
these specialists had the incentives to over sell fertilizer to the farms because of sales 
incentives and kick-backs the moral hazard is obvious. With regards to the outputs the 
company had to trade in the open market and did not have an ability to affect or manipulate 
                                                 
52 By removing any competition via contractual obligations, the company is trying to act as a monopoly to their 
own farmers within the model.  
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the market53. The result was that they to a large extent received for their maize what the 
normal commercial farmer receives for his grain.  
This problem was perpetuated by a subsidiary that knew very little about farming and relied 
on the honest opinions and recommendations from their “partner’s” specialists. Because the 
final decision rested with the primary production subsidiary, this decision was made upon 
imperfect information that was fraught with moral hazard. This moral hazard in the 
production and decision making process resulted in these farms being allocatively inefficient.   
5.2.3 Property Rights and Profit Sharing 
From the data it can be gathered that the non-productive inputs (management fees, admin 
fees, rent (land and equipment), etc.) outweigh the productive inputs (fertilizer, chemicals 
etc.) by more than 100%. That is a farm with /ha input costs of R 11 500, will have 
“productive input” costs of R 5 100 and “non-productive input” costs of R 6 400. This is 
tantamount to fixed and overhead costs of 50% of the total income assuming the LTAY is 6 
tons, and the maize price is R 2000, this situation gets worse if the yields and prices change. 
The proportions of these costs that are paid out to the farmer are of great concern, as this 
could have to some extent become the level at which these farmer would want to be 
compensated at in order for them to remain in the model. 
A reduction in these costs is imperative especially since these costs for the most part are not 
coupled to output nor prices received for the output. They therefore pose a grave threat to the 
sustainability of the model, in situations of either low prices or low yields such as in cases of 
drought. The difficulty in this arrangement is firstly the risk and the reward for risk and 
secondly the issue of property rights in the sense that the farmer owns the pre-requisite to 
production and the only fixed assets. Even though the company takes all the risks of 
production by hiring the fixed factors of production and paying for all of the intermediate 
inputs, the company is not the residual claimant to profit because they do not own any of the 
fixed factors of production. This type of fixed rent production contract in this sense does not 
seem to attract equal rewards for risk and a type of share crop or profit share arrangement 
might work better. 
 Profit sharing would to an extent reduce these costs. However the costs such as land and 
machinery rent cannot be ignored, and would have to be paid to the farmer. If one were to 
view these costs as the contribution being made by the farmers to the costs of producing the 
output, this would propose an equitable means to the costs incurred by both sides and 
therefore risks, which would require an equal level of compensation, incurred by both sides. 
That is say for example the inputs cost R 6000, and the rent amounted to R 900 (150 x 6), and 
the machinery rent was R2000/ha, then the total costs for producing a hectare of maize would 
be (R 8900).  
The farmers contribution towards the production could then be the rent of the land as well as 
the rent of the machinery towards the production of the output (i.e. in this case R 2900/ 
R8900), and that is the share of the profits the farmer should receive as a reward for his risk 
                                                 
53 They produced less than 5% of the country’s maize crop. This is assuming that the countries maize crop was 
at 12 million tons. 
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in producing. The management fee to be paid on the sliding scale of incentives then could be 
determined by calculating the farmer’s percentage contribution towards production, and this 
percentage value could be used to calculate the management fee to be paid to the farmer as a 
part of his incentives to produce. The exact level of the contribution towards the total costs 
would need to be determined, and the profit to be shared then should ideally be the level at 
which the contributions are made towards the total costs. Therefore an equitable arrangement 
could be achieved between the two parties concerned. Below is an example; 
If the farmer were to contribute the value of his machinery say at R2000 per hectare, then his 
contribution towards the total costs would amount to 36% of the total costs of production 
(2000/9000). This value could then be paid out to him as his share of the profits, which are R 
3200 after all the costs have been, subtracted (Inputs – R6000). This would result in a total 
amount of R 3117 being paid out to the farmer (8.5% x R 3100 + R900+R2000), and a total 
amount of R 2883 being paid out to Farmsecure per hectare. Therefore the farmer makes a 
slightly higher profit than Farmsecure, this deficit from Farmsecure perspective could easily 
be made up in savings on the costs of certain inputs. The farmer on the other hand has more 
than an incentive to join the model, as he is in most cases receiving a more than adequate 
amount per hectare (R 2900 per hectare per season), and he has an incentive to produce larger 
outputs, as the benefit he gains from doing so would become greater and greater, one could 
the assume that the farmer would want to increase his efforts so as to increase production, 
that he can reap higher rewards for doing so. 
Within the theory, if the firm uses a production contract it should not try an intermediate the 
various stages of production as this results in increased transaction costs and moral hazards 
because of the difficulty and expense of monitoring the agent’s actions. Therefore if the 
model were to follow the above means, it would be suggested that the ultimate decisions as to 
which types of inputs to be applied as well as at what cost should be made by the farmer. 
These “options” of which inputs should be used should be made by specialists, as they have 
the correct technical skills to make such suggestions. It would thus be recommended that the 
specialists recommend various options to the farmer who then has the option, under cost 
consideration, to choose which one is to be used in the production process. 
It is recommended in this fashion because of the fact that the farmer now has the incentive to 
maximize profits, and it would be assumed that they would then limit the spending on 
unnecessary inputs. They would thus act as the policemen in the whole scenario and this 
would in turn reduce the transaction costs incurred by the company to monitor all these steps 
into the production process. One would also assume that since the farmers have been on the 
farms for such a length of time these farmers would be the most qualified on their specific 
farms to make such decisions. This would also seem to reduce the chances of a moral hazard 
presenting itself between the farmers and the company.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6 Conclusion 
As was determined using empirical analysis using both deterministic as well as stochastic 
measurements the technical efficiency with which these farms operated at was relatively high 
which contrary to Allen & Lueck (1998) argument suggests that these farms have been able 
to specialize. If one considers the changes in technology since 1998 this inability to specialize 
(Allen & Lueck, 1998), might no longer be in place to the same magnitude they once were. In 
present times there are means and methods of tracking and recording almost every single 
aspect of production, and these are almost all accessible in the market place. One could 
deduce that the larger the owner-operated farm is the better access the farmer has to the 
market place, which would imply that the opposite might be true. This would be because of 
the fact that these larger egalitarian farms would benefit from aspect such as discounted 
transactions and better and cheaper access to credit. What results is a manager that has the 
ability to specialize in the production and operation of the farm, with the ability to make use 
of the services of industry specialists to specialize and advise on the use of certain inputs, this 
farm would have “economies of size”. Economies of size therefore seems to be an important 
factor in the modern day setting, and it can be argued then that commercial farmers who have 
the ability to access and make use of these technologies and markets can greatly improve 
their technical efficiency, and therefore productivity in producing outputs. 
This argument is often found in the literature as a major benefit of the larger company over 
owner-operated farms. To such an extent that because of the size of some of these companies 
they have the ability to horizontally integrate which limits they need for perfect contracts as 
argued by Deininger & Byerlee (2012). Apart from the ability to horizontally integrate, 
because of the sizes of corporate farms they generally have the ability to access these markets 
and hire much of the work requiring specialist attention out to specialists in the field. This 
would suggest and was indeed shown that these larger corporate farms with their ability to 
adopt the latest technology have high technical efficiency scores such that there were not 
significant gains to be had by improving their technical efficiency. This was thought to be the 
case because by having agronomists and other field specialists under the company’s 
employment it was assumed that they would form part of the company and thus principles. 
Rather it was the allocative efficiency and subsequently the economic efficiency with which 
these farms operated at that seemed to have a larger bearing on the profitableness of the 
model. The owner-operated farm however does not suffer from this, as has been shown in 
numerous studies, simply because the owner-operated farms firstly have autonomous 
decision making rights and secondly they are residual claimants to profits. They will 
therefore not have the incentive to shirk or behave in an amoral fashion. The corporate, 
production contract farming model for grain farms on the other hand is fraught with 
opportunities for amoral and opportunistic behavior. 
This is because of the adverse selection in obtaining farmers for the model and it was argued 
that there is an affinity for the company to attract farmers who seek to diminish their risk by 
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creating a situation in which they earn fixed incomes. The level of income the farmer desires 
as well as the amount the farmer would demand not to farm, would according to Stigler 
(1976) be a function of these farmers utility. That is some farmers would require more to give 
up their autonomous management rights on their farms, while other farmers would only 
require a certain level of income and not be to perturbed by giving up their autonomous 
management rights. It is this adverse selection then that opens the possibility for post-
contractual opportunism in the form of moral hazards. 
This was shown by the case of the rent where the farmers have the incentive to overstate both 
the quality of their land as well as management ability which resulted in many cases where 
the company were paying rents way above the soils productive capacity. If rent is viewed 
purely as an input into production54 for these corporate farms then one could assume that 
there could be optimal proportions of land used in the production of outputs as such the rent 
being paid out would have a negative impact on the allocative efficiency if this amount is too 
high. These moral hazards seem to be imbedded in the fact that the agent and his utility 
function will have pre-contractual imperfect information as to their true expectations from 
and motivations for joining the model.  
These moral hazards were perpetuated by the difficulty in effectively monitoring costs55 and 
amoral behaviour. These moral hazards were highlighted throughout the discussion 
particularly in the examples of the on farm employment and the management fee. It was also 
argued that the specialists could have had the incentive for opportunistic behaviour. The 
already complicated process fraught with moral hazard and incentive issues is made even 
more complicated by property rights and the reward to risk. The result for these farms was 
therefore low allocative efficiency and subsequently economic efficiency scores which 
greatly reduced the returns for these farms and therefore for the company. This was shown 
using Spearman’s Correlation Co-efficient, indicating that it is this allocative efficiency in the 
form of fixed costs to the company that limits the returns and therefore metamorphosis of 
owner-operated farms into corporations, and not the inability to specialize as argued by Allen 
& Lueck (1998).  
The commercial farmer is not faced with these moral hazards and is therefore assumed to 
have the incentive to maximize profit by being allocatively efficient. While this data set did 
not contain any owner-operated private farms, it is believed that with economies of size these 
commercial farmers have the ability to access the market and latest technology which would 
increase their technical efficiency. Because of the allocative efficiency the increase in their 
technical efficiency would imply an increase in their economic efficiency, productivity and 
profitability. This could be because it would allow the various specific farmers the ability to 
“specialize” on their own farms where they would essentially act as specialist farm managers 
as such truly using their own farming management abilities. The continuous growth in size of 
                                                 
54 It could be viewed as an input into production because the company can choose how much rent is to be paid 
and which farms they prefer, as is the case with fertilizer and other intermediate inputs where you can change 
the proportions and formulations. 
55 This difficulty in monitoring the actions and behaviour of the farmer as argued by Allen and Lueck (1998) is 
as a result of the influence of both random shocks and weather shocks and this results in the farms not being 
able to specialize in any aspect of their farming. 
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these farms could therefore be as a result of “economies of size” and the desire for these 
farmers to attain these economies of size such that the manager or owner maximizes their 
utility. In other words the good managers grow larger while the bad managers grow smaller 
and exit the industry, Deininger (2011) argues that this is because of the off-farm wage rate 
implying that utility is mainly derived from money and a monthly income. 
Based on these results it would seem then that these farms with “economies of size” being a 
pre-requisite, do have the abilities to specialize in the production of these field crops which is 
an argument used for the owner-operated farm in Allen & Lueck (1998) study. Rather the 
difficulties of the model come into play with the motivational aspects of corporate farming 
which can be seen by the low allocative efficiency scores. In grain production autonomous 
decision making is of utmost importance because of the short cycles involved, this 
autonomous decision making in the corporate setting however is often limited by lengthy 
processes and applications and therefore struggles to alter input and output mixes with signals 
from the market. These stem from moral hazards between the principle and the agent and 
result in low allocative efficiencies for these farms. It is therefore argued that it is these 
inefficiencies that determine the organizational form chosen and not the ability or lack in 
ability of the farmer to specialize.   
There are various limitations to this study, the majority of which stem from the data that was 
used. As a result of the data being collected for management purposes and decisions, the data 
was collected for financial reasons and not for the analysis of efficiency and much more 
information could have been gathered had the data been gathered specifically for these 
purposes. Another important issue with the data was that as a result of the data being only one 
dimensional, the year studied could have been a particularly dry or wet year which could 
have an effect on the results as no time trends can be observed so as to definitively establish 
trends and relationships, which would make the analysis less meaningful. The decision to use 
the data set however was made so as to perhaps find issues with the model, and was therefore 
making the best out of what was offered. Future research might want to include time series 
data as well as data from individual private farms and corporate farms to try and reliably 
replicate these findings and arguments.  
This study is useful as it could be used as a background for studying these various 
relationships and their effects on the tendency for farming to remain in the owner-operated 
organizational form. Future research using a more complete data set containing time series 
could study firstly the relationship between allocative and technical efficiency and land 
ownership of these corporate farms, i.e. does the ownership of land reduce this adverse 
selection and moral hazards enough to improve these farms efficiency? Secondly to what 
extent these “economies of size” affect the farms ability to partake in the market place and 
the effects this has on firstly the technical efficiency of these farms and secondly the 
implications this has on the arguments for the Inverse Relationship? Lastly further research 
might want to analyze the impact of partnerships on economic (and allocative) efficiency, i.e. 
the farmer’s ability to choose optimal levels of inputs or outputs (cost minimizing or profit 
maximizing) for given prices? 
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